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Abstract
This thesis consists of four essays that relate to the design and implementation of effective
competition policy in the fields of cartels and merger control. The first essay contains a new
empirical cartel screen that can be used to detect cartels in market data to increase deterrence.
The second essay uses an experimental analysis to study the determinants of tacit collusion
after the end of cartels and develops policy suggestions to prevent such outcomes. The third
essay provides an experimental study on the use of endogenous fines for cartels to reduce the
harm caused by them by lowering the optimal cartel price. In the fourth essay a new empirical
framework for the ex post evaluation of the effects of mergers and acquisitions in clustered
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The four essays in this thesis in broad terms are concerned with the design and implementation
of effective antitrust enforcement in the fields of cartels and merger control. In principle,
each chapter is self-contained and can be read independently. Yet, at a higher level, they are
connected by two overarching themes. The first is the use of empirical methods to improve the
effectiveness of antitrust enforcement. First, this idea motivates a new screen for the detection
of cartels to increase the deterrence properties of anti-cartel laws. Second, a method is
developed that allows to uncover ineffectiveness in merger control regimes relating to spillover
effects. The second purpose is the use of experimental methods to contribute to solutions to
current problems of competition policy relating to the deterrence of harmful cartel behaviour.
A new empirical screen for detecting cartels is developed in Chapter 2. Cartels screens are
subject to an increased interest both in academia and in the field and complement other
methods of cartel detection with the prospect to enhance the deterrence of cartels. In particular,
they might help to target stable cartels not threatened by leniency programmes and high
fines and improve deterrence by increasing the exogenous risk of detection. For this purpose,
they aim at detecting cartels by discovering suspicious patterns left by collusion in market
data. The new empirical cartel screen detects collusion by scanning for structural breaks that
are induced by cartels in the data generating process of industry prices. Technically, it tests
reduced form price equations modelling industry pricing dynamics for structural instability. It
is applied to three European markets for pasta products, in which it successfully reports the
cartels that were present in the Italian and Spanish markets, but finds no suspicious patterns
in the French market, which was not cartelised. The screen can also be used to date the
beginning of known conspiracies, which is often difficult in practice.
Even if cartels are detected – for example by a cartel screen as the one above – they often
continue to induce welfare damages after their dissolution. These welfare damages can
persist if the industry does not immediately revert to competition but continues to adhere
to the collusive prices and strategies. As such a behaviour rests on a tacit understanding
of the market participants, it is referred to as post-cartel tacit collusion (PCTC). Despite
1
the fact that PCTC can have important consequences on the welfare properties of antitrust
enforcement and has been observed repeatedly in the field, little is known about it. Chapter 3
attempts to tackle this gap and contains an experimental investigation of the determinants of
PCTC, its effects on market outcomes, and potential policy measures aimed at its prevention.
PCTC is found to be determined both by collusive price hysteresis and learning about cartel
partners’ characteristics and strategies. It induces a downward bias in the estimation of cartel
overcharges, which plays an important role in private damage litigation and contributes to the
deterrence of cartels. The results show that this bias increases with preceding cartel stability
such that the most stable cartels might be deterred the least by fines imposed for collusion.
In the experiment, rematching colluding subjects with strangers within a session prevents
PCTC by disrupting the learning process that contributes to the tacit understanding of the
market participants. The findings imply that manager disqualification orders, also known as
debarment, might hold the promise to reduce the welfare damages created by PCTC.
An effective design of competition law might not only prevent the damages caused by cartels
after their demise, but also reduces their harm to welfare while they are active. As one cannot
hope to prevent cartel formation altogether or detect all cartels, a strategic design of fines to
reduce the optimal cartel price can help to reduce their harm too. Such a design of cartel fines
is the subject of Chapter 4, in which experiments are used to study the impact of antitrust
enforcement on cartel price decisions when fines and detection probabilities depend on them.
Expected punishment is imposed that creates two payoff-equivalent collusive price equilibria,
of which one features a lower riskiness of collusion. Subjects are found to behave strategically
in that they choose the equilibrium with a lower riskiness of collusion. This suggests that
competition authorities can exploit the effects of such endogenous enforcement on strategic
uncertainty between cartelists, i.e. the a priori uncertainty about the actions of the other
cartel members, to lower cartel prices. However, frequency deterrence might be reduced as
well such that the overall welfare effects of endogenous fines may be ambiguous.
Ambiguity in effects can also be a problem in merger control. In Chapter 5, the overall effects
of spillovers in multi-market mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are studied to assess the role
that they should play in merger control. For this purpose, a new empirical framework for the
ex post evaluation of multi-market M&As is proposed. Approaches to correct for self-selection
bias and for the estimation of the effects of M&As on clustered and interrelated product
markets are suggested. The framework is applied to estimate the price effects of multi-market
pharmaceutical M&As in the United Kingdom that were cleared by the European Commission
(EC). Results suggest that the case practice developed by the EC might have limited success
only at preventing price increases triggered by M&As. This follows from the fact that spillover
effects can foster market power in markets, in which the market shares and (non-)overlapping
presence in isolation appear unproblematic.
A summary of the results in this thesis can be found in Chapter 6.
2
Chapter 2
A structural break cartel screen for
dating and detecting collusion
2.1 Introduction
1 Recent success of empirical methods used by competition authorities in the Netherlands,
Brazil, and Mexico leading to the detection of several cartels as well as the spectacular case of
the LIBOR market manipulation have increased the interest in cartel screens (Abrantes-Metz,
2014). The purpose of these empirical methods is to detect a cartel by identifying patterns in
market outcomes that suggest collusion. They are meant “not to deliver the final evidence
based on which colluders will be convicted, but instead to identify markets where empirical
red flags are raised and which are worth further investigations.” (Abrantes-Metz, 2014, p.7).
Increasing the detection probability might be necessary to prevent cartel recidivism and to
increase deterrence with respect to potentially more successful and stable cartels (Harrington,
2007).
There are two categories of cartel screens. Structural screens identify markets which are
likely to be subject to cartelisation due to industry characteristics. Behavioural screens detect
cartels by detecting patterns in market outcomes treated as signs of collusion (Abrantes-Metz,
2014; Harrington, 2007). The literature on behavioural cartel screens has grown significantly
in the last decade. Most notable are the contributions of Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) and
Bolotova et al. (2008), who propose cartel screens based on the analysis of price variance in
an industry.
In this essay, a novel behavioural cartel screen is proposed that is based on identifying structural
breaks in the data generating process (DGP) of industry prices that are induced by cartel
activity. The idea to trace structural breaks originating from changes in pricing dynamics
1This chapter is partly based on Crede (2015).
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to detect cartels has first been suggested by Harrington (2008). A DGP characterising
competition is established with a reduced form price equation based on periods characterised
by competition and then used to test suspicious periods for collusion. In the absence of other
explanations for the structural breaks, their existence raises an empirical red flag suggesting
that there might be a cartel and that the market requires further investigation.
In addition to cartel screening, the structural break cartel screen is suitable to date the start
of a conspiracy that has already been detected. This is often an issue in antitrust litigation,
when it is uncertain whether the earliest written evidence that has been found of a cartel
represents the start of the conspiracy.
Application of the new screen is discussed based on three European pasta markets, two of
which were cartelised. Each market has different features, which allows to test the screen
under varying circumstances: the market in Italy featured a cartel and altered industry pricing
dynamics consistent with tacit collusion after cartel breakdown. The cartel in the Spanish
market lasted only 3 months, which renders it difficult to detect its impact on market prices.
The French market did not feature a cartel, but saw prices rise significantly during 2007 due
to a strong input cost shock. Unlike variance-based cartel screens, the proposed structural
breaks screen successfully detects the cartels in Italy and Spain, but does not report a false
positive of a cartel in France. Robustness checks show that the power of the test increases
with the precision, with which the DGP of competition in an industry can be modelled.
2.2 Literature review
Most behavioural screens so far have been suggested for bid-rigging conspiracies, which are
now regularly used in auctions (Porter, 2005). For example, in a study of a bidding ring for
highway-paving construction tasks in New York Porter and Zona (1993) find that while the
lowest bid of a conspirator was most likely to be related to the fact that this firm had the
lowest cost, such a correlation did not exist for the higher bids of other ring members.
In the last decade, researchers began to develop behavioural screens for cartels outside
auctions. Abrantes-Metz and Bajari (2010) and Blair and Sokal (2013) provide an overview
of the different applications of screens for detecting collusion, and Crede (2016) describes
the intuition behind several behavioural cartel screens. In particular one class of behavioural
screens has recently received much attention: variance-based price screens rely on the idea
that the reduced price variance of firms across time or within geographical clusters is an
indicator of collusion.2
Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) find a significant reduction in the price variance for a frozen perch
cartel in Philadelphia between 1984 and 1989 based on a comparison of the price coefficient
of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean) between periods marked by collusion
2This is not to be confused with price dispersion between firms at a point in time (see, e.g. Connor,
2005).
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and competition. Given the absence of changes in costs around significant price reductions,
they are also able to track the collapse of the conspiracy. They further test for geographical
clusters of gasoline retail stores in Louisville, USA, based on the concept of a reduced price
variance indicating collusion. In a similar study, Esposito and Ferrero (2006) find reduced price
variances for two Italian cartels fixing prices for motor fuel and products sold in pharmacies.
A similar but more sophisticated approach is suggested by Heijnen et al. (2015), who test the
Netherlands’ gasoline market for suspicious local clusters with a reduced price variance.
Bolotova et al. (2008) use ARCH and GARCH models to analyse price and price variance
changes of the citric acid and lysine cartels. Finding strong support for the former cartel, only
mixed evidence is found for the latter. The authors provide several reasons that might explain
the lack of robust findings regarding the price variance. Abstracting from the methodological
explanations for this result, they stress that variance-based screens can fail when cartels are
not all-inclusive and do not have full control over the price or abnormal supply or cost shocks
affect market outcomes.
Blanckenburg et al. (2012) test whether the other moments of price change distributions mean,
kurtosis, and skewness of price changes can be used as collusive markers for 11 cartels. They
conclude that only the variance is a robust indicator for collusion. A different conclusion is
reached by Hüschelrath and Veith (2013), who use sequential t-tests to test for changes in the
mean of prices in the German cement cartel to show that with this approach the cartel could
have been detected before it was uncovered by the German competition authority.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 The screen and its identification strategy
Abrantes-Metz (2014) points out two important rules with respect to designing and applying
a cartel screen. First, the screen must be fitted to the industry under investigation to ensure
proper identification. Second, identification further depends on the quality of the data that is
used for the screen. This knowledge must be used to develop an idea how collusion or cheating
might alter market outcomes to use statistical methods to test for significant changes in the
considered market outcomes. These changes are signs of collusion. Harrington (2007) provides
an extensive discussion of these changes, which are sometimes labelled collusive markers.
The existing behavioural screens in the literature exploit the existence of these collusive
schemes to empirically test for specific changes in market outcomes that are assumed to
result from the specific operation of a cartel. For example, the price variance-based screens
assume that cartel activity reduces the price variance potentially indicating collusion. This is
a shortcoming of the existing screens, as they only work in situations in which the cartel shows
the very specific behavioural pattern assumed by the screen. Therefore, their functionality
critically depends on choosing the correct screen for the market under investigation.
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The structural break cartel screen suggested in this essay overcomes the problem of sensitivity
of behavioural cartel screens to the underlying assumptions about cartel conduct by relying
on a more general approach. It merely assumes that a cartel induces a structural break in
the DGP determining industry pricing over time – whether there are reductions in the price
variance, price wars, changes in cost pass-through, more cost increases than reductions, sudden
price increases after cartel meetings, and so on does not matter. The approach of the screen is
to estimate a reduced form equation of industry pricing for the industry under consideration
and control for structural breaks induced by potential cartel activity. This idea is similar in
spirit to the seminal work of Porter (1983), who shows how cartel activity induces regime
switching measurable in market outcomes.
One way to determine the existence of breaks would be to run simple multiple change point
models that test for significant changes in the mean or the variance as before, which is a
more sophisticated way to implement existing approaches in the literature. However, such an
approach has high risks of both type I and type II errors, as it cannot evaluate whether (no)
changes in the price are unproblematic outcomes under competition or changes of the DGP
arising from cartel activity.3 Therefore, a regression-based approach to detect structural breaks
is proposed that controls for all factors that should govern price changes under competition
in a reduced form price regression, such that unexplainable price shifts can be attributed to
cartel activity. Thus, the regression-based approach relies on fewer assumptions to identify
cartel behaviour than the established methods.
Reduced form price equations are an established and the most common approach to estimate
cartel overcharges in antitrust litigation (Brander and Ross, 2006; Nieberding, 2006; Baker and
Rubinfeld, 1999). Advantages of this approach are its simplicity of use and its limited demands
towards data compared to full demand and supply systems. Like these systems, reduced
form equations explain price changes with supply and demand shifters as well as variables
capturing changes in the market structure. Yet, unlike full structural systems, no instruments
are needed for the identification of separate demand and supply equations (see, e.g. Davis and
Garcés, 2009). The coefficient of an indicator variable flagging the cartel periods measures the
average overcharge generated by a cartel in the dummy variable approach. In case of a cartel
screen, whether and when a cartel exists is unknown, such that cartel dummies or forecasting
cannot be used to identify suspicious pricing.
In case the reduced form price equation captures all demand, supply, and market characteristic
factors that affect pricing in the industry, it can be used for cartel detection. Equation 2.1
shows a reduced form price equation that can be used to detect cartels
∆Pt = α1∆Ct + α2∆Dt + α3∆St + t , (2.1)
3See, e.g. 2.4: without controlling for significant input cost changes faced by the French pasta
industry, price increases in the industry under competition would wrongly be detected as structural
breaks.
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where ∆Pt denotes a price change of the industry under consideration in period t, Ct and Dt
are vectors of exogenous supply and demand shifters, St is a vector of market characteristics,
and t denotes the model error.4 All variables are included in the form of the first difference
to ensure stationarity and prevent spurious results.5 As a result, the model describes the
short-run relationship between the price and its shifters. First-differencing is a transformation
of the data that incurs some loss of information because it removes undesired (unrelated)
deterministic trends and unit roots. As such, it is not equivalent to reduced form equations
of the price based on its absolute or demeaned value. Yet, in terms of the identification
strategy of the screen this makes little difference provided that the DGP is specified correctly
in each case. The screen detects a cartel from a significant relative change in the DGP –
irrespective how exactly the DGP looks like – but not from specific absolute parameter values
that describe it.
The choice of the specification should be driven by priors derived from an understanding of
the industry under investigation. These priors relate to the selection of essential price shifters
and, e.g. the inclusion of reasonable lags and leads that mirror reported dynamics of cost pass-
through in the industry. These priors dictate the boundaries in which the specification of the
DGP can be modelled based on a reasonable fit of the data. If available, priors relating to the
signs of the coefficients or the functional form of the specification derived from an underlying
structural model of the industry provide further guidance (see, e.g. Baker and Rubinfeld,
1999). While sensible tests of the robustness of the specification vary by application, testing
the screen’s robustness to the inclusion of price shifters with limited theoretical importance or
statistical significance strengthens the credibility of the results.
Before a cartel forms, the price changes are determined by a DGP of competition. In this
situation, the coefficients show the relationship between the regressors and the price changes
in the industry when it is characterised by competition. A cartel that affects prices induces a
structural break in the DGP of competition resulting in a bad model fit and sudden instability
of coefficients during the cartel periods. Thus, the structural break cartel screen tests whether
there are significant fluctuations of model parameters in the DGP of competition as identified
above over time. The hypothesis H0 and alternative hypothesis H1 that are tested are
H0 : αt = α and H1 : αt 6= α for t = 1, . . . , T, (2.2)
where αt denotes the full vector of all coefficients at any point of time and α is a vector
containing the corresponding whole-sample averages of the coefficients. Suitable methods to
test the hypothesis in Equation 2.2 are introduced below. These tests provide only a single
p-value for the stability of coefficients in the whole sample.
The screen incorporates testing for many different collusive technologies. Any successful
4This implies that, e.g. the cartel does not strategically alter its input costs (see, e.g. Mueller and
Parker, 1992) leading to endogeneity of some of the variables. I am thankful to Daniel Rubinfeld for
pointing this out.
5Further differencing of the variables needs to be conducted in case a first difference is nonstationary.
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attempt of a cartel to affect prices creates a structural break that theoretically can be picked
up by the screen. For example, sudden price increases increase residuals significantly and
might lead to arbitrary fluctuations of coefficients provided that the price changes cannot be
explained by the factors that usually induce price changes. Similarly, a cartel that links prices
to a certain input good creates a significant change of the coefficient of the corresponding
regressor in the regression. A reduced price variance due to collusion in turn should point
to a structural break because price changes are predicted based on the DGP of competition
leading to increased residuals.
2.3.2 Selection of suitable structural change tests
Dozens of structural break tests can be found in the literature, because “[...] there are infinitely
many conceivable ways of deviation from the null hypothesis of structural stability.” (Zeileis
et al., 2005, p.100). Most of these structural change tests are designed against a specific H1
hypothesis and feature the highest power against these specific alternatives rendering them
too restrictive to be used for the cartel screen. Examples include tests for parameter constancy
against the alternative hypotheses of a single shift (Andrews and Ploberger, 1994; Andrews,
1993), random walks (Nyblom, 1989), and unit roots (Zivot and Andrews, 1992).
For brevity, the discussion of the relevant literature on structural breaks is limited to seminal
articles and recent fluctuation-based test introduced below that have been developed for
linear models, which can be applied to reduced form equations and are flexible in application
with favourable properties for the tasks at hand. As such, this selective literature review
does not cover the enormous amount of work that the field of structural instability generates
every year. First, in favour of a flexible approach specialised methods for specific applications
such as cointegrated models, long memory processes, trending variables, unit roots, or
heteroskedasticity are not discussed. Second, this focus excludes, e.g. non-linear and threshold
models, Bayesian, bootstrap or non-parametric methods, and methods relating to the GMM
framework.6
A suitable methodology for a cartel screen that has to deal with unknown forms of structural
instability is the generalized fluctuation test framework that “includes formal significance
tests but [...] the techniques are designed to bring out departures from constancy in a graphic
way instead of parameterizing particular types of departure in advance and then developing
formal significance tests intended to have high power against these particular alternatives.”
(Brown et al., 1975, pp.149-150). Kuan and Hornik (1995) show that the different fluctuation
tests can be combined in the generalized fluctuation test framework. Fluctuation tests test
for parameter consistency against the alternative of non-constancy, i.e. they do not rely on
any assumption about the type of structural break – may it be triggered by one or several
structural breaks, or different sources of departure from constancy. Further, they do not
require any assumption with respect to the date(s) of the structural break(s).
6The interested reader is referred to Aue and Horváth (2013), Andreou and Ghysels (2009), and
Perron (2006) for more general recent overviews over the literature.
8
To assess whether coefficient fluctuations are significant, the fluctuation tests calculate a
functional called an empirical fluctuation process (EFP), which captures the parameter
fluctuations in the data window. The EFP is then compared to a benchmark to assess the
stability of the coefficients. In case of parameter constancy, the EFP converges to a functional
central limit theorem. Yet if fluctuations are too large, no such convergence exists and the
null hypothesis of no structural instability is rejected. Fluctuation tests provide both formal
significance tests for the H0, i.e. a single hypothesis test of Equation 2.2 for the existence of
fluctuations in the sample, as well as allow for a graphical inspection of the EFPs. While the
former provides an easy-to-interpret and familiar procedure to determine whether there are
structural breaks, the latter enables the econometrician to gain information on its dates and
lengths.
Different fluctuation tests exist, which vary with respect to the construction of the EFPs
and feature different approaches to test the H0 of constancy of parameters. While no test
is dominated by any other test under all circumstances, the OLS-based cumulative sum
(OLS-CUSUM ) and the moving sum (OLS-MOSUM ) residual-based tests as well as the
Moving Estimates (ME) parameters-based test introduced below in many circumstances have
high statistical power in the presence of either one or several structural breaks (Kim, 2011).
For a more in-depth discussion of the approaches, the interested reader is referred to Kuan
and Hornik (1995).
The first test used is the residual-based OLS-CUSUM test by Ploberger and Krämer (1992)
with the improved alternative boundaries suggested by Zeileis (2004). It outperforms the
OLS-MOSUM test when there is a single break, features good finite sample properties, and is
suited well to detect relatively short-lasting structural instability (Chu et al., 1995a). Starting
from an initial data window at the beginning of the sample, the OLS-CUSUM test sequentially
tests the data for structural breaks based on the cumulative sum of residuals. In period t, the
model is calibrated for periods 1 until t − 1 that serve as the benchmark and an expected
value of the dependent variable is predicted for period t. If the regression parameters are
constant across time, the residuals should fluctuate around zero. If, however, there is structural
instability, the residuals systematically increase. The OLS-CUSUM test statistic is based on
the accumulation of these residuals, such that the structural instability results in the test
statistic to systematically drift away from zero. If this drift crosses a boundary determining
whether fluctuations are significant, the test finds evidence for structural instability.
Instead of relying on a growing window of observations like the OLS-CUSUM test, the OLS-
MOSUM test is based on a window of fixed width that is sequentially “moved” through the
whole sample to calculate the moving sums of OLS residuals. It reports structural instability
when the sum of the residuals in the data window exceeds a boundary. As it is only based on
a window of the sample that changes across time, it detects multiple structural breaks faster
and with a higher power than tests based on a growing window such as the OLS-CUSUM
test (Chu et al., 1995a, p.603). For example, Chu et al. (1995a, pp.610-611) show that the
OLS-MOSUM test has a higher power than F-based tests or CUSUM tests when there are two
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structural breaks. Further, it outperforms F-tests in many other circumstances, in particular
if they rely on wrong alternative assumptions (Chu et al., 1995a, p.612).
In contrast to the OLS-CUSUM and OLS-MOSUM tests, which are based on the fluctuation
of the residuals, the ME test of Chu et al. (1995b) extends the analysis to the fluctuations
within all regression parameters. As such, an EFP can be observed for each coefficient. This
makes the ME test an attractive choice, because it allows to gain inference about the source
of a structural break, i.e. which coefficients in the model are subject to structural instability.
Further, unlike the residual-based tests, the ME test is sensitive to orthogonal shifts of the
mean regressor (Zeileis, 2005; Chu et al., 1995a; Ploberger and Krämer, 1992).7 The ME
test measures the fluctuations of coefficients by comparing the moving-window estimates to
those based on the whole sample to pick up structural breaks. As such, it has approximately
constant detection probabilities across time and can detect several structural changes.
While the fluctuation tests above are useful for determining the existence of structural breaks
in the data, the approach suggested by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) is better suited to
determine the number of breaks as well as their dates.8 This follows from the fact that
information about the number and dates of structural breaks determined with the generalized
fluctuation tests are obtained from a graphical inspection of the EFPs. This does not always
allow to identify a precise date of a structural break.
Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) develop a procedure to determine the number of breaks as
well as the optimal breakdates within a regression. They propose an algorithm based on
dynamic programming to determine the number and dates of structural breaks in the estimated
regression. The structural breaks are simultaneously obtained based on the global minimisation
of the sum of squared residuals (RSS). Selection of the number of breaks is carried out by
sequential checks of optimal single break partitions (for details, see Bai and Perron, 2003).
The approach requires assumptions similar to those required by the generalized fluctuation
test framework, i.e. detrended and stationary variables are required, lagged (dependent)
variables can be included, and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (between segments) is
allowed provided that consistent estimators are used. Thus, we can comfortably apply the
approach of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) for dating structural breaks to the same specification
used for the generalized fluctuation tests.
Their approach computes the RSS for models based on different numbers of segments in the
data. Increasing the number of segments towards their true number leads to a significant
reduction in the overall RSS. Yet, assuming more than the true number of segments does
not induce a further significant reduction in the RSS. Similar to the bandwidth in the OLS-
7Another estimates-based test is the Recursive Estimates (RE) test of Sen (1980) and Ploberger
et al. (1989). Here, the ME test is preferred, as unlike the RE test it provides non-parametric estimates
of the corresponding mean functions (Kuan and Hornik, 1995, p.136). Further, it usually has higher
power than the RE test when there are multiple structural breaks (Chu et al., 1995b, pp.713-714).
8Carlton (2004) and Boswijk et al. (2016) apply the methodology of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) to
date cartels as well, albeit based on different econometric approaches and to answer different research
questions – I am indebted to Maarten Pieter Schinkel for pointing this out.
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MOSUM and ME tests, the econometrician needs so specify a minimal segment width in
this test. Different information criteria are considered to assess how many segments (and
therefore structural breaks) are in the data. Simulations of Bai and Perron (2003) show that
the different information criteria to different degrees might struggle to establish the existence
of structural instability. For the purpose of the screen, the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC) is suited best.9
Due to the potential problems in determining the existence of any structural instability in the
dating approach of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003), for screening it can be used in conjunction
with the generalized fluctuation tests. The existence of structural instability should be
determined with the generalized fluctuation framework. If one or several structural breaks
have been found with different tests from the framework, the approach of Bai and Perron
(1998, 2003) can be used to establish the number and dates of the breaks based on the BIC
criterion. This approach combines the strengths of both methodologies and reduces the risk
of type I errors.
2.3.3 Estimation procedure and choice of specifications
In the following, the application of the cartel screen is discussed, i.e. how the reduced form
price equation has to be combined with the structural break tests to ensure correct inference
of the new approach. Chu et al. (1996) provide a useful list of aspects with respect to factors
that determine the power of fluctuation tests. First, their precision depends on how accurately
the DGP is estimated: the better the fit of the model, the higher is the chance to pick up a
structural break. Second, chances of detecting a structural break increase with the magnitude
of the structural break (i.e. the change of the DGP) and the induced parameter change in the
model. Third, shorter windows in the OLS-MOSUM and ME tests, i.e. a smaller bandwidth
h, lead to a faster detection of breaks but longer windows have better finite sample properties.
It is not known which bandwidth performs best. However, it can be small if the data set is
large, but should be increased in small data sets.
The specification should be determined based on competitive periods only to identify a
valid DGP characterising competition in the industry. For this purpose, the suggested
fluctuation tests can be used by regressing the dependent variable on a constant to assess
when sufficient changes in the DGP might occur. This check can be supplemented by the
structural break dating methodology suggested by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) to determine
the breakdate. Further, if data on unaffected industries in other regions/countries is available,
these regional benchmarks can be used to determine the point of time from which the market
under consideration was subject to different pricing dynamics.
To improve the finite sample properties of the estimates given the limited number of ob-
servations available in growing or moving windows, the inclusion of regressors should be
9The BIC does not perform well when there are no structural breaks present by overstating the
true number of breaks in the data, but performs well in the presence of structural breaks.
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parsimonious. This also prevents the risk of overfitting in the model from affecting inference
in the structural break tests. The rule here is as many regressors as necessary, but as few as
possible. Lagged regressors as well as lagged dependent variables are allowed and a compromise
between goodness of fit and number of included lags has to be made. Priors do not only guide
the inclusion of variables into the specification, but also the decisions which lags to use. The
parsimonious lag structure of the variables should further be adapted to achieve a good fit of
the data. The better the DGP can be modelled, the higher the power of the structural break
tests. As such, the specification is not either correct or wrong. Lag specifications that differ
from the true specification but capture some of the correlations that determine the DGP can
result in the screen to work reasonably well albeit with less power.
The regression model must not feature any endogenous regressors, such that appropriate
corrections need to be conducted if deemed necessary. Further, all variables need to be
detrended if necessary and then checked for stationarity.10 These steps are necessary to
prevent spurious relationships from biasing the estimates and “exploding” variances to affect
the statistical inference.
Seasonality needs to be removed from the data to ensure correct inference. While different
methodologies exist to remove seasonality, the seasonal-trend decomposition procedure based
on non-parametric loess smoothers (STL) by Cleveland et al. (1990) is used here. A strength
of this approach is that it allows for a robust estimation of seasonality that is not biased by
aberrant behaviour of the data, as can follow from the effect of cartels on prices. Removing
rather than modelling seasonality is necessary for the screen, as the growing or moving data
windows do not allow for a robust distinction between seasonality and cartel price changes.
To reduce the risk of type I errors, the OLS-MOSUM and ME tests are used with multiple
bandwidths and it is only concluded that breaks are present if the majority of tests point
towards structural instability. First, this ensures that the bandwidth choice does not drive
the results. Second, this tackles potential convergence issues of the structural break tests:
given that the power of the tests critically depends on the size, number, and type of structural
breaks, no clear guideline can be provided on their convergence properties, although the
tests tend to perform reasonably well for a sample size of 100 observations (see, e.g. Kim,
2011; Kuan and Hornik, 1995). Further, such handling of the results in a pre-defined and
planned way addresses potential multiple comparison problems without relying on potentially
problematic corrections of p-values.11
10Tests for unit roots have to be chosen carefully. Structural breaks in the time series can be
misinterpreted as nonstationarity by Augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests. An often
suitable unit root test is proposed by Zivot and Andrews (1992), which tests for unit roots against the
alternative of a structural break.
11This approach is suitable because the p-value comparisons are few in numbers only and comple-
mentary. Further, as the tested p-values are strongly and positively correlated with each other, many
approaches to adjust p-values to address multiple testing are likely to produce misleading results by
being overly conservative. The fluctuation tests used here tend to be conservative reducing the risk of
Type I errors (Kuan and Hornik, 1995).
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Segment widths for the dynamic programming algorithm to date breaks by Bai and Perron
(1998, 2003) should be smaller than window widths of the fluctuation tests. If the distance
between two breaks in the data is smaller than the minimal segment width defined for the
algorithm, correct inference on the number and exact dates of the breaks is not possible. This
is discussed in greater detail in Section 2.4.4.
2.4 Application: European pasta industries
2.4.1 The industry
As an application, the structural break cartel screen is used on the pasta industries in Italy,
Spain, and France based on monthly data between 2003 and 2012. While the former two were
subject to cartels between October 2006 to March 2008 and July to October 2007, respectively,
the latter did not feature any cartel (Notaro, 2014; Ordóñez-de Haro and Torres, 2014). As
such, we would expect a properly working cartel screen to detect cartels in Italy and Spain, but
not to report structural breaks in France. Cartel formation in Italy and Spain was triggered
by significant price increases in the main input good in pasta production – durum wheat –
during 2006 and 2007.
These markets represent useful cases to test the screen under difficult conditions: In Italy,
potential post-cartel tacit collusion might have prevented a clear breakdown of the DGP of
collusion. In Spain, the cartel lasted only for three months, providing few observations only to
detect collusive behaviour. In France, market prices rose significantly due to a strong durum
wheat cost shock in the absence of a cartel. Absent significant changes in supply, demand,
and market characteristics across countries, differences in the reaction of markets to common
supply shocks allow for a preliminary analysis of market prices to the cost shock.























































Notaro (2014) discusses the Italian pasta cartel in detail and estimates the average overcharge
to be around 11 % of the price under competition. The cartel covered 76% of the market (90%
if private labels produced by the cartelists are included). Market coverage of the Spanish
cartel was less complete with a joint market share of 55-60% including private labels produced
by the cartel members (Spanish Competition Authority, 2009). Between May 2006 and May
2008, the price charged by the producers to retailers in Italy increased by about 51.8% (Italian
Competition Authority, 2009). Using a dynamic treatment effects analysis Notaro (2014)
shows that the observed cost changes including the significant price increases for durum wheat
could not explain the price increases for pasta. In addition, he argues that the market was
characterised by a significant level of tacit collusion after breakdown of the cartel.
Figure 2.1 contains the cumulative price changes in % between 2000 and 2012 in the pasta
price indices of Italy, Spain, and France (International Pasta Organisation, 2012).12 While the
prices of pasta develop similarly in the three countries before 2007, the indices rise significantly
further in Italy and Spain than in France. While the pricing of the French industry suggests
competitive price increases due to the common input cost shock of around 30%, prices at
times rose by up to 82.1% and 48.9% in Italy and Spain. The pronounced price differences
between the Italian and Spanish pasta indices compared to French prices after breakdown of
the cartels are hard to explain by potential changes in the industry structures.
2.4.2 Specification of the DGPs of competition
In the first step in the application of the screen, models describing the markets’ DGPs of
competition are established based on periods assumed to be characterised by competition.
The strong dependence of pasta prices on few input goods renders the industry suitable for an
analysis with the proposed cartel screen: Notaro (2014) reports that domestic and imported
durum as well as labour and energy costs represented 73% and 77% of the total direct costs
and 54% and 60% of the total costs of the Italian pasta industry in 2006 and 2007.
In the following, five cost shifters are used together with a demand shifter for the screen. All
variables are detrended and included as first differences to achieve stationarity. Augmented
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests for unit roots confirm that all variables are stationary
at a 1% significance level. A potential caveat of the analysis below is the absence of variables
that control for market characteristics due to a lack of data. Thus, the assumption is imposed
that market characteristics in the industries under consideration were roughly stable across
time which should be likely given the short time window included in the analysis.
12Figure 2.1 presents cumulated price changes instead of the absolute price levels to simplify the
graphical comparison of commonalities and differences in the trends. Otherwise, the time series would
lie further apart in (absolute) values because of different base years and require a scaling of the vertical
axis that makes it harder to visually derive information from the Figure. Further, this renders it easier
to observe how long and pronounced certain price levels persisted compared to the price changes that
are used in the empirical analysis and which are displayed for the Italian market in Figure 2.4.
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Denote Domestic durum and International durum as the domestic and international durum
price indices. The domestic durum wheat prices capture the majority of actual costs of the
main input good in pasta production. The domestic prices are usually fixed in contracts
between suppliers and customers for several months in advance. The international durum
price measures both import prices and expected price changes of durum wheat. Further,
let Labour costs, Energy, Energy sq., and Borrowing costs denote the Italian price indices
for industry labour, (squared) energy costs, and costs of borrowing capital for companies.
Expenditure measures household expenditure on goods to approximate demand fluctuations.
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 in the appendix contain descriptions, sources, and descriptive statistics of
all variables used in the analysis.
The optimal specification for a DGP that characterises competition in the industry must
be determined based on unsuspicious, non-collusive periods only. An inspection of the
pasta industry prices in Figure 2.1 shows that prices increase significantly during 2007
suggesting that these periods should be excluded to establish the specification. Further,
regressing price changes on a constant and testing for parameter instability with the structural
break tests indicates changes in the average price changes in the mid of 2007 for all three
countries. Therefore, only periods before 2007 are considered for the estimation of the DGPs
of competition.13
The pasta industry is not characterised by contemporaneous cost pass-through, as input prices
are often determined by fixed contracts several months in advance. The three national pasta
industries are characterised by different market characteristics and are dominated by different
firms. As such, their DGPs of competition are characterised by divergent lag structures.
Parsimonious lag structures are used that in each case provide the best fit given the priors for
the observed pricing dynamics.
While not all supply and demand shifters are always significant, they are included due to
their theoretical importance for prices as well as the fact that they might become significant
determinants of price changes outside the time frame used to determine the DGP of competition
to prevent potential omitted variable bias. No lagged dependent variables are included in any
of the regressions, as there is neither a theoretical reason to do so in the pasta industry nor are
there observable patters of price changes that would suggest an inclusion. The specifications
of the different DGPs of competition can be found in Table 2.1.
In line with theoretical expectations the coefficients of all significant (non-squared) cost
and demand shifters are positive. The results are robust to different functional forms. The
estimates in Table 2.1 are not used for the analysis. They are merely used to establish the
lag structure that is later tested for stability with the structural break tests and for various
specification tests.
13For Italy, only the periods prior to the cartelisation of the industry in October 2006 are used. Yet,
this exclusion restriction has no effects on results, as the cartel did not influence market prices before
June 2007.
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Table 2.1: Specification of DGPs of competition
Italy Spain France
Domestic durum 0.017∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.012) (0.032)
4 3 4






Labour costs 0.012 0.069 2.791∗
(0.011) (0.053) (1.425)
0 2 5
Energy costs 0.175∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.061) (0.103)
3 1 6
Energy costs sq. - - −0.209∗∗∗
(0.045)
6
Borrowing costs −1.114 −0.911 3.967∗∗∗
(0.692) (0.551) (1.340)
2 4 1
Household expenditure 0.000 0.140∗ 0.414
(0.000) (0.083) (0.412)
4 6 2
Adj. R2 0.373 0.486 0.523
Observations 42 43 46
Notes: The dependent variables are the domestic producer prices for pasta products. All
variables are included as first differences. The first row for each variable features the
coefficient, with ***, **, and * showing significance of the coefficient at a 1%, 5%, and 10%
significance level. The second row contains the (robust) standard errors in brackets. The
third row indicates which lag of the variable is used with 0 denoting the contemporaneous
value.
Heteroskedasticity is suspected for the Spanish market, such that heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation-robust standard errors are reported throughout the analysis for this market.14
The Italian and French markets show no signs of either heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation
as reported by appropriate tests, such that standard OLS residuals are used for these markets
throughout the analysis. The careful use of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent
14This does not affect results of the structural break tests in Section 2.4.3. Using unadjusted
covariance matrices for the structural break tests in the Spanish test rather than HAC-consistent
matrices provides p-values of 0.006 for the OLS-CUSUM test, 0.010, 0.013, 0.021, 0.021, and 0.023 for
the OLS-MOSUM tests with window widths of 15%, 20%, 25%, and 30%, and p-values of 0.01 for all
ME tests based on the same window widths.
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covariance matrices is necessary, as samples in the growing or moving windows in the fluctuation
tests typically are small. This ensures that poor asymptotics in small samples do not lead to
significant biases in the covariance matrices leading to wrong inference (Wooldridge, 2012;
Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
Seasonality is only detected in regressions for the French pasta industry, whereas no seasonality
is present in those for the Italian and Spanish markets. Therefore, the seasonality in the
French data is removed with the nonparametric STL deseasoning approach by Cleveland et al.
(1990). Ramsey’s RESET test results for all regressions indicate that the linear functional
form is correct (Ramsey, 1969): in case of the French industry, energy costs must be quadratic
such that the functional form of the specification is valid.
2.4.3 Determining the existence of structural breaks
In the second analytical step, the fluctuation tests are applied to the specifications proposed in
Table 2.1 to test for structural breaks in the DGPs identified above. As such, the regressions
are tested for stability throughout all available time periods between 2003 and 2012, which
yields sample sizes of 115 (Spain), 117 (Italy), and 118 (France) observations. The sample
size should be high enough to obtain reasonably reliable inference (in particular because the
price changes are very pronounced between 2006 and 2008, see, e.g. Kuan and Hornik, 1995).
All structural break estimations are carried out in the statistical software package R with the
package strucchange by Zeileis et al. (2002).15
To address potential convergence issues arising from the sample size, all three tests are applied
to all three countries and different bandwidths are specified for both OLS-MOSUM and ME
tests. The choice of the bandwidth parameter h denoting the % of total observations to be
included in the moving windows is no obvious task and requires the researcher to make a
choice. As pointed out in Section 2.3.3, shorter windows increase the sensitivity of the tests
to fluctuations of the coefficients and improve detection of short periods of instability in the
data. Yet, overly small window widths also increase the risk of false positives. OLS-MOSUM
and ME estimates based on smaller window widths might be subject to low power.
Therefore, four window widths h = [0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3] are tested and results across the
different tests are compared with each other. To reduce the risk of Type I errors, we will only
conclude that there is structural instability if evidence for it arises in the majority of the tests.
This also helps to ensure that the manual choice of window widths does not determine the
conclusions drawn from the results.
Table 2.2 reports the p-values for the tested H0 hypotheses of stability of the regression models
throughout time. The results show that there is strong evidence for structural breaks in the
15I am indebted to Achim Zeileis for providing access to a developer version of strucchange that
allows to use HAC covariance matrix estimators for the estimation of empirical fluctuation processes.
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Table 2.2: Break test p-values
h Italy Spain France
OLS-CUSUM - 0.000 0.015 0.755
OLS-MOSUM
0.15 0.010 0.014 0.088
0.20 0.010 0.036 0.043
0.25 0.010 0.050 0.123
0.30 0.010 0.052 0.151
ME
0.15 0.010 0.010 0.034
0.20 0.010 0.010 0.276
0.25 0.089 0.010 0.235
0.30 0.160 0.010 0.212
DGP of pasta prices in Italy and Spain. The ME test merely fails to detect breaks in the
Italian market for large window widths. This might occur if the industry is characterised by
a distinct DGP for few periods only, such that the coefficients in the window insufficiently
capture the changed DGP. Yet, given the strong and largely robust results, the structural
break cartel screen suggests that DGPs changed significantly both in Italy and Spain, such
that price changes were governed by distinct processes at different points in time in these
markets.
A different conclusion arises for the French market, in which there was no cartel. Indeed,
despite the strong and sudden price increases during 2007, most of the tests report that
no structural break is present in the French market. Note that there are Type I errors for
small window widths for the OLS-MOSUM and ME tests pointing towards false positives for
the French market. Nevertheless, given that most results fail to reject the H0 hypothesis of
stability of the coefficients over time, based on the pre-defined rule to interpret the p-values it
can be concluded that the DGP is stable across time in France. Put differently, price changes
in the French pasta industry can be explained throughout time by established patterns of
cost pass-through and the reaction to changes in demand.
The absence of reported instability in France shows the advantage of including price shifters
in the estimated regressions. This relaxes the assumption about constancy of all supply and
demand factors needed for the approach to provide valid inference. As is shown in a robustness
check in Section 2.4.7, the tests would have reported structural breaks if the price changes are
only regressed on a constant controlling for changes in the mean of prices changes over time.
A graphical inspection of the EFPs of the residuals in the different tests can be used to gain
an impression of the structural instability in the models. The EFPs of the OLS-MOSUM
and ME tests for the Italian and Spanish markets are plotted (solid lines) together with the
boundaries of the corresponding 95% confidence intervals (horizontal dashed lines) in Figure
2.2.16
16Results of the OLS-CUSUM tests are plotted in Figure 2.6 in the appendix in Section 2.7.
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For the OLS-CUSUM and OLS-MOSUM tests, these EFPs are functions of residuals from a
model fit on a growing or moving data window. An increasing EFP in a period represents a
decline in the goodness of fit of the model. This results in larger residuals in periods with
structural instability or change that can be spotted in the graphical representation of the EFP.
For the ME test, the interpretation of EFP fluctuations is similar, although it is a function
of the difference between coefficients in the models based on the moving window and on the
whole sample.
The DGP of pasta prices in Italy is stable until the mid of 2006 when the EFP suddenly
increases significantly and crosses the boundary in early 2007. Both OLS-MOSUM and ME
tests point towards a significant instability of the DGP between early 2007 and the mid of
2008, after which the industry reverts to a stable DGP. Yet, as the higher EFP in the ME test
after the mid of 2008 shows, the regression model fitted to the DGP of competition provides
a worse and less stable fit after cartel breakdown, possibly due to post-cartel tacit collusion.
A similar picture arises for the Spanish market.
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As the ME test is a parameter-based test, we can also look at the EFPs of the model coefficients
for, e.g. the Italian market, which are plotted in Figure 2.3. This provides insights on the
sources of instability in the model. In each case the EFP is a function of the difference of the
coefficients of the models fit on the moving data window and the whole period. The difference
between the estimated coefficients gets larger and results in a more positive or negative EFP
the more the coefficient diverge between the two models. This divergence implies a difference
between the two models that is the result of structural instability of the DGP.
On the one hand, the cartel could engage in arbitrary price changes not linked to price
developments of price shifters. As the estimated regression has no intercept, such a collusive
behaviour likely results in instability of all coefficients, and (arbitrary) significant fluctuations
in one or more coefficients. On the other hand, if the cartel links price changes to the
development of specific price shifters, a strong and persistent change for that price shifter can
be expected, while the other coefficients are not subject to strong and arbitrary fluctuations.
































































































The Figure shows that all coefficients are subject to instability starting in early 2007, when
the cartel first affected market prices. However, only the fluctuations in the Labour cost
coefficient are significant, even though – unlike durum wheat – it was not subject to significant
price changes. Taken together, this suggests that the structure of cost pass-through was not
significantly altered by the cartel, but that it engaged in arbitrary price increases.
2.4.4 Dating the breaks
In the third step of the analysis, the dynamic programming algorithm of Bai and Perron
(1998, 2003) is used to determine the number and dates of the structural breaks in the Italian
and Spanish markets. For this purpose, the specifications established in Section 2.4.2 are
20
applied to the whole sample, and the optimal partition into different segments is carried out
by the algorithm.
Similar to the choice of window widths for the OLS-MOSUM and OLS-CUSUM tests, a
minimal segment width has to be chosen manually for the dynamic programming algorithm.
Segment widths should not be chosen too large, as this could negatively affect identification:
if the segment width is larger than the distance between two structural breaks, the breaks
cannot be dated correctly. To reduce the chance that arbitrary choices affect the conclusions
drawn from the results, again different values are tested within reasonable bounds. Therefore,
segment widths of s = [0.07, 0.08, 0.1] are used for dating the structural breaks. Results are
reported in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Dates of structural breaks
s Italy Spain
0.07 6/2007 5/2008 1/2009 4/2007 12/2007 10/2008 5/2011
0.08 6/2007 5/2008 2/2009 3/2007 12/2007 10/2008 5/2011
0.10 6/2007 5/2008 4/2009 7/2007 - 10/2008 5/2011
The results show that the dating algorithm detects three structural breaks for the Italian
industry, and either three or four breaks for the Spanish industry. For Italy, the algorithm
detects a first break induced by cartel formation in June 2007. A comparison of this result
with the cumulated price changes as shown in Figure 2.1 suggests that this break coincides
with the first period when the cartel that came into existence in October 2006 had a first
visible impact on industry prices. Further, industry prices collapsed by about 20% after cartel
detection in March 2008. The dating algorithm dates the breakdown of collusive pricing to
June 2008. The third reported break varies by segment width and captures the point in time
in which the industry entered a state of suspected tacit collusion.
A visualisation for the breaks identified for the Italian market for s = 0.1 can be found in
Figure 2.4, in which the price changes over time are shown by the grey line, and the mean in
each of the four distinct price phases in the industry are shown by the black line. The vertical
dashed lines show the detected structural breaks, and the small horizontal black lines at the
bottom of the break lines represent the 95% confidence intervals for the breaks. Thus, the
cartel screen works well for the Italian market, in which it detects the cartel 9 months before
the Italian Competition Authority learned about it.
The choice of the segment width parameter can affect the dating of a break when the distance
between two breaks is smaller than the minimal segment width. This becomes evident for the
Spanish market. The dating algorithm reports three or four structural breaks for the Spanish
pasta prices. The short length of the Spanish pasta cartel – it lasted only between July and
September 2007 – causes problems for the dating algorithm, as the structural instability is
much shorter than the minimum segment width of the algorithm. Compared to the Italian
market, this leads to less stable break dates across the different segment widths in the Spanish
21


























2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
markets. Therefore, neither the establishment nor the breakdown of the Spanish pasta cartel
after detection can be dated with precision for s = 0.07 and s = 0.08 leading to some arbitrary
results for the exact break dates. These break dates that vary significantly between different
segment widths point to a lack of robustness of the results and should not be considered when
drawing conclusions on the dates of structural instability.
The above result highlights a caveat of the methodology used to date the structural breaks:
cartels need to last sufficiently long enough to enable a proper dating. Only for s = 0.1
does the reported structural break with the start of the cartel, but no break is reported for
its breakdown. However, two breaks that are further apart from each other can be dated
consistently. The first is found for October 2008, when Spanish pasta prices stop to decline
and converge towards the relative price level in the non-cartelised French market. Like Italy,
this might indicate the start of post-cartel tacit collusion in the Spanish market. The second
break is found for June 2011, when a noticeable price decline not existent in the other markets
occurs, after which the price variance in the Spanish market increases. This suggests a collapse
of the suspected tacit collusion in the market ending the resulting price hysteresis and bringing
price variance more in line with the French market.
2.4.5 Comparison to other screens
To highlight the greater flexibility of the structural break screen compared to other commonly
used screens, the coefficient of variation screen of Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) and the GARCH
variance screen of Bolotova et al. (2008) are subsequently applied to the three pasta markets.
As these screens require the user to specify which periods are tested for collusion, in both
cases it is assumed that in all three markets the observations from 2003 to the end of 2006
serve as the benchmark of competition (Phase 1 ). The potential periods of collusion are
divided into two phases: Phase 2 lasts from January 2007 to June 2009 and Phase 3 from
July 2007 to December 2012. This segmentation roughly follows the noticeable patterns in
the prices in Figure 2.1.17
17The succeeding results are robust to reasonable alternative specifications of the tested periods.
22
Table 2.4: Variance test: coefficient of variation
Time period Diff. coeff. of var. (in %)
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 1 to 2 Phase 1 to 3
Italy
Std. dev. 0.920 24.722 3.661
1798.65% 145.94%Mean 101.149 143.100 154.517
Coeff. of var. 0.009 0.173 0.024
Spain
Std. dev. 1.583 14.793 1.955
1272.27% -14.96%Mean 75.198 99.769 99.990
Coeff. of var. 0.021 0.148 0.020
France
Std. dev. 2.018 11.801 2.857
817.09% 49.67%Mean 99.000 115.591 112.684
Coeff. of var. 0.020 0.102 0.025
Table 2.4 reports the mean, the standard deviation, and the coefficient of variation of the price
indices for all three countries and phases. The last two columns report the percentage change
of the coefficient of variation from Phase 1 to Phase 2 and 3, respectively. As variance-based
screens see reduced price variances as signs of collusion, a reduction of the price variance from
Phase 1 to Phase 2 and/or Phase 3 in these screens indicate a “detected” cartel. Yet, the
results show that the variances during the cartel activity are significantly increased in Italy
and Spain. The only sign of potential collusion is reported for post-cartel periods in Phase 3
for Spain.
Results of GARCH-based variance tests in the spirit of Bolotova et al. (2008) are reported
in Table 2.9 in the appendix. They are conducted by applying the same variables and lag
structures as reported in Table 2.1 to the whole sample from early 2003 to the end of 2012.
However, dummies for Phases 2 and 3 are added to the specification to allow for significantly
higher price changes during the suspected periods of collusion. To test for significantly
increased variances, the dummies for Phases 2 and 3 are added to the variance equation as
well to model a changed variance in the periods of collusion. The GARCH models do not
report reduced but increased variances for all three markets both in Phase 2 and Phase 3.
Thus, like the coefficient of variation approach, the GARCH tests do not detect any signs of
collusion. This result is robust to various specifications of the GARCH models.
A potential reason for the variance-based screens’ failure to detect the cartels in Italy and
Spain is that they might require comparably long periods of stable cartel activity. In the
markets under investigation, the cartels were short-lasting and featured steep price rises and
declines, such that measurable reduced price fluctuations based on stable collusion could not
set in.
2.4.6 Extension to monitoring
The cartel screen might not only be used to test past prices for signs of collusion, but also
automatised and extended to monitor incoming data for structural breaks. Monitoring is in
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particular relevant for competition authorities or compliance efforts by companies, which want
to learn about potential collusion in markets so far marked by competition as soon as possible.
Extensions of the fluctuation tests to monitoring have been developed by Chu et al. (1996),
Leisch et al. (2000), and Zeileis (2005). The monitoring variants of the OLS-CUSUM, OLS-
MOSUM, and ME tests essentially work like their variants for “historical” data. Similar
to the historical testing above, monitoring requires a DGP of competition to be defined for
a collusion-free “historical” benchmark. This benchmark is then sequentially compared to
data from succeeding periods as it becomes available. Monitoring tests monitor new data
by comparing the estimates from growing or moving windows to the whole-sample estimates
of the parameter(s) derived from the historical periods. Structural instability results in the
difference between the two (sets of) estimates to exceed a boundary. Once the monitoring
framework has been set up, screening can be conducted automatically and merely requires to
re-run the monitoring test as new observations become available. Additional work or attention
is not required until a break is reported.
Figure 2.5: Monitoring in the Italian pasta industry






















As an example, monitoring is conducted for the Italian pasta industry using the DGP specified
in Table 2.1 and using observations between early 2003 and the end of 2005 as the historical
benchmark. Figure 2.5 shows the EFP of the ME monitoring test with window width h = 0.1.
In the ME monitoring test, the EFP is a function of the differences between the estimated
coefficients in the moving window in the monitoring period and those from the historical
period. An increase in the EFP indicates a growth in the difference of the estimated regression
parameters that results from a change in the DGP in the monitoring period compared to the
historical period.
Starting from the first period outside the historical data periods, structural stability is
constantly monitored. In the example, the monitoring screen would have detected and
reported collusion by July 2007 (i.e. 9 months before the Italian Competition Authority),
which is shown by the EFP of the test (black line) crossing the boundary (horizontal grey
dashed line) representing a 5% significance level.
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2.4.7 Robustness checks
General statements about the robustness of the structural break cartel screen are hard to
derive because of the almost infinite number of possible combinations of types, numbers, and
magnitudes of structural breaks. Yet, one might try to address the robustness in a specific
application by testing how changes in the specification of the DGP affect the results.
Two alternative DGPs are specified as robustness checks. In Constant, the regression consists
of a constant only. The specification controls for changes in the mean of price changes, i.e. to
what extent results might be driven by fluctuations in the dependent variable over time.18
This represents the extreme case of having no price shifters available. In Durum, all variables
other than the domestic and international durum wheat price changes are dropped. This
specification tests how well the screen performs when only the primary price shifters are
available/included but other main price shifters are missing. P-values of the structural break
tests for both specifications are reported in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Alternative specifications of the DGPs – Break test p-values
h Italy Spain France
Specification Constant Durum Constant Durum Constant Durum
OLS-CUSUM - 0.012 0.000 0.130 0.004 0.491 0.395
OLS-MOSUM
0.15 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.041 0.075
0.20 0.010 0.010 0.033 0.013 0.036 0.052
0.25 0.010 0.010 0.077 0.021 0.099 0.139
0.30 0.010 0.010 0.130 0.029 0.131 0.162
ME
0.15 0.010 0.256 0.010 0.113 0.041 0.211
0.20 0.010 0.236 0.031 0.013 0.036 0.207
0.25 0.010 0.160 0.074 0.010 0.099 0.148
0.30 0.010 0.113 0.126 0.010 0.131 0.112
Qualitatively, the results of the specification Durum are mostly in line with those of the full
specification in Table 2.1 indicating a certain level of robustness of the above results: evidence
of a structural break in Italy is less pronounced but still present, whereas there is still strong
evidence for structural instability in Spain and for no structural breaks in France. Therefore,
in the present case, controlling for the main input costs is sufficient to ensure correct albeit
less clear results. A different picture arises in the specification Constant, in which structural
instability is consistently reported throughout all three countries. Therefore, failure to control
for the relevant price shifters would wrongly raise a red flag with potential signs of collusion
in the French market. This highlights the necessity to limit the application of the screen to
cases in which at least the most relevant price shifters are available.
Results of the robustness check might not carry over to other applications. For example, for
price time series that do not feature large price rises during periods of collusion, it is more
likely that incomplete specifications of the DGP result in no detected structural breaks. As
18This approach is very similar to the price-change based cartel screen of Hüschelrath and Veith
(2013).
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pointed out before, the empirical power of the tests is higher the better the DGP can be
modelled.
Table 2.6 reports results of the dating algorithm for the two alternative DGPs intended as
robustness checks. For the specification Constant, the dating algorithm quite precisely detects
the start of price increases induced by the cartel as well as the turning point towards declining
prices after their collapses both in Italy and Spain. In addition, in both cases the end of price
declines towards new market equilibria is dated as well. For the Durum specification, the
algorithm reports a single break only for Italy for February 2009, but no break in Spain.
Table 2.6: Alternative specifications of the DGPs – Dates of structural breaks
Specification Constant Durum
s Italy Spain Italy Spain
0.07 6/2007 6/2008 4/2009 7/2007 6/2008 3/2009 2/2009 -
0.08 6/2007 6/2008 2/2009 7/2007 6/2008 3/2009 2/2009 -
0.10 6/2007 6/2008 5/2009 7/2007 6/2008 - 2/2009 -
Thus, at least in the present application, dating collusion appears more vulnerable to misspec-
ification than detection, which naturally results from greater challenges related to counting
and dating breaks instead of detecting instability per se. In such cases, a graphical inspection
of the EFPs similar to that shown for the full specification of the DGPs in Figures 2.2 and 2.6
of the structural break tests can provide insights on the break dates albeit with less precision.
2.5 Discussion
In the following, advantages and limitations of the screen are discussed. With respect to
limitations in scope, first and foremost – as all behavioural cartel screens – its application
assumes that a cartel has significant control over the market price affecting the DGP. Thus, a
cartel is only detected once it has a significant effect on prices. As a consequence, depending
on the speed and magnitude of the cartel’s impact on prices after its establishment or the
time it takes participating firms to change their pricing strategy after its demise, the screen
might only detect the start and end of the cartel with lags. Second, determining the number
of breaks and the correct dates can be difficult if the break dates are not far apart. Third, in
line with some of the other behavioural screens, it cannot distinguish between explicit and
tacit collusion. Fourth, the screen assumes that at least some data is available about price
shifters, and that unobserved important variables are not subject to significant changes across
time.
The cartel screen suggested in this essay has several advantages compared to other behavioural
cartel screens. The biggest advantage is that it is not based on a particular collusive marker
for the identification of cartel activity – it only requires the cartel to affect industry prices.
Thus, it can detect different collusive technologies which reduces the risk of type II errors
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compared to other cartel screens. In addition, the approach works equally well for both
stable and unstable/short-lasting cartels. Further, the identification strategy is not based
on a manual (arbitrary) choice of time periods that are to be formally tested for collusion.
Therefore, it avoids the problem faced, e.g. in the ARCH-based price variance test of Bolotova
et al. (2008), in which the results of formal hypothesis tests depend on the exact definition of
the time periods to be tested for collusion. Finally, it is not as prone to manipulation as the
established cartel screens.
It is often argued by critics of cartel screens that they are useless because cartels will react
to screening by developing mechanisms that trick the screens. For example, a cartel that
knows that the market is screened with a price variance-based cartel screen could easily avoid
detection by engaging in arbitrary price changes to keep the price variance stable over time.
This problem does not exist for the proposed structural break cartel screen. Any artificial
cartel price increase does alter the DGP. The only way for a cartel to avoid detection is to
engage in many small price increases that would not be detected as significant alterations
of the DGP but being hidden in the margin of error. However, this has very destabilising
effects on collusion rendering such behaviour unlikely to occur, as it reduces the profits from
collusion compared to the (fixed) penalties imposed for the formation of the cartel (see, e.g.
Harrington, 2005, 2004a).
2.6 Conclusion
In this essay a new empirical methodology to detect previously unknown cartels and to date
the beginning and end of cartels is proposed and tested. Based on the idea that cartels change
the DGP of industry prices compared to periods of competition, an approach is presented that
detects collusion by testing the stability of this DGP with structural break tests. Different
structural break tests suitable for this task are discussed and those from the generalized
fluctuation test framework are found to be the most useful for determining the existence
structural breaks in an industry. The approach by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) is suggested
as a useful complement to provide exact estimates of both the number and dates of structural
breaks. In addition to historical testing for breaks, an extension of the methodology to
monitoring of markets is presented.
The new structural break cartel screen is applied to three European pasta industries: the
markets in Italy and Spain were cartelised, while no cartel was present in France. The screen
successfully detects the Italian pasta cartel 9 months before the Italian Competition Authority
learned about the cartel. Despite its short length of three months only, the Spanish cartel
is detected as well. However, the screen cannot precisely date the beginning and end of the
cartel due to its short length. Although the pasta prices were characterised by a sudden and
significant price increase of about 30%, the screen does not wrongly report the existence of
a cartel in the French market. This result follows from the fact that – unlike in the Italian
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and Spanish industries – the price increase in France could reasonably well be explained
by changes in the input costs. Robustness checks suggest that the detection of structural
instability is reasonably robust to the inclusion of additional independent variables, as long as
the main determinants of price dynamics are included. However, the dating algorithm used to
determine the start and end of collusion is more susceptible to the specification of the DGP.
The structural break cartel screen is a useful tool for detecting and dating cartels. While
a conservative econometric approach can reduce the risk of type I errors, e.g. by requiring
different structural break tests to unanimously report a break across different specifications, a
change in the DGP should not be seen as definite evidence of a cartel. Instead, structural
instability calls for a more in-depth analysis of the industry. Only if a supplementary analysis
of the market shows that the change in industry pricing cannot be attributed to other factors
not considered in the econometric model can the screen be seen to provide substantial evidence
for collusion. Further, it should be seen as complementary to the other behavioural cartel
screens. First, it is not always possible to obtain all data necessary for a particular type of
screen. Second, in some situations behavioural screens which are specifically tailored to a
market might provide more compelling evidence based on a technically simpler analysis.
The results show that the development of cartel screens is a promising field of research that
should receive more work. Recent developments in the behavioural cartel screen literature
provide the opportunity to further strengthen antitrust enforcement. Given the new technology
at hand, competition authorities could increase the proactive search for cartels to increase
the risk of detection. This renders collusion less viable and attractive to cartels, and could
complement other efforts to increase deterrence that are not based on the problematic unilateral
increases of cartel fines.
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Table 2.7: Data sources and definition of variables
Variable/Country Source Description
Pasta price index
IT ISTAT Producer price index for industrial products: manufacture
of macaroni, noodles, couscous, base year 2005.
ES INE Producer price index for industrial products: manufacture
of macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar farinaceous prod-
ucts, base year 2010.
FR INSEE Producer price index for industrial products: pasta products,
base year 2010.
Domestic durum
IT, ES, FR EC Durum wheat price in the domestic market, in e/tonne.
This variable is country-specific.
International durum
IT, ES, FR INSEE International price for imported durum wheat, in US cents
/ bushel of 60 pounds.
Labour costs
IT ISTAT Labour costs per full time equivalent unit in the manufac-
turing industry, base year 2010.
ES INE Total wage cost per effective hour of work in the manufac-
turing industry, base year 2012.
FR INSEE Labour cost index including wages and payroll taxes in the
manufacturing industry, base year 2012.
Energy
IT ISTAT Producer price index for electricity, gas, steam and air con-
ditioning supply, base year 2010.
ES INE Industrial price index for electric power generation, trans-
mission and distribution, base year 2010.
FR INSEE Industrial market price index for energy, base year 2005.
Borrowing costs
IT, FR ECB Monthly average interest rate of borrowing capital for non-
financial cooperations with new businesses coverage. This
variable is country-specific.
ES INE Average interest rates for loans over 1 million e to non-
financial corporations.
Household expenditure
IT ISTAT Quarterly national expenditure of households and non-profit
institutions serving households, base year 2010.
ES INE Quarterly final household consumption expenditure, base
year 2010.
FR INSEE Monthly household consumption expenditure on goods, base
year 2005.
Notes: IT, ES, and FR denote the variables for the Italian, Spanish, and French markets. EC
denotes the European Commission, ECB the European Central Bank, INE the Spanish Statistical
Office, INSEE the French Statistical Office, and ISTAT the Italian Statistical Office. Variables are
selected according to being the best available proxy variable for the price shifters between 2003 and
2012.
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Table 2.8: Descriptive statistics
Italy Spain France
Variable Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.)
Pasta price 0.505 -7.20 16.70 0.250 −7.25 10.15 0.075 -12.80 8.73
index (2.692) (1.978) (2.295)
Domestic 0.797 -76.10 105.73 0.976 −62.50 57.12 0.784 -65.80 71.50
durum (19.574) (16.086) (14.809)
International 4.475 -210.10 201.50 4.767 −210.10 201.50 4.064 -210.10 201.50
durum (53.312) (53.668) (53.269)
Labour costs 0.044 -8.68 9.29 0.050 −5.30 4.13 0.004 -0.57 0.26
(5.635) (2.610) (0.143)
Energy costs 0.462 -4.70 4.50 0.443 −7.39 9.26 0.407 -7.60 5.00
(1.558) (1.816) (2.043)
Borrowing −0.009 -0.69 0.29 -0.009 −0.81 0.42 −0.013 -0.81 0.23
costs (0.145) (0.207) (0.147)
Household −19.595 -1374.17 647.48 -0.018 −1.66 2.28 0.002 -1.36 1.23
expenditure (468.154) (1.132) (0.390)
Observations 117 115 118
Notes: All variables are detrended and in case of France seasonality has been removed with the STL
approach of Cleveland et al. (1990). The values are based on the first differences.
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Table 2.9: Variance test: GARCH regressions
Italy Spain France
Pasta Price Equation
Domestic durum 0.018*** 0.045*** 0.021
(0.005) (0.012) (0.025)
4 3 4






Labour costs 0.004 0.084 1.436
(0.009) (0.056) (0.993)
0 2 5
Energy costs 0.146*** 0.040 1.013
(0.036) (0.113) (0.842)
3 1 6
Energy costs sq. – – -0.004
(0.004)
6
Borrowing costs -0.268 – 1.731
(0.606) (1.377)
2 4 1
Household expenditure 0.000 0.249** 0.253
(0.000) (0.124) (0.387)
4 6 2
Phase 2 1.496* 0.787 0.684
(0.832) (0.504) (0.595)
Phase 3 0.0276 -0.2128 -0.134
(0.190) (0.246) (0.372)
Pasta Price Variance Equation
Phase 2 5.294*** 3.531*** 2.136***
(0.432) (0.476) (0.692)
Phase 3 2.710*** 2.282*** 1.251*
(0.341) (0.731) (0.659)
Constant -2.275*** -1.513*** 0.245
(0.241) (0.302) (0.429)
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.017 0.251
Observations 117 115 118
Notes: The dependent variables are the domestic producer prices for pasta products. All
variables are included as first differences. The first row for each variable features the
coefficient, with ***, **, and * showing significance of the coefficient at a 1%, 5%, and 10%
significance level. The second row contains robust standard errors in brackets. The third







1 Post-cartel tacit collusion (PCTC) occurs when firms tacitly collude after an explicit cartel
that they were involved in breaks down. Such PCTC intensifies the negative welfare effects of
collusion and at the same time undermines the deterrence of cartels. Due to PCTC prices do
not immediately return to the level of competition even after the cartel is detected. As a result,
firms continue to earn supernormal profits and the harm induced by the cartel on welfare
extends to post-cartel periods. Moreover, fines that are imposed on detected cartels can deter
collusion only if the fines are based on the conspiring firms’ gains from the cartel. These gains
are estimated as the cartel overcharge and are used by some antitrust authorities to impose
fines. Further, they are also used in private damage litigation to calculate damages awarded to
the cartel customers. PCTC results in underestimated cartel overcharges if the supernormal
markup created by PCTC is not accounted for. This leads to fines that are insufficient to
deter collusion and fully compensate customers. This downward bias in overcharge estimates
is in particular a problem in some of the price-based approaches commonly used in court cases,
in which post-cartel periods are used as competitive counterfactuals to establish the cartel
overcharge (see, e.g. Davis and Garcés, 2009; Harrington, 2004b).2 Despite these important
consequences of PCTC, little is known under which circumstances PCTC might occur, to
1This chapter is based on joint work with my supervisor Subhasish Modak Chowdhury and builds
on Chowdhury and Crede (2015).
2In the last 30 years, private damage litigation related to cartels grew significantly in the United
States. Currently about 90% of all cartel court cases are based on private litigation representing an
important source of cartel deterrence (Lande and Davis, 2008; Wils, 2003). A similar development is
in process in Europe triggered by the European Commission’s Directive on Antitrust Damage Actions
(December 2014).
33
what extent the overcharge estimates may be biased due to PCTC, and how antitrust law can
be designed to obstruct or prevent it. Thus, a better understanding of the determinants of
PCTC and of potential tools aimed at its prevention is vital. This study aims to add to this
knowledge.
PCTC has been observed or at least suspected in various industries and studied based
on different methodologies. Harrington (2004b) provides a theoretical model, Fonseca and
Normann (2012) experimental results, and Connor (2001, 1998), de Roos (2006), Ordóñez-de
Haro and Torres (2014), and Kovacic et al. (2007) empirical observations that point towards
the occurrence of tacit collusion after the end of cartels. Connor (1998) notes that prices
in the citric acid industry did not decline significantly even 18 months after the breakdown
of the cartel. However, it is not certain whether this observation was triggered by increases
in input prices or by tacit collusion. Similar suspicions are raised in Connor (2001) and de
Roos (2006) for the lysine cartel. de Roos (2006) provides two potential explanations for
the lack of post-cartel price reductions in the lysine industry, in which prices actually rose
after the detection of the cartel. It could have been possible that the conspirators learnt
enough about each others’ behaviour through several years of explicit communication and
cooperation that enabled them to collude tacitly. Knowing that communication to dissolve
disputes was no longer possible after breakdown, the firms were particularly careful to prevent
a price war. However, it is also possible that the firms simply continued to set collusive
prices to reduce fines to be paid under the U.S. antitrust sentencing guidelines (that refers to
post-cartel prices to determine the cartel overcharge). Harrington (2004b) shows that firms
have the strategic interest to keep the prices high after cartel detection during litigation, such
that overcharge estimates based on post-cartel prices underestimate the true harm caused by
the cartel. Erutku (2012) provides empirical evidence in support of this idea. Ordóñez-de
Haro and Torres (2014) examine the breakup of several Spanish food cartels that relied on
the signals of trade associations. Significant levels of price hysteresis (i.e. prices remained
high and were subject to a reduced variance) can be observed in most of the cartels after
antitrust intervention. This evidence suggests that the firms may have continued to post
prices based on past signals from their trade associations. Fonseca and Normann (2012)
provide experimental evidence for the existence of tacit collusion after periods of explicit
communication that suggests that the chance of PCTC to arise in industries as well as its
magnitude are negatively correlated with the number of firms in the market. Similar findings
are reported by Kovacic et al. (2007), who empirically study multiple markets that were
engaged in the Vitamins cartels.3
Although these studies provide potential explanations regarding the existence and potential
sources of PCTC, these theories have not been formally tested. This lack of empirical evidence
inhibits the creation of knowledge that can be used to prevent inappropriate overcharge esti-
3Isaac and Walker (1988) are the first to test the effects of communication on coordination after
communication is disallowed in public goods experiments. They find that preceding communication
has a negative but diminishing effect on free-riding in periods without communication.
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mates and the development of policies aimed at preventing or obstructing PCTC. Therefore,
the aim of this study is to concentrate on tacit collusion after periods of explicit communica-
tion,4 and to shed light on the following research questions: (1) Is the existence of PCTC
robust to differences in competition regimes (in terms of fines, leniency programmes etc.)? (2)
What are the determinants of PCTC? (3) What consequences does PCTC have on attempts
to estimate cartel overcharges? (4) Can policy measures be implemented to prevent or reduce
PCTC?
To our knowledge, this is the first study to systematically investigate the driving factors
and related consequences of PCTC as well as possible preventive measures aimed against it.
For this, we carry out a laboratory experiment that allows for an analysis of the marginal
contribution of different market characteristics to tacit collusion in a controlled environment.
Lack of data prevents to carry out a similar exercise with field data. Results show that PCTC
is a robust phenomenon across competition regimes. Learning about other players’ types
through successful cartel formation and collusive price hysteresis are found to be determinants
of PCTC. Further, the downward bias in cartel damage estimates induced by PCTC increases
with the preceding cartel success. Rematching is proposed and found to be a promising
measure to prevent or reduce PCTC.
3.2 Sources of post-cartel tacit collusion
Although an important legal difference exists between explicit and tacit collusion, the standard
theory of collusion does not differentiate between the two. Only recently have scholars begun
to close this gap with theoretical models (Bos et al., 2015; Harrington, 2012; Martin, 2006).
An important function of communication in collusion is that it reduces uncertainty about
present and past actions (Mouraviev, 2006). Throughout this essay, we refer to explicit
communication as communication, and implicit communication as price signalling. Price
signalling enables subjects to express their intention to collude by setting prices above the
market level (see, e.g. Davis et al., 2010; Cason, 1995). Although there are other forms of
implicit communication, signalling with price choices is the only means to express intentions
to collude apart from (explicit) communication in this experiment.
Despite the importance of communication for collusion, the aforementioned empirical evidence
indicates that tacit collusion can be sustained after periods of communication, such that
communication can have intertemporal spillover effects on collusion. It might not only reduce
uncertainty in the period in which it is used, but also in the periods afterwards. Then, PCTC
can be induced through two distinct channels.
First, former cartelists abstain from price reductions in attempts to prevent triggering a
price war that ends collusion (de Roos, 2006). We refer to this source of PCTC as collusive
price hysteresis. Prime examples for this source of tacit collusion are the Spanish food
4Therefore, we are not interested in pure tacit collusion, i.e. collusion established without any
communication (see, e.g. Martin, 2006; Ivaldi et al., 2003).
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cartels observed by Ordóñez-de Haro and Torres (2014). Second, past actions in periods with
communication allow firms to learn about their competitors’ types in terms of discount factors.
This knowledge helps to sustain collusion by reducing the uncertainty about the other cartel
members. Hence, given successful explicit collusion, the perceived profitability of playing
collusive strategies in the post-cartel periods increases. We refer to this effect as learning
in cartels. This argument is provided by de Roos (2006) as one possible explanation for the
observed tacit collusion following the detection of the lysine cartel. More formally, deviation
is an important source of risk to colluders that can only be observed a posteriori. As such, a
firm that considers collusion needs to form subjective beliefs about this risk and incorporate
them into the decision problem. The observed history of play is important and shapes the
subjective beliefs and therefore a firm’s decisions. Ceteris paribus, firms with a longer history
of successful collusion should assign a higher subjective probability to other firms’ actions of
continuing to abide to the collusive agreement. Such belief-updating as a reaction to risk has
been studied theoretically in the context of tacit collusion by Harrington and Zhao (2012)
and in generic multi-agent learning models (see, e.g. Young, 2007; Foster and Young, 2003).
Thus, PCTC might be a function of the preceding cartel success, and markets colluding more
successfully in the past are more likely to engage in and sustain PCTC.
Fonseca and Normann (2012) provide experimental evidence for the effect of communication
on collusion after the end of communication, and point out that the effect’s magnitude depends
on the number of firms in the market. In their experiment, the gains for firms are characterised
by an inverted U-shaped curve and are highest for markets with four firms. Furthermore, they
find that these gains diminish over time. Fonseca and Normann (2014) find a higher level of
cartel recidivism for markets with four firms than with duopolies, as the four-firm-markets
profit more from re-engaging in communication after the breakdown of collusion. These two
studies are the only ones to provide experimental evidence on PCTC. However, they focus on
the link between PCTC and the number of firms in the market. Thus, they neither investigate
the reasons for and consequences of PCTC nor strategies that can be used to prevent it.
3.3 Experiment
3.3.1 Experimental procedure
The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science
(CBESS) at the University of East Anglia, UK. It was programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007) and the recruitment of subjects was done using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The subjects
were allocated into groups of three and interacted with the same two other participants
throughout the experiment (except for a treatment in which subjects at some point in time
with their knowledge are rematched into new groups). We recruited 228 students with no prior
experience in oligopoly experiments. 36 subjects participated in each treatment to obtain 12
independent market observations.5
542 subjects participated in the Fine and the Rematching treatments. Hence, each of them features
14 independent markets.
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Subjects were randomly seated in the laboratory at the start of each session. Each participant
received a printed copy of the instructions, which were also displayed on the computer screen
and were read aloud by an experimenter at the beginning of the session. Questions about
the instructions could be asked in private by subjects raising their hands. The experiment
was comprised of two parts. The first part consisted of a risk elicitation task whereas the
second part was the market game. In the market game, subjects interacted in markets for
20 (30 in one treatment) regular periods, i.e. periods that are played with certainty before
a random stoppage rule applies. To prevent potential end-game effects and to reflect the
infinitely repeated game with discounting, a random stopping rule in the spirit of Dal Bó
(2005) was implemented. After the end of the regular periods, in each period there was a 20%
chance that the experiment ends. Subjects’ understanding of the instructions was tested with
a questionnaire, in which all values used in the questions were randomised across subjects
to prevent example numbers to systematically influence decisions in the experiment.6 An
example of the instructions can be found in the appendix in Section 3.6.2.
Sessions lasted between 25 and 50 minutes and subjects were allowed to participate in one
session only. Earnings in part one were denoted in British Pounds, whereas earnings in the
second part were labelled as “experimental points”. Each experimental point gained in the
market game was converted into £0.15 at the end of the experiment. Payments varied from
£5.63 to £28.90 with a mean of £11.35.
3.3.2 Experimental design
In this experiment three subjects, each representing a firm in a market, engage in homogeneous
goods price competition with perfectly inelastic demand as proposed by Dufwenberg and
Gneezy (2000). This oligopoly market design is similar to that of Gillet et al. (2011) and
is combined with a variation of the “Talk-NoTalk” design of Fonseca and Normann (2012).
We implement a three firm homogeneous goods rather than a two firms differentiated goods
market (e.g. Bigoni et al., 2012), as this significantly reduces the complexity of the decision
making process for subjects as well as the subjects’ learning effects on outcomes. Finally,
triopolies are used because previous studies find that three firms are sufficient to prevent
significant levels of collusion without communication in markets with both price (Wellford,
2002; Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000) and quantity (Huck et al., 2004) competition.
Unless stated otherwise, the experiment consists of four stages. In the first stage, subjects
need to decide whether they would like to attempt to reach a price agreement with the other
subjects in the market. In the instructions, they are informed that in the experiment they
“... may decide to agree with the other firms to set the highest price of 102 and share the
earnings”. On the computer screen, subjects in this stage are asked “Do you want to agree on
prices?” and need to click on option “Yes” to signal their intention to form a price agreement
with the others. An agreement is only reached if all three subjects in the market confirm
6Risk preferences of the subjects were elicited using a risk elicitation task based on Holt and Laury
(2002) before the market game, and an anonymous questionnaire followed at the end of the experiment.
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that they want to agree on prices. If it is reached, a message is displayed that all subjects
agreed to set the price of 102. However, the agreement is non-binding, i.e. subjects are not
required to follow the price agreement. In the second stage, subjects are asked to make a price
decision. Each subject can charge a price between 90 and 102 (integer values only) facing
costs of 90 if she sells the good. Therefore, a subject’s profit equals Price - 90 if she sells
the good and is 0 otherwise (when another subject charges a lower price). If either two or all
three subjects charge the same lowest price, the profits are shared equally. Thus, the demand
is characterised by a computerised buyer that buys either 1 or 0 units from each subject
depending on whether the subject sets the lowest price in that round. Subsequently, we refer
to the price entered by subjects as the asking price, and to the lowest price in a market as the
market price. There are several Nash equilibria in this framework. In one equilibrium two
subjects charge 90 and the remaining subject charges any of the available prices including
90. Alternatively, all subjects charge 91. However, the latter is both the payoff-dominant
equilibrium as well as the unique equilibrium in strategies that are not weakly dominated. In
the third stage, the subjects learn about each others’ prices. In this stage, they also receive
additional information and face further choices that are treatment-specific. In the last stage,
subjects learn their profits in that period.
Figure 3.1: Sequence of the experiment
Stage 1:  
Collusion decision 
 Stage 2:  
Price decision 
 Stage 3: 
Feedback 
 Stage 4: 
Final outcome 
• First 10 periods 
only 
• Yes/No question 
whether agreement 
shall be attempted 
• Info. whether 
cartel formed 
• Price choice 
required 
• Info. on 
price choices 
of all subjects 
• Info. on the 
min. price 
 
• Profits are 
reported 





Figure 3.1 depicts the sequence of the experiment and shows the four stages as well as the
main feedback provided to subjects in each of them. In all treatments (except for the Baseline
treatment introduced below), subjects were told in the instructions that they may agree on
prices in the market game (i.e. the option of communication might or might not be given).
Then they were allowed to communicate in the first 10 periods only – which we call the
Communication phase. Then, without prior notice, the communication is disallowed for the
rest of the game – which we call the No Communication phase. As such, while subjects know
that at some points they might be able to communicate with others with respect to price
agreements, they also know that this option might not always be available.7 The uncertainty
with respect to the possibility to communicate ends at the beginning of period 11 when
subjects are informed that from this point onwards communication is not possible any more
7The word may is applied deliberately as it is defined in the Cambridge Dictionary as “used
to express possibility”. In contrast to other words such as will (“used to talk about what someone
or something is able or willing to do” and can (“to be able to”), the word may does not imply
that communication is always possible. Taken from the Cambridge dictionary, available online at
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/.
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and that previous agreements cannot be detected for the rest of the experiment. This design
prevents strategic behaviour of subjects in the transition from explicit to tacit collusion and
assures that no cheating is triggered by the anticipation of the end of communication in period
10. In one treatment (ExtComm), the Communication phase is preceded by 10 additional
periods in which no communication is possible. An overview of the possibility to communicate
in all treatments can be found in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Communication in treatments
Treatments No Communication Communication No Communication
phase phase phase
Baseline - × ×
Comm - X ×
ExtComm × X ×
Fine - X ×
Leniency - X ×
Rematching - X ×
Periods -9 to 0 1 to 10 11 to 20
Notes : A X indicates that communication is possible in the time periods, and in periods denoted
with × subjects cannot communicate. The dash (-) denotes that in all but the ExtComm treatment
directly start with communication in the Communication phase.
Instead of implementing an exogenously given cutoff point for communication after 10 periods,
an alternative design could have been to stop communication after the first incidence of
cheating or detection in a market. We have decided against such a design for several reasons.
First, both re-emergence of collusion after temporal breakdown as well as cartel recidivism
are common observations in the field. Our design allows us to observe whether PCTC occurs
despite both such forms of interruptions. Second, collusion in the lab has been noted to be very
unstable, especially when it is not based on free-form communication. Removing the possibility
to communicate after the first incidence of failure of collusion would therefore significantly
limit the scope for learning. This would in turn undermine the analysis of learning, one of the
main determinants mentioned in the literature. Third, our design provides a common cutoff
point for all groups as well as all treatments, which greatly simplifies the analysis and allows
for a clean identification of the sources of PCTC. In particular, it allows us to separate the
effects of changing the expected length of interaction in the Rematching treatment introduced
below from the effects of disrupting PCTC by ending the possibility to communicate.
We introduce several treatments pertaining to our research questions:
Baseline: Subjects cannot communicate at any point and each round starts directly with the
price decision in the Baseline treatment. It serves as the benchmark for tacit collusion that
can be obtained without communication. Any difference in price levels between this and the
other treatments in which subjects can communicate represents the effect of communication.
Comm: Subjects can agree on prices as described above for the first 10 periods during the
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Communication phase in the Comm treatment, but not afterwards in the No Communication
phase. This is the equivalent of the relevant treatment in Fonseca and Normann (2012).
ExtComm: In this treatment, the Communication and No Communication phases of the
Comm treatment are supplemented by 10 additional, initial periods without communication.
Subsequently, we do not analyse these initial 10 periods (-9 to 0) but in line with the other
treatments focus on the periods with and without communication that follow. The treatment
is introduced to test whether experiencing competition before communication affects PCTC.
Subjects can learn about the Nash equilibrium in the initial periods and revert back to it quickly
after the end of communication. Furthermore, they might have a better understanding of the
benefits of communication because of preceding exposure to low profits during competition.
Fine: The Fine treatment replicates the effect of an antitrust authority on illegal communi-
cation. Subjects face an exogenous detection probability of 16% if they agree to fix a price
in the Communication phase. This probability is in the range of the estimated detection
probabilities of cartels of between 13%-17% provided by Bryant and Eckard (1991). Detection
is possible either in the period in which the agreement is formed or in subsequent periods
provided that it has not been detected before. Detected subjects have to pay a fine of 5
experimental points irrespective of the number of agreements that they reached before. Past
agreements can only (jointly) be detected and fined once, so additional fines are not possible
unless another agreement is formed later.
Leniency: The Leniency treatment is an extension of the Fine treatment. It implements a
leniency programme by offering subjects the option to report price agreements. This leads to
the immediate detection and to fines of the other cartel members in return for a (partial or
full) reduction of the fine for the reporter(s). If a cartel is formed in the same or a previous
period and so far has remained undetected, subjects can report it after learning about each
others’ prices in Stage 3. Such a fine reduction procedure for leniency applications is standard
in the experimental literature (Bigoni et al., 2012; Hamaguchi et al., 2009). If only one subject
submits a leniency application, she is not fined but the other two subjects pay the full fine of
5 experimental points.8 If two subjects submit leniency applications, both pay only half of the
fine while the third pays the full fine. If all three subjects use the leniency scheme, they all pay
1/3 of the fine. A cartel is always detected if at least one leniency application is submitted,
but subjects are not informed whether the detection occurred due to the exogenous detection
probability or because of a leniency application.
Rematching: The Rematching treatment introduces a mechanism aimed at disrupting PCTC
by targeting its source of learning. Similar to the Comm treatment, here each subject starts
in a group with two other subjects but they are informed that they will be rematched with
8The fine is chosen such that the incentive compatibility constraints (ICC) for the infinitely repeated
games that characterise the incentives to collude in the Fine and in the Leniency treatments are similar
(given collusion on the price of 102, the critical discount factors necessary to support collusion are
approximately 0.66 and 0.68, respectively, if only one subject deviates to price 101 and is the only one
to submit a leniency application).
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two new randomly chosen subjects at some point in the experiment. The point in which
they are rematched is not revealed beforehand; it is announced immediately before the
rematching is carried out. The rematching takes place at the beginning of period 11, in which
communication ends too. This ensures that subjects cannot learn about the types of the new
group members. Hence, any change in behaviour observed in this treatment from period 11
onwards compared to the Comm and ExtComm treatments comes from the disruption of the
effects of learning. Further, from a supergame perspective, this should yield lower rates of
cooperation by reducing the horizon for cooperation itself. The uncertainty due to different
expectations of the duration of cooperation in the supergame may also destabilise collusion.
This treatment is new to the literature. The mechanism in Rematching replicates one of the
indirect enforcement effects that (criminal) sanctions against managers involved in cartels
have on PCTC. Sanctions against cartel managers in the form of imprisonment or debarment,
i.e. disqualification from taking up managing positions in the same or similar industries
after conviction, remove convicted managers from the market. While we do not attempt to
exactly replicate such sanctions, the Rematching has a similar disruptive effect with respect
to learning in cartels. Just as sanctions against managers do in the field, rematching creates
instability in the lab through shortening the expected length of interaction between sanctions.
Moreover, rematching eliminates any knowledge about the strategies and likely actions of the
other subjects, as is the likely effect of removing key managers involved in operating a cartel
in the field. Hence, we regard this mechanism as a preventive measure against PCTC.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Sources of post-cartel tacit collusion
As a first step, we test the existence and determinants of PCTC across the treatments that
approximate various competition regimes. All observations after the 20th period are excluded
from the analysis to prevent potential end-game effects and an unequal sampling of the groups
(towards the end of the experiment) to influence the results.9 We distinguish between the
asking and market prices as defined in the previous section. The market price serves the
whole market in homogeneous goods price competition and is the relevant market outcome
from a welfare perspective. The asking price captures additional information such as price
signalling or failed attempts to collude. This is in particular important for periods without
communication because subjects can signal their intentions to establish collusion by deviating
from the Nash equilibrium and setting a price of 102.
Table 3.2 contains the average absolute margins (Average price – 90) for both the asking
and market prices separated by treatment in the Communication and No Communication
phases. For Baseline, for ease of exposition we include periods 1-10 and 11-20 into the
Communication and the No Communication columns, respectively. As the market prices are
9Given the random stoppage-rule, actual termination varies between the 20th and the 25th period
across sessions.
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the market-clearing prices, they are at least as low as the asking prices in all treatments.
Based on the magnitude of price margins, the ranking of treatments with respect to asking
prices in the Communication phase is as follows: ExtComm features the highest price margins
followed by Comm, Rematching, Leniency, Fine, and Baseline.
Table 3.2: Asking and market price margins by communication possibility
Communication phase No Communication phase
Asking prices Market prices Asking prices Market prices
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Baseline 3.328 3.324 1.925 2.338 3.436 3.600 2.125 2.410
Comm 7.744 4.816 5.958 5.004 6.925 4.968 5.725 5.042
Fine 4.978 4.019 3.508 3.498 4.206 4.229 3.042 3.487
Leniency 5.276 4.784 3.429 4.125 4.595 4.699 3.021 3.888
ExtComm 8.078 4.769 6.533 5.002 5.817 4.979 4.667 4.731
Rematching 6.874 4.730 4.507 4.365 5.238 4.725 2.557 3.232
This ranking coincides with the number of markets successfully engaged in collusion in the
Communication phase. Successful collusion, i.e. a cartel is formed and all subjects abide to
the agreement in a period, occurs at least once in 7 markets in ExtComm, 6 in Comm, 5 in
Rematching, 4 in Leniency, and 2 in Fine. This strong link between price agreements and
asking and market price margins provides a first indication of the importance of collusion for
generating positive margins.
Comparing prices between the Communication and the No Communication phases shows a
strong correlation of price margins across the two phases. Price margins in the No Commu-
nication phase are significantly higher in the treatments with communication compared to
Baseline and the order of treatments remains the same apart from Rematching. The price
margin in the No Communication phase relative to Baseline is an indicator of PCTC, as
it is enabled by subjects’ preceding ability to communicate. Therefore, the occurrence and
magnitude of PCTC appears to be correlated with successful collusion in the Communication
phase. This correlation does not exist in the Rematching treatment. Whereas market prices
in Rematching are close to those of Comm and ExtComm in the Communication phase, they
are subject to a significant decline in the No Communication phase and then are very close to
Baseline. Thus, unlike in the other treatments, PCTC appears to be absent in Rematching.
This provides first evidence of the disruptive effect of rematching on collusion by eliminating
learning that apparently drives PCTC.
The link between PCTC and successful collusion in the Communication phase becomes clearer if
it is distinguished between the markets in which price agreements were successfully implemented
and those in which no such successful collusion occurred. In Figure 3.2, market prices are
separated by treatments and markets are divided into two groups. The group “Successful
cartels” contains the average market prices for markets which successfully established a market
price of 102 based on a price agreement at least once in the Communication phase. The group
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“No cartels” contains all other markets, i.e. those in which the subjects did not manage once
to reach a market price of 102 based on a price agreement. The vertical grey line marks the
last period of communication, and market prices are averaged over two periods.
Note that the particular shape of the price paths in the treatments should be interpreted with
care, as only 2 and 4 cartels are formed in Fine and Leniency, respectively. Yet, while the
data does not allow to assess whether PCTC occurs to a larger or smaller extent in Fine and
Leniency compared to Comm and ExtComm, Figure 3.2 clearly shows that PCTC does occur
in all four treatments. Subjects successfully forming a cartel are able to charge higher prices
throughout the experiment in all four treatments.
For the Rematching treatment, market prices in the No Communication phase are separated
between subjects previously engaging in successful collusion and those who did not. Note
that market prices in Rematching immediately collapse in the No Communication phase
after subjects are matched into new groups. This sudden decline in market prices does not
occur in the other treatments with communication. This suggests that the positive effect of
communication on PCTC is removed in the Rematching treatment.10
We turn to regression analysis to formally test the observations regarding the sources of
PCTC and its absence in the Rematching treatment. This allows us to distinguish the
sources, control for the dynamics, and run analyses that capture the marginal contributions
10As we argue below, market prices recover during the end of the experiment in the Rematching
treatment because of an increased stability of tacit collusion in the Rematching treatment compared
to Baseline. We attribute this stability to the subjects’ preceding experience that a return to collusion
after deviation is hard to achieve after the possibility to communicate ceases to exist.
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of different key determinants of prices. Asking and market prices in the No Communication
phase are regressed on other market outcomes and the results are reported in Table 3.3. To
distinguish PCTC from any tacit collusion that is established by price signalling only, we
include variables aimed at capturing the sources of PCTC, i.e. learning in cartels and collusive
price hysteresis. The regressions are calculated using the random effects model.11 For all
estimations, cluster-robust standard errors based on pairs cluster bootstrapping with 500
iterations are used to account for clustering at the market level. The small numbers of cartels
in Fine and Leniency do not allow for producing reliable treatment-specific estimates. Hence,
we pool them with Comm and ExtComm to estimate average effects for these treatments.
Results based on all treatments excluding Rematching are presented in Columns I and III
using the asking and market prices as the dependent variables. We analyse the Rematching
treatment separately and report the results in Columns II and IV due to the potentially very
different nature of tacit collusion in this treatment. The regressions are based on Periods
12-20 only, such that despite the use of lagged variables the analysis is limited to data from
the No Communication phase.
We include the following independent variables in the regressions. Lag price represents a
subject’s own asking price (Columns I and II) or the market price (Columns III and IV)
from the previous period. Max price others and Min price others contain the higher and
lower of the other two subjects’ asking prices in the previous period and are included in the
asking price regressions only. If both competitors set the same asking price, both variables
contain that price. Inclusion of lags of the dependent and independent variables yields the
autoregressive distributed-lag model, which is a widespread model in applied econometrics to
model dynamics in time series and panel data (Pesaran and Shin, 1998; Banerjee et al., 1990).
Comm, Fine, Leniency, and ExtComm are treatment indicators, with the Baseline treatment
being the baseline category for the regressions in Columns I and III. Therefore, the treatment
dummies control for treatment-specific effects on PCTC that are not captured by any of the
other included regressors. The variable Period measures a time trend.
We include two independent variables to measure the effect of preceding collusion on pricing,
which repesent the two sources of PCTC described above. Lag collusion is an indicator
variable that takes the value 1 if all three subjects charged the collusive price of 102 in the
previous period and is 0 otherwise. Given the ceteris paribus character of the analysis, this
variable measures collusive price hysteresis. No. of successful cartel periods contains the
market’s number of periods of successful cartelisation (i.e. all subjects agreed to fix prices
and did not cheat) in the preceding Communication phase.12 For all treatments except for
11As a robustness check, we have also used the correlated random effects model (Wooldridge, 2010;
Mundlak, 1978). It is less restrictive with respect to unobserved heterogeneity than random effects
models and does not require the random effects to be uncorrelated with the included level 2 variables
(e.g. variables that vary by subject but not over time). The results are reported in Table 3.5 in the
appendix in Section 3.6.1 and are robust to the choice of the estimator.
12In the Rematching treatment, the three subjects in a market in the No Communication phase
come from markets with different histories of collusion. Therefore, in this treatment we use the average
value of the variable across the three markets that the subjects come from. This allows us to control
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Rematching, it captures the effect of preceding cartel success on PCTC and corresponds to
the effect of learning in cartels on subsequent tacit collusion. For the Rematching treatment
the interpretation is different, as rematching has a strong and immediate negative impact
on PCTC. The coefficient of No. of successful cartel periods in Column II shows whether a
subject’s intention to establish collusion with price signalling is driven by preceding experience
of collusion. Our rematching procedure allows us to observe how subjects with a history of
engaging in collusion behave in a new market environment. In Column IV, the coefficient
captures the average collusive experience in the new market and shows how price signalling
triggered by former collusion contributes to market prices. We also include an interaction of
Period with the measure of preceding cartel success, Period × No. of successful cartel periods.
The interaction term measures whether the contribution of learning as proxied by preceding
cartel success deteriorates faster in markets with a stronger history of collusion.
Column I provides strong evidence that collusion in the preceding period has a significant
positive effect on price choices. This suggests that PCTC is indeed partly caused by collusive
price hysteresis, and collusion in the preceding periods increases asking prices in the current
period. The significance and high magnitude of the positive effect of preceding cartel success
on the asking prices provides evidence for the effect of learning in cartels on PCTC. The lack
of significance of the treatment dummies provides support for the intuition that treatment
differences with respect to tacit collusion arise from differences in the formation and stability
of cartels in the Communication phase. In line with the previous analysis, this suggests
that other than through their effect on cartel success, communication between subjects in
preceding periods does not affect prices. Moreover, the insignificant coefficient of ExtComm
shows that our experimental design with respect to the Communication phase followed by the
No Communication phase is robust to experimental learning effects.
The estimates based on market prices in Column III show that the results are robust to the
choice of the price variable and lead to the same qualitative findings. Given these results,
we conclude that learning as proxied by preceding cartel success fosters PCTC through
two distinct channels. First, markets with former cartels inherit supercompetitive prices
that only slowly erode back towards levels of competition due to collusive price hysteresis.
Second, learning about the other players’ types contributes to the existence and stability of
tacit collusion. This result has important consequences for the estimation of cartel damage
overcharges, which are discussed in detail in Section 3.4.2.
Result 1: PCTC is determined by both collusive price hysteresis and learning
about the other players’ types and strategies.
Turning to the Rematching treatment in Columns II and IV, the large positive coefficient
of Lag collusion suggests that collusion is more stable after rematching. It may be because
for the effect of the average level of preceding experience of successful collusion of subjects on PCTC
after rematching.
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Table 3.3: Prices in the No Communication phase – Random effects model
I II III IV
Asking price Market price
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Baseline: Baseline treatment (Std.E.) (Std.E.) (Std.E.) (Std.E.)
Lag price 0.516† 0.539† 0.709† 0.309∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.044) (0.069) (0.096)
Min price others 0.045 0.019 – –
(0.048) (0.085)
Max price others 0.207† 0.099 – –
(0.030) (0.071)
Lag collusion 1.691† 2.647† 2.273† 6.503†
(0.446) (0.687) (0.658) (1.238)
No. of successful cartel periods 0.213∗∗ 0.532 0.271∗∗ 0.427
(0.094) (0.698) (0.127) (0.510)
Period 0.024 0.030 −0.008 −0.019
(0.030) (0.101) (0.026) (0.068)
Period × No. of successful −0.010∗∗ −0.031 −0.014∗∗ −0.013
cartel periods (0.005) (0.046) (0.007) (0.038)
Comm 0.275 – 0.112 –
(0.395) (0.379)
Fine 0.209 – 0.102 –
(0.324) (0.311)
Leniency 0.004 – −0.168 –
(0.268) (0.222)
ExtComm 0.331 – 0.086 –
(0.394) (0.332)
Constant 21.008† 31.419† 26.910† 62.590†
(5.104) (6.130) (6.437) (8.888)
R2 overall 0.714 0.416 0.863 0.595
R2 between 0.961 0.930 0.981 0.939
R2 within 0.140 0.169 0.408 0.396
Observations 1,674 378 558 126
Notes : ∗ 10% level, ∗∗ 5% level, ∗∗∗ 1% level, † 0.1 % level. – Cluster and autocorrelation-
robust standard errors are based on pairs cluster bootstraps with 500 iterations. Columns I
and III contain observations for all treatments except for Rematching, and Columns II and
IV are based on Rematching treatment observations only. Random intercepts are included
at the subject level in Columns I and II, and at the market level in Columns III and IV.
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subjects are aware that re-establishing collusion after cheating is harder to achieve without
communication. However, as collusion on price 102 only arises in about 6% of the observations
in the No Communication phase under Rematching, the magnitude of the coefficient might be
overstated due to unrepresentative outliers. In Rematching, the coefficient of No. of successful
cartel periods is insignificant and implies that the positive effect of learning on PCTC is
eliminated by being rematched with other subjects. This is consistent with the idea that the
information obtained with past successful collusion about competitors becomes redundant
due to a change in group composition. Therefore, the regression results are consistent with
the descriptive analysis above that suggests that PCTC is virtually absent in Rematching.
Result 2: PCTC occurs in all treatments except for Rematching.
However, notice that the coefficient of the interaction term Period × No. of successful cartel
periods is negative. It suggests that the positive impact of learning in cartels deteriorates faster
for previously more successful cartels. For example, in period 11, ceteris paribus, the regression
results in Column III show that successful collusion in 5 periods in the Communication phase
lead to an increase in market prices of, on average, 0.585 experimental points. Yet, in period
15 its effect has gone down to 0.305 experimental points.
3.4.2 Implications for cartel overcharge estimations
We use the “before-after approach” to calculate the damages caused by all cartels formed in
the experiment and study the relationship between preceding cartel success and overcharge
bias. This estimator is one of the most common methods used in the field to estimate cartel
overcharges. The cartel overcharge is established by comparing the price during the cartel
with a counterfactual price under competition from a benchmark period. Three different
variants of this approach are commonly used (see, e.g. Davis et al., 2010; Baker and Rubinfeld,
1999). Pre-Cartel denotes the overcharge estimate that compares the price during periods
of cartelisation to a price benchmark based on prices before the cartel. Post-Cartel denotes
the estimate based on post-cartel prices serving as benchmark prices, and Whole sample uses
prices both before and after a cartel as the counterfactual for competition.
As we observe pre-communication prices only for the Baseline and ExtComm treatments,
we use the average market price of the ExtComm treatment observations from periods -9
to 0 as the benchmark of competition for all treatments.13 To calculate the overcharges, a
reasonable assessment has to be made about the periods that should be regarded as cartel
periods. In the Comm, ExtComm, and Rematching treatments we include only those periods
13Market price margins are considerably larger in ExtComm with 3.475 than in Baseline with 1.925.
Hence, the Baseline treatment is not a good benchmark for the calculation of the cartel overcharge
as it lacks comparability with the other treatments with respect to the attainable profits before
communication has taken place. Thus, we use only the ExtComm treatment for such purposes.
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in which subjects communicate and reach a price-fixing agreement as cartel periods.14 Fine
and Leniency feature periods in which either a cartel forms or a previous cartel is undetected
in the Communication phase. These differences in the composition of cartel periods reflect
the underlying differences in incentives for cartel formation and pricing. Given that detection
is possible in Fine and Leniency even if no cartel is formed in a certain period but a previous
price agreement so far has remained undetected, subject behaviour might be affected by the
presence of a chance of detection.
Table 3.4: Overcharge estimates and biases
Overcharge estimate Overcharge bias
Obs. Pre-Cartel Post-Cartel Whole sample Post-Cartel Whole sample
Comm 6 64.45 19.91 41.12 -77.75% -40.73%
Fine 2 55.41 10.73 32.01 -68.01% -35.62%
Leniency 4 48.91 8.82 27.91 -20.30% -10.63%
ExtComm 7 46.89 22.12 33.91 -24.67% -12.92%
Pooled 19 53.76 17.42 34.72 -45.07% -23.61%
Rematching 5 40.63 53.86 47.25 129.73% 64.87%
Notes: Pre-Cartel, Post-Cartel, and Whole sample overcharge estimates represent average values of
estimated cumulated cartel overcharges by cartel based on competitive price benchmarks including
periods before, after, and before and after the cartel. Pre-cartel prices serve as the counterfactuals
for the calculation of overcharges biases. Pooled includes the average values of the columns excluding
the Rematching treatment.
Table 3.4 reports the average of the estimated cartel overcharges using the different benchmark
prices in the first three columns by treatment. The prices in Pre-Cartel that are not affected
by any communication represent the correct counterfactual of competition. Unlike post-cartel
prices, they are untainted by tacit collusion enabled by preceding communication. The last
two columns report the average overcharge bias. The results show that the Post-Cartel
and the Whole sample overcharge estimates are biased downwards for all treatments except
for Rematching. Hence, PCTC leads to a significant underestimation of cartel damages by
econometric techniques that rely on post-cartel data. It is not possible to rank the treatments
with respect to the severity of the downward bias due to the limited sample size. Yet, the
main implication that the problem of underestimating cartel damages does not exist in the
Rematching treatment because of an absence of PCTC remains valid.15
As has been shown with Table 3.3, post-cartel prices are correlated with preceding cartel
14Periods without price agreements that lie between periods with price agreements could have also
been included here. Whether exclusion of such periods with potential tacit collusion increases or
decreases the overcharge estimate depends on the market outcome in these periods. If the subjects
collude tacitly (compete fiercely) between periods with price agreements, then the true damage would
be higher (lower).
15In fact, the estimations point to a large overestimation of damages in this treatment. However,
these results should be treated with caution, as the competitive counterfactual of ExtComm prices
in periods -9 to 0 might not be good counterfactuals for Rematching. Given the destabilising effect
of informing about rematching in the future on collusion, a proper counterfactual for this treatment
would likely contain lower prices.
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success. Hence, the downward bias of the estimates should be increasing with the number of
preceding cartel success. Figure 3.3 plots the relationship between the number of successful
cartel periods and the bias of the Post-Cartel estimates with a lowess smoother excluding the
Rematching treatment (the overcharge estimates are jittered to improve readability). Indeed,
the downward bias is increasing with preceding cartel success.
Result 3: There is a downward bias in overcharge estimates based on the before-
after approach when post-cartel prices are considered as benchmark prices. The
bias increases with preceding cartel success without rematching.
3.4.3 The impact of rematching on explicit collusion
Our final investigation centres on the effects of rematching on the performance and stability
of cartels. The absolute price margin based on market prices in the Communication phase
in the Rematching treatment appears to be lower than in the Communication treatment
(4.507 vs. 5.958; Table 3.2) for markets with at least one successful cartel period. As the two
treatments are identical in the Communication phase aside from the announcement of future
rematching of the groups in the Rematching treatment, we can attribute the lower market
prices in Rematching to a negative effect of anticipated rematching on collusion.
To determine how rematching affects cartels, we compare the incidence of collusion and
cheating in the Communication phase between the treatments. Figures 3.4a and 3.4b show
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differences in the proportions of markets with price agreements and with cheating on existing
agreements, respectively.16 We define cheating as any subject’s decision to charge a price
below 102 when either an agreement was reached in the same period or a previous periods’
agreement has not yet been undercut by any other subject. Thus, a higher level of cheating
shows a lower level of stability of cartels.
In line with the literature, Fine and Leniency feature lower levels of collusion by rendering
collusion less attractive, although collusion and cheating are not much different between the two
treatments. Rematching does not reduce attempts to collude (as cartel formation is unchanged)
in the Rematching treatment compared to the Comm treatment (a two-sample t-test testing
for differences in the proportion of the subjects colluding in Comm and Rematching reports
a p-value of 0.497). Yet, the incidence of cheating in the Rematching treatment is higher
than in the Comm treatment. A two-sample t-test comparing cheating between the Comm
and the Rematching treatments shows a weakly significant difference between the treatments
(p-value = 0.058).17 Thus, rematching does not reduce attempts to collude, but it significantly
increases the incidence of cheating. This destabilising effect is very pronounced with the
proportion of firms cheating rising from 36.2% in Comm to 69.6% in Rematching.
Result 4: Rematching reduces explicit collusion through its negative effect on
cartel stability.
16Attempts to collude that fail are implied the difference between agreements that were reached
and the number of observed cases of cheating.
17The t-tests use cluster- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors based on pairs cluster boot-
strapping with 500 iterations and compare the incidence of collusion and cheating at a market and
period level. They are derived from a linear probability model. The t-tests are preferred here to
Mann Whitney U tests, as the latter cannot take sample weights into account. As different markets
engage to different extents in collusion and cheating, markets more active in collusion and cheating are
more informative. Using this information with weighting leads to efficiency gains of the test statistic
compared to non-parametric tests.
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3.5 Conclusion
Although it is a conventional wisdom that firms may resort to tacit collusion after a cartel
breaks down, little is known about the conditions under which this happens and about the
determinants that drive the level and persistence of such behaviour. As a result, it is hard to
assess implications of such firm behaviour for competition policy and how to counteract it.
Given the importance of PCTC for deterrent fines, welfare effects of cartels, and the right
design of antitrust legislation, this essay aims at adding to the knowledge on the existence,
determinants, consequences, and prevention of PCTC.
We run experiments in which groups of three firms, each controlled by a subject, compete
in homogeneous goods price competition and can establish price agreements. These price
agreements can be renewed in the following periods or remain active absent new agreements
that were neither detected nor cheated upon. After this initial phase of communication, the
ability to agree on price-fixing ends and subjects are only able to collude tacitly. Such an
approach contributes to our understanding on how cartels react to detection when continued
communication is deemed too risky. We test the existence of PCTC in different competition
regimes to establish whether it is a common phenomenon unrelated to particular policy
tools. Conducting an econometric analysis we study the different sources of PCTC. We then
show how under PCTC the standard procedures to estimate cartel damages may be biased.
Furthermore, the use of rematching to disrupt the positive effects of learning on PCTC is
tested.
The results suggest that firms might be able to profit frequently from PCTC irrespective
of different antitrust laws. We identify two sources of PCTC: collusive price hysteresis and
learning in cartels. The former describes a firm’s strategy to continue charging preceding
cartel prices after the end of the cartel in order to avoid triggering a price war resulting in
lower prices of competition. The latter describes how communication and a cooperative history
facilitate PCTC by reducing uncertainty about the actions of the other firms. Moreover, the
magnitude of PCTC is positively linked to preceding cartel success. In line with Bigoni et al.
(2015), this stresses the importance of beliefs for successful collusion in infinitely repeated
games. Rematching in the experiment is found to be an effective mechanism to prevent
PCTC as well as to reduce cartel stability. The Rematching treatment emulates one indirect
enforcement effect that debarment, i.e. disqualification orders for convicted cartel managers
and imprisonment, have on collusion. Note, however, that we do not fully replicate such
mechanisms.18 Our focus is on the indirect enforcement effects of sanctions against managers.
As such, stronger (deterrent) effects are likely to arise if the direct enforcement effects linked
to these punishment mechanisms were modelled as well.
18See e.g. the December 2016 disqualification of Daniel Ashton by the Competition and Markets
Authority in the UK (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-secures-director-disqualification-for-
competition-law-breach), last retrieved on 06/08/2017.
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Several implications arise from our analyses. Antitrust laws that reduce the formation and
stability of cartels lessen the negative welfare effects of PCTC, as the incidence of tacit
collusion is linked to the preceding cartelisation of the industry. Cartels that do not break
down due to cheating but are detected exogenously might realise supercompetitive profits
long after the end of communication. Therefore, competition agencies should rely on leniency
programmes to reduce cartel formation as much as possible to reduce the negative welfare
effects of PCTC. In addition, provided that debarment programmes and imprisonment have
similar disruptive indirect enforcement effects on collusion in the field as indicated by the
Rematching treatment in the lab, these policy tools may help to minimise the harm caused by
PCTC. In particular, the debarment of managers so far has been limited to few countries such
as the USA, UK, Sweden, and Slovenia (Ginsburg and Wright, 2010). Our results suggest
that this policy tool might offer the potential to reduce the damage caused by cartels in
other ways than the direct effect on individuals that has been discussed in the literature,
and should receive greater attention by the antitrust authorities. Finally, our analyses show
that post-cartel prices should not be used as competitive counterfactuals to determine cartel
overcharges as this creates the risk of a downward bias in these estimates that increases with
preceding cartel success. As such, the most harmful cartels might be those deterred the least.
There are several ways to extend our analysis. We focus on learning as a source of PCTC
abstracting from focal points in the spirit of Scherer (1967) as a source of collusion. After
rematching, subjects could try to establish tacit collusion by setting the price last charged
in markets in previous periods with collusion. Furthermore, the effects of the variations of
market characteristics including firm numbers and product differentiation on PCTC and its
identified sources should be studied. Finally, the complete effects of debarment are not tested




Table 3.5: Prices in the No Communication phase – Correlated random effects model
I II III IV
Asking price Market price
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Baseline: Baseline treatment (Std.E.) (Std.E.) (Std.E.) (Std.E.)
Lag price 0.257† 0.336† 0.467† 0.207∗∗
(0.054) (0.046) (0.091) (0.087)
Min price others 0.009 −0.018 – –
(0.064) (0.083)
Max price others 0.134† 0.078 – –
(0.040) (0.082)
Lag collusion 2.088† 2.473† 2.654∗∗∗ 6.059†
(0.510) (0.749) (0.833) (1.115)
No. cases of cheating 0.003 −0.041 −0.016 −0.033
(0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.058)
No. of successful cartel periods 0.171∗ 0.603 0.272∗∗ 0.350
(0.103) (0.980) (0.127) (0.669)
Period 0.007 0.021 0.008 0.021
(0.042) (0.124) (0.032) (0.084)
Period × No. of successful −0.014∗∗ −0.045 −0.021∗∗∗ −0.025
cartel periods (0.007) (0.063) (0.007) (0.042)
Comm −0.036 – −0.087 –
(0.256) (0.294)
Fine 0.085 – −0.021 –
(0.140) (0.173)
Leniency −0.074 – −0.127 –
(0.126) (0.171)
ExtComm 0.121 – −0.045 –
(0.208) (0.235)
∅ Lag price 0.642† 0.639† 0.521† 0.671†
(0.052) (0.063) (0.053) (0.130)
∅ Lag collusion −1.923∗∗∗ −0.154 −2.284∗∗ −1.827∗∗
(0.686) (0.577) (0.965) (0.792)
∅ Min price others 0.054 −0.080 – –
(0.093) (0.104)
∅ Max price others −0.079 0.017 – –
(0.053) (0.112)
Constant −1.651 1.952 1.064 11.083
(4.431) (5.259) (6.101) (9.554)
R2 overall 0.758 0.493 0.880 0.635
R2 between 0.987 0.970 0.990 0.993
R2 within 0.149 0.172 0.418 0.399
Observations 1,674 378 558 126
Notes: ∗ 10% level, ∗∗ 5% level, ∗ ∗ ∗ 1% level, † 0.1 % level. – Cluster and autocorrelation-
robust standard errors are based on pairs cluster bootstraps with 500 iterations. Columns I and III
contain observations for all treatments except for Rematching, and Columns II and IV are based
on Rematching treatment observations only. Random intercepts are included at the subject level in
Columns I and II, and at the market level in Columns III and IV. Variables without a ∅ symbol
control for within-group effects. Group mean-centred variations are measured by coefficients with a
∅ symbol, which capture the effect of the cluster-specific mean. This coefficient captures both the
between effects in the sample as well as the captured unobserved heterogeneity (the fixed effect). Their
significance indicates evidence of between variation with respect to the variable under consideration.




Welcome and thank you for taking part in this experiment. In this experiment you
can earn money. How much money you will earn depends on your decision and on the
decision made by other participants in this room. The experiment will proceed in two
parts. The currency used in Part 1 of the experiment is Pound Sterling (GBP). The
currency used in Part 2 is experimental points. Each experimental point is worth 15
pence. All earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
Every participant receives exactly the same instructions. All decisions will be anonymous.
It is very important that you remain silent. If you have any questions, or need assistance
of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you.
Instructions for Part 1
In the first part of the experiment you will be asked to make 15 decisions. For each line
in the table that you will see on the computer screen there is a paired choice between
two options ("Option A" and "Option B"). Only one of these 15 lines will be used in
the end to determine your earnings. You will only know which one at the end of the
experiment. Each line is equally likely to be chosen, so you should pay equal attention
to the choice you make in every line. At the end of the experiment a computerized
random number (between 1 and 15) determines which line is going to be paid.
Your earnings for the paid line depend on which option you chose: If you chose Option
A in that line, you will receive £1. If you chose Option B in that line, you will receive
either £2 or £0. To determine your earnings in the case you chose Option B there
will be second computerized random number (between 1 and 20). Both computerized
random numbers will be the same for all participants in the room.
Instructions for Part 2
In this part of the experiment you will form a group with two other randomly chosen
participants in this room. Throughout the experiment you are matched with the same
two participants. All groups of three participants act independently of each other. This
part of the experiment will be repeated for at least 20 rounds. From the 20th round
onwards, in each round there is a one in five (20%) chance that the experiment will
end.
Your job:
You are in the role of a firm that is in a market with two other firms. In each round,
you will have to choose a price for your product. This price must be one of the following
prices:
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90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102.
You will only sell the product if your price is the lowest of the three prices chosen by
you and the other two firms in that round. If you sell the product, your earnings are
equal to the difference between the price and the cost, which is 90:
Earnings = Price - 90.
If you do not sell the product, you will not get any earnings but you will not incur costs
either. If two or more firms sell at the same lowest price, the earnings will be shared
equally between them. Before you choose your price, you may decide to agree with the
other firms to set the highest price of 102 and share the earnings. This agreement is
only valid if all three firms want to agree on it. After you made your choice, you will
be informed whether the price agreement is reached. However, the price agreement is
not binding and firms are not required to set the agreed price. After your price choice,
you will be told whether you have selected the lowest price as well as the prices of the
other firms.
The price agreement may be discovered by the computer. In that case, a fine of 5 points
has to be paid. The computer can detect it in 16 out of 100 cases (a chance of 16%).
A price agreement remains valid – and can be discovered – as long as it has not been
discovered in a previous round. Once this has happened, you will not be fined in the
future, unless you make a price agreement again. If you have reached a price agreement
in this period, or a past agreement has not been detected by the computer, you must
decide whether to report it. You can do this by choosing between the “Report” and
“Not report” buttons. If you report it, you are charged additional costs of 1.
In case one or more group members reports the agreement, it is discovered and a penalty
of 5 has to be paid by all group members. However, in case you report your penalty
gets reduced as follows:
• If you are the only one to report, you will not pay the penalty but the others will
pay the full penalty.
• If you report and exactly one of the other two reports, then your penalty is
reduced by half (50%). The other reporting participant has to pay only half of
his penalty, while the remaining participant will pay his full penalty.
• If you report and both the other two also report, then the penalty is reduced by
one third (33%) for all three of you.
At the end of each round, you will be told the earnings you made in this round. If
you agreed on prices, you will also be told whether the agreement was detected by the
computer (either because it was detected by chance or by reports).
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Final Payment:
At the beginning of the experiment you start with an initial endowment of 40 points =
6 GBP. If the sum of your profits from Part B is below 0, the difference is being covered
by the initial endowment. The earnings you earned in each round minus any fine and
penalty that you paid will be converted into cash. Each point is worth 15 pence, and
we will round up the final payment to the next 10 pence. We guarantee a minimum
earning of 2 GBP.
56
Chapter 4
The effects of endogenous
enforcement on strategic
uncertainty and cartel deterrence
4.1 Introduction
1 The fight against cartels fixing prices or allocating customers remains a priority of
antitrust authorities around the globe. The main tool of antitrust authorities to deter
cartels is to punish detected cartelists with fines, which feature both fixed and variable
elements. Cartels are usually prosecuted for their wrongdoings per se, i.e. they receive
an exogenous, fixed fine for the mere attempt to collude irrespective of the actual
cartel harm. Yet, in some jurisdictions fines are partially adjusted to the magnitude
of harm induced by the cartel. Furthermore, a growing part of costs of detection for
cartelists stems from private damage litigation, in which damages are awarded based on
estimated overcharges, and therefore are endogenous and determined by cartel conduct.
Subsequently, we refer to enforcement in which the detection probability and/or the
fine depend on the cartel overcharge as endogenous enforcement. In contrast, exogenous
enforcement is characterised by fines and detection probabilities that do not change
with the cartel overcharge.
The deterrent effect of antitrust enforcement can be decomposed into two elements:
frequency and composition deterrence. Frequency deterrence refers to the prevention of
cartel formation and is often measured as the number of cartels that are not formed in
the presence of antitrust laws, but would have formed otherwise. Composition deterrence
1This chapter is based on joint work with Liang Lu and builds on previously released research in
Crede and Lu (2016) and Lu (2016).
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refers to the mitigation of harm caused by the cartels that are formed nonetheless. It is
achieved through inducing a change in cartel behaviour in response to the enforcement,
e.g. a reduced cartel overcharge (Bos et al., 2016; Harrington, 2005, 2004a; Block et al.,
1981). It is usually assumed that composition deterrence results from a change in
the cartel’s optimisation problem in the presence of endogenous enforcement and is
treated as profitability-driven. Yet, cartel behaviour may not only be influenced by
profitability concerns, but also by strategic responses of cartelists to uncertainty about
the actions of the other cartel members. Drawing on Heinemann et al. (2009), we refer
to this type of uncertainty as strategic uncertainty. Ex ante, the probabilities of the
specific actions of the other cartel members are unknown to a cartelist. Such strategic
uncertainty between cartel members might be affected by endogenous enforcement, e.g.
if the enforcement contributes to mistrust among cartelists by improving the relative
profitability of unilateral deviations from the agreement. Thus, strategic uncertainty
potentially generates an indirect effect of endogenous enforcement and contributes to
the deterrence of cartels.
In this essay, we seek to determine whether endogenous enforcement can induce compo-
sition deterrence through increasing strategic uncertainty in a non-cooperative infinitely
repeated game market experiment. In doing so, we abstract from the direct profitability-
driven effects.2 Instead, we focus on the indirect effects induced by antitrust law on
strategic uncertainty. We contribute to the experimental literature on collusion in the
presence of an antitrust authority by proposing a framework that allows us to study
the impact of endogenous enforcement on equilibrium cartel price selection. For this
purpose, we allow the expected punishment to increase with the cartel price, so that
cartels formed on a high price and a low price are identical in expected profitability but
different in the riskiness of collusion (Blonski et al., 2011; Blonski and Spagnolo, 2015).
As a result, the two collusive equilibria are equally payoff-dominant, but the low cartel
price is the equilibrium with a lower riskiness of collusion.
While we expect endogenous enforcement to add to composition deterrence, it may
produce adverse effects on frequency deterrence. The enforcement regime featured
in our design renders the low cartel price a less risky collusive equilibrium, and thus
may encourage more collusive agreements on the low cartel price as well as stabilise
such agreements. Therefore, endogenous enforcement may produce frequency and
composition deterrence that move in opposite directions.
The results show that – consistent with our theoretical predictions – endogenous
enforcement produces composition deterrence through its effect on strategic uncertainty.
2See, e.g. the aforementioned studies by Bos et al. (2016), Harrington (2005, 2004a), and Block
et al. (1981).
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Subjects tend to suggest the low cartel price with the lower riskiness of collusion in the
presence of fines and detection probabilities that increase overproportionately with the
cartel overcharge. This tendency is not affected by different combinations of fines and
detection probabilities that feature the same expected payoffs and an almost identical
riskiness of collusion. Yet, we find an adverse effect on welfare induced by a reduction
of frequency deterrence due to an increased stability of cartels formed on the low price.
The overall effect of endogenous enforcement on market outcomes in the experiment is
unclear, as the positive effect of strategic uncertainty, ceteris paribus, is neutralised by
the adverse effect on frequency deterrence. Furthermore, our results show that subjects’
preferences over cartel prices are not driven by their risk attitudes, suggesting that
subjects behave strategically in such repeated cooperative games.
4.2 Literature review
Until now, most cartel experiments that explore how enforcement regimes affect fre-
quency deterrence focus on the impact of exogenous fines and detection probabilities
on collusion. Examples with exogenous fines include studies on the effects of leniency
programmes by Hamaguchi et al. (2009), Bigoni et al. (2012, 2015), Clemens and Rau
(2014), and Hinloopen and Onderstal (2014), but also on other aspects such as the
substitutability of fines and detection probabilities (Chowdhury and Wandschneider,
2017), avoidance activities of cartels (Chowdhury and Wandschneider, 2016), and tacit
collusion induced by previous cartel activities (Chowdhury and Crede, 2015).
Exceptions are the studies of Apesteguia et al. (2007) and Hinloopen and Soetevent
(2008) on the effect of leniency programmes and of Fonseca and Normann (2014), who
study how firm numbers affect the necessity to engage in repeated communication to
preserve collusion. In these three studies, fines are endogenous and depend on either
the chosen cartel price and/or the preceding collusive history. Yet, they do not study
how the endogeneity of fines affects cartel prices or stability such that the issue of
composition deterrence remains unaddressed.
To the authors’ knowledge, endogenous detection probabilities (apart from detection
triggered by leniency applications) have not yet been experimentally implemented or
studied in the context of cartels. However, in the field cartelists decide not only whether
to collude, but also which price to collude on. Although it is reasonable to assume that
the risk of detection of cartels increases with the magnitude of collusive price changes
(Crede, 2015; Harrington and Chen, 2006; Harrington, 2005, 2004a), cartel experiments
so far have forgone to analyse composition deterrence due to the exogenous design of
detection probabilities (and often of the fines) in the implemented enforcement regimes.
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Although the breakdown of all-inclusive cartels is, in general, either triggered internally
by coordination failure of cartelists or externally through the detection by antitrust
authorities, the experimental literature on antitrust enforcement against cartels tends
to focus on the latter channel. In a recent study, Bigoni et al. (2015) suggest that
deterrence can be achieved not only through imposing severe punishments, but also
by worsening the incentive and trust problems faced by cartelists. As a cartel is a
type of collective crime, when reaching the decision whether to collude each member
cares not only about the expected profitability of a collusive agreement, but also about
its stability and sustainability. As severe coordination complexity might itself render
collusion infeasible, the formation of a cartel fundamentally depends on the cartelists’
ability to reach and sustain cooperative equilibria.
The relevant literature of coordination games can loosely be divided into two classes:
finitely or infinitely repeated non-cooperative games and cooperative coordination games
that are classified according to the access to information. Both strands of literature
point out that the Nash equilibrium concept fails to predict a unique outcome in such
games (e.g., Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1993; Cooper et al.,
1990). Coordination failure may arise not only from the absence of a payoff-dominant
cooperative equilibrium, but also from Nash equilibria that are not self-enforcing (Van
Huyck et al., 1990). The multiplicity of equilibria calls for equilibrium refinement criteria
to select the equilibria that are most likely to arise. While Harsanyi and Selten (1988)
suggest that payoff dominance performs better at predicting choices than alternative
deductive selection criteria, more recent theoretical and experimental studies (e.g. Van
Huyck et al., 1990) tend to support the risk dominance criterion. An underlying reason
for coordination failure that has been suggested in the literature by Van Huyck et al.
(1990) and formalised by Heinemann et al. (2009) is strategic uncertainty that arises in
a socially interactive decision situation.
Knight (1921) distinguishes between risk and uncertainty. The former is usually referred
to as Knightian uncertainty or exogenous uncertainty, whereas the latter is referred to
as strategic uncertainty or endogenous uncertainty. Heinemann et al. define exogenous
uncertainty as “a priori given and known probabilities for all possible states of the world”
(Heinemann et al., 2009, p.182). In the context of cartel experiments, the probability of
detection by the competition authority usually is assumed to belong to this source of
uncertainty.3 Strategic uncertainty, on the other hand, describes situations in which the
probabilities with which the states occur are not exogenously given or known a priori.
3Fines for collusion in many jurisdictions follow fining guidelines, such that they can be anticipated
by cartels. While detection probabilities are generally not known, there is a wide consensus that
the mean detection probability most likely lies between 10% to 20% (Bos et al., 2016; Ormosi, 2014;
Hyytinen et al., 2011; Bryant and Eckard, 1991). Taken together, cartels are able to form expectations
about the expected punishment for explicit collusion.
60
Each subject is uncertain about the strategies and actions of the others within the same
group, and thus has to take decisions according to subjectively assigned probabilities
based on her own beliefs. The trustworthiness of the other group members is a crucial
element in these assigned probabilities. Based on a behavioural definition of trust and
betrayal aversion, Fehr (2009) suggests that trust is captured by preferences and beliefs
of individuals that partly are shaped by social interactions and influence them too.
Intuitively, as the degree of strategic uncertainty faced by decision makers increases,
it becomes more difficult to trust and subjects tend to choose inefficient but secure
actions.
In the evolutionary game theory literature, Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) conclude that
the games’ fundamentals, which are structural determinants contributing to exogenous
uncertainty such as the attractiveness and riskiness of alternative actions, the length of
the games, the form of communication, and subjects’ experience may affect cooperative
behaviour. Although repeated play of the game allows for inductive selection of strategies
and learning, long run stochastically stable equilibria that emerge tend to be those that
satisfy the concept of risk dominance (Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993). Blonski et al.
(2011) and Blonski and Spagnolo (2015) introduce the concept of riskiness of collusion
of a cooperative equilibrium in non-cooperative infinitely repeated games, which is
heuristically related to the concept of risk dominance.4 In doing so, they consider
strategic uncertainty by taking cognitive and behavioural determinants into account
with a particular emphasis on the sucker’s payoff, i.e. the payoff a subject receives who
is playing a collusive strategy but is cheated upon by others. They take an axiomatic
approach and offer a strategic uncertainty-based measure of the critical discount factor,
which allows for a comparison of the riskiness of several cooperative equilibria.
Cooperative games have been applied in the lab to study illegal activities and the
optimal design of enforcement. For example, Berninghaus et al. (2013) and Tan and
Yim (2014) use coordination games to model corruption and tax evasion. Both studies
highlight the role of trust and beliefs and find higher degrees of uncertainty to be an
effective device to deter illegal activities. However, unlike tax evasion a cartel is a type
of collective crime, such that the incentive and trust issues are more pronounced. This
follows from the risk of punishment that is attached to attempted collusion. Bigoni et al.
(2015) suggest that a crucial part of the deterrent effect offered by leniency programmes
is driven by the “distrust” that they create. They measure the minimum level of trust
required to sustain collusion and find that it increases with strategic uncertainty, such
that collusion is less likely to be established.
4The riskiness of cooperation measured by Blonski and Spagnolo (2015) is related to strategic





The experiment was carried out at the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental
Social Science (CBESS) at the University of East Anglia, UK, in February and March
2015. Recruitment of subjects was carried out with hRoot (Bock et al., 2014) and the
experiment was programmed and run with zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). 144 students from
a variety of backgrounds and nationalities and without prior experience in oligopoly
experiments participated in the experiment. 36 subjects were allocated in groups of
three, providing 12 independent market observations in each of the four treatments.
Group composition was fixed throughout the session. At the start of each session,
subjects were randomly seated in the laboratory at workstations separated by modular
walls. Each subject received a printed copy of the instructions, which were also read
aloud by an experimenter and displayed on each computer screen at the beginning of
each session. Subjects’ understanding of the instructions was tested with a questionnaire
before they participated in the main part of the experiment.
The experiment consisted of two parts. In the first part, the risk preferences of subjects
were tested with a risk elicitation task similar to that in Eckel and Grossman (2008).5
Subjects indicated the choices of their preferred lotteries on their computers, and then
an experimenter determined the outcome of the lottery with a coin toss monitored by a
volunteering subject. In the second part, subjects each represented a firm and played
an oligopoly game in markets of three firms as described below in Section 4.3.2 for 20
regular periods. A random stopping rule was implemented to avoid end-game effects as
described in Dal Bó (2005): there was a 20% chance in each additional period after the
end of the regular periods that the experiment ends.
At the end of each session, subjects filled out an anonymous demographic survey
before being called out of the laboratory and paid in private. Earnings are denoted
as “experimental points" and each point was converted into £0.12 for cash payment.
Based on subjects’ performance, payments varied from £4.00 to £13.20 with a mean of
£8.19. Sessions lasted between 40 to 60 minutes. Sample instructions can be found in
the appendix in Section 4.6.2.
5The risk elicitation task can be found in the sample instructions in the appendix in Section 4.6.2.
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4.3.2 Experimental design
In the experiment, each subject represents a firm and engages in competition in a
market with two other subjects. The market is defined as a homogeneous goods price
competition triopoly with (discontinuous) inelastic demand as introduced by Dufwenberg
and Gneezy (2000) and with market characteristics similar to those in Gillet et al. (2011).
Previous experimental evidence indicates that three firms are sufficient to ensure that
collusion can only be sustained effectively with communication (Fonseca and Normann,
2012; Wellford, 2002; Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000).
In each period, all subjects simultaneously make price decisions by choosing any price p
from the choice set p ∈ {40, 41, ..., 52}. A subject sells one unit of the good and incurs
costs of 40 experimental points if her price is not higher than that of any other subject,
and does not sell anything nor incur any costs otherwise. The subject who sells the
good at a price lower than her two competitors in a period therefore makes a profit of
p− 40 experimental points whereas the other two subjects make a profit of zero. If two
or three subjects choose the same lowest price, the profit is evenly divided among them.
Before subjects engage in the price competition as described above, in each period they
first have to simultaneously decide whether they wish to enter a non-binding price
agreement, and if so, which price to agree on. There are two price agreements to choose
from: one on the high cartel price phC = 52 or one on the low cartel price plC = 46.6
We allow subjects to choose between two cartel prices to facilitate the identification
of effects in the econometric analysis of price agreements and to ensure that fines and
detection probabilities are transparent to the subjects. Subjects wishing to cooperate
can choose to suggest their preferred cartel price, or they can suggest both prices if
they are indifferent between the two. However, a successful price agreement can be
detected by the computer with a positive probability resulting in a fine that is deducted
from the profit. If there is detection, only the most recent price agreement is detected.
Further, an agreement can only be detected once. The fine does not depend on the
length of the agreement.
Subjects need to indicate their intention to cooperate by answering the question “Do
you want to agree on prices?”. If all three subjects wish to agree on prices and a unique
common price exists among the three subjects’ suggested cartel prices, an agreement is
reached on that price. If all three subjects choose both prices, implying that they wish
to agree on either price, then in half of the groups in each treatment a price agreement
652 is the highest possible price and 46 is the mean price in the choice set. These prices represent
markups of 30% and 15%, respectively. This roughly corresponds to the estimated median of cartel
overcharges, which depending on samples and geographic and historical scope usually vary between
around 15% to 25% (Boyer and Kotchoni, 2015; Connor and Lande, 2012; Bolotova, 2009).
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on 46 and in the other half a price agreement on 52 is reached automatically. This is
done to control for any potential effect of this protocol on cartel price choice.7 The
default price remains the same within a group throughout the experiment. No price
agreement is reached if there is no common price among the suggested cartel prices of
all subjects.8 For example, this is the case if two subjects choose a suggested price of 46
and one subject chooses a suggested price of 52. If subjects do not wish to cooperate,
they can express so by choosing the option “No”. If at least one subject chooses “No”,
no price agreement is reached in that period. To avoid potential effects arising from
the order of items on the screen on subjects’ choices, their order is randomised across
subjects and periods.9
With our design, we expect coordination complexity arising from endogenous enforce-
ment to render reaching price agreements more difficult than in the presence of free-form
communication. Although a free-form communication protocol may help to facilitate
agreements, we restrict communication to a limited-form protocol for several reasons.
First, our focus is to obtain clear measures of subjects’ desired price choices. Second,
limited-form communication prevents the social dimension to influence results (see, e.g.
Cooper and Kühn, 2014) and ensures that communication is limited to pure signalling
and cheap talk. Furthermore, our communication protocol allows for a clear identifica-
tion and econometric analysis of how strategic uncertainty increases the complexity of
cartel coordination. Given that in our experiment bargaining is only possible through
signalling over the course of several periods of the game, observations on cartel price
choices at the subject level may not directly translate into similar patterns at the market
level. Yet, we focus primarily on subjects’ decisions to study the uncertainty-driven
behavioural patterns in the choices of subjects.
The sequence of the market experiment is summarised below:
1. Subjects simultaneously indicate their decisions with respect to cooperation by
answering the question “Do you want to agree on prices?”. Subjects willing to
cooperate can choose either “Yes, with price 46”, “Yes, with price 52”, or “No”
otherwise.
2. Subjects are informed about whether a price agreement has been reached. If this
is the case, they learn about the agreed price as well.
7It is shown in Section 4 that this default agreement price rule does not affect subjects’ price
choices.
8This is in contrast to the field, where usually the mere attempt to establish collusion is illegal and
results in a fine if detected. Yet, we refrain from introducing potential punishment for the mere attempt
to collude. This greatly simplifies the decision problem faced by subjects as well as the experimental
design. Thus, it facilitates the identification of our effects of interest in the experiment.
9A computer screenshot of the communication protocol can be found in the instructions in the
appendix in Section 4.6.2.
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3. Subjects simultaneously make price decisions for their goods by choosing a price
from the discrete choice set p ∈ {40, 41, ..., 52}. Any price agreements reached are
not binding for the subjects’ price decisions in this stage.
4. Subjects learn about each others’ prices and whether they sell a good in the
current period.
5. Subjects are informed whether they are detected by the computer provided that
they have reached a price agreement in the current period and/or their price
agreement(s) in previous periods have not been detected yet.
6. Finally, subjects learn about their profits in the current period minus any potential
fines, as well as about their accumulated profits.
This experiment is based on a 2x2 between-subjects design. Baseline is the control
treatment and serves to capture coordination failure that occurs because a set of
cooperative actions are not supported by an equilibrium. The other treatments assess
the explanatory power of the concept of riskiness of collusion when two cooperative
equilibria are payoff equivalent, which is useful to determine the uncertainty-driven
channel of composition deterrence. We compare the three treatments with endogenous
enforcement with each other to examine – given a constant expected profitability of
1.6 experimental points among the two collusive prices and across those treatments
– whether there is a limited substitutability between fines and detection probabilities
that affects cartel pricing as well as deterrence. The detection probabilities (D) and
the fines (F ) differ in the treatments as shown in Table 4.1, and the resulting expected
profits are denoted as E(pi).
Table 4.1: Treatments and key parameters
Exogenous detection prob. Endogenous detection prob.
Exogenous Baseline EndoD
fine 46: D = 20%, F = 12, E(pi) = −0.4 46: D = 3.3%, F = 12, E(pi) = 1.6
52: D = 20%, F = 12, E(pi) = 1.6 52: D = 20%, F = 12, E(pi) = 1.6
Endogenous EndoF BothEndo
fine 46: D = 20%, F = 2, E(pi) = 1.6 46: D = 10%, F = 4, E(pi) = 1.6
52: D = 20%, F = 12, E(pi) = 1.6 52: D = 20%, F = 12, E(pi) = 1.6
In Baseline, the detection probability (20%) and the fine (12 experimental points) are
the same for collusion on the high price of 52 and the low price of 46. It represents
a homogeneous goods price competition cartel experiment with exogenous fines and
detection parameters independent of the cartel price. In EndoF, the detection probability
is held fixed but the fine is endogenous. The magnitude of the fine is a function of the
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agreed cartel overcharge: collusion on price 52 yields a higher per period profit and
hence requires a higher potential fine of 12, whereas collusion on price 46 requires a
lower potential fine of 2 to achieve the same expected punishment. Similarly, in EndoD
the fine is held fixed but the detection probability increases with the cartel overcharge:
collusion on the low price 46 and on the high price 52 feature detection probabilities of
3.3% and 20%, respectively. In BothEndo, the fine and detection probability attached
to collusion on price 52 are the same as in Baseline, whereas those attached to collusion
on price 46 are lower with F = 4 and D = 10%, i.e. both elements are endogenous in
this treatment.10
Parameters and the experimental design are chosen such that the expected profitability
and the incentive compatibility constraints (ICCs) are equal across the treatments with
endogenous enforcement and the two cartel prices as is shown in Section 4.3.3. This is
crucial for answering the research questions: it rules out the profitability-driven effects
of endogenous enforcement on cartel behaviour as analysed in Katsoulacos et al. (2015),
and allows us to focus on the strategic uncertainty-driven effects.
4.3.3 Theoretical background
Before we describe the theoretical model that underlies our framework and experimental
design, we briefly discuss the main insights from the theoretical literature on endogenous
punishment on cartel prices. Consider a homogeneous goods market with n ≥ 2 firms
that face identical unit costs of production c and compete in prices. The demand
function is Q(p), where p denotes price and Q is the quantity supplied to the market.
The industry profits pi(p, c) can be expressed as
pi(p, c) = (p− c)Q(p). (4.1)
If price collusion is not possible, competition gives rise to the price pB = c. If price
collusion is possible and all firms agree to collude, then in the absence of antitrust
enforcement, each firm sets pM = arg maxp pi(p, c) yielding each firm a profit of piM/n.
In this context, the existing literature (e.g. Katsoulacos et al., 2015; Block et al.,
1981) has shown that antitrust enforcement that is increasing in the cartel overcharge
can mitigate the harm caused by the illegal activity by contributing to composition
deterrence. To illustrate this result, we include an expected punishment function DF
10Detection probabilities of 10% and 20% are in range of the mean detection probabilities reported
in Bryant and Eckard (1991), Hyytinen et al. (2011), Ormosi (2014), and Bos et al. (2016). Although
the detection probability in EndoD of 3.3% is somewhat low, it is not ruled out by the estimation
results of the aforementioned studies, which represent mean estimated detection probabilities.
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that is a product of D denoting the detection probability and F that is the penalty
imposed upon detection. Let the function DF depend on cartel prices with ∂DF/∂p > 0
and ∂2DF/∂p2 ≥ 0, such that it is weakly convex with respect to cartel prices.11 With
this general functional form, we allow either the fine, the detection probability, or
both elements to increase with the cartel overcharge, which is a reasonable assumption
given observations from the field.12 Figure 4.1 plots the cartel gross profit against
the price in the absence of the expected punishment (piM) as well as the net profit
under consideration of the expected punishment presence (piDF ). As can be seen,
such endogenous antitrust enforcement leads to composition deterrence by altering the
expected profitability of a cartel. As a result, cartels may not be deterred altogether,
but they are formed at lower prices, i.e. at pDF instead of pM .
Figure 4.1: Profitability-driven composition deterrence
Changing the cartel’s optimisation problem, however, is not the only channel through
which composition deterrence can be achieved by endogenous enforcement. Price
collusion is in nature a cooperative problem. Therefore, in this analysis we wish to
assess whether pricing below the monopoly level could also be an optimal reaction to
strategic uncertainty in non-cooperative infinitely repeated games. For this purpose,
we introduce an antitrust regime with endogenous punishment, in which several cartel
prices are equally profitable but carry different levels of riskiness of collusion as is
11We consider our findings based on this assumption to hold in most cases, in particular with respect
to the counteracting effects of frequency and composition deterrence. However, special scenarios may
exist in which the assumption does not hold. See Bos et al. (2015) for an example in which antitrust
punishment benefits cartels.
12As outlined before in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, fines increase with the overcharge, e.g. in the presence
of private enforcement against cartels, in which compensations are based on overcharge estimates.
Further, detection is more likely to occur the more pronounced the effect of the cartel is on market
outcomes (Crede, 2015; Harrington and Chen, 2006; Harrington, 2005, 2004a).
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explained below. As such, we rule out any incentive that arises from the relative size of
the expected profitability of the cartel, and make sure that cartelists’ collusive price
choices are driven by their decisions when facing strategic uncertainty. As mentioned in
Section 3.3.2, this constitutes the crucial property of our experimental design, which is
explained further below.
In the framework of the experiment, several price equilibria exist. The non-cooperative
equilibrium that tends to dominate choices in case of coordination failure is characterised
by each subject choosing pB = 41 and obtaining a competitive profit of piB = (41 −
40)/3 = 0.33 in each period. However, subjects reaching price agreements – depending
on which price they have agreed on – can each earn a high or a low cartel profit,
pihC = (52− 40)/3 = 4 or pilC = (46− 40)/3 = 2, both of which are strictly higher than
piB. In the treatment Baseline, the expected punishment is exogenous and fixed at
0.2× 12 = 2.4, therefore the relevant expected payoffs of forming cartels are given by
E(pihC) = 4− 2.4 → 1.6 > piB,
E(pilC) = 2− 2.4 → −0.4 < piB.
 for Baseline (4.2)
The expected payoff of colluding on phC is strictly higher than the payoff piB associated
with the non-cooperative equilibrium, whereas it is negative for plC . Hence cartels can
only be profitably formed on price 52 in expected terms, and rational subjects would –
absent other strategic considerations – either collude on price 52 or not collude at all.
In treatments EndoF, EndoD, and BothEndo, the expected punishment of forming a
cartel increases with the cartel price, i.e. it is endogenous. The expected punishment
DF is now different for the two cartel prices: it is lower with 0.4 for price 46 and higher
with 2.4 for price 52. Consequently, the expected payoffs of colluding on the high and
the low cartel prices are the same, i.e.
E(pihC) = 4− 2.4→ 1.6 > piB,
E(pilC) = 2− 0.4→ 1.6 > piB.
 for EndoD, EndoF, and BothEndo (4.3)
In these treatments, the two cartel prices thus represent two payoff-equivalent Pareto-
dominant collusive equilibria. In the following, we characterise the equilibrium condi-
tions, which may vary under different treatments and with different cartel prices.
Suppose that firms react to cheating with a grim-trigger strategy. Thus, a firm that
is slightly undercutting the cartel price obtains a one shot deviation profit of pidev,
while the others earn a profit of zero. The corresponding ICC for sustaining collusion
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1− δ(1−D) , (4.4)
where δ denotes the discount factor. Note that the punishment is linked to the agreed
cartel price in the experiment, irrespective of whether deviation occurs afterwards or
not.13 As such, the term measuring expected punishment, DF/(1− δ(1−D)), appears
on both sides of the ICC and cancels out. Thus, the ICC is not affected by the variations
in fines and detection probabilities and the discount factor derived from the ICC is
given by
δ ≥ (pidev − piC)/(pidev − piB), (4.5)
which is almost identical for phC and plC (0.66 and 0.64). Therefore, cartel formation
should not be driven by the relative size of the ICCs: when firms are able to cooperate,
they should be equally likely to collude on either of the two cartel prices.14
However, although the ICCs ensure the existence of a cooperative equilibrium and that
the firms’ incentives are not affected by variations in the exogenous uncertainty DF , the
cooperative difficulties and trust issues arising from strategic uncertainty may render
collusion infeasible. Thus, firms may not stick to a price agreement even if it represents
an equilibrium. Recent theoretical and experimental studies suggest that the riskiness
of collusion criterion selects more self-enforcing and sustainable equilibria. We use the
prisoner’s other dilemma by Blonski and Spagnolo (2015) to compare the riskiness of
collusion when firms collude on different prices. This measure of risk can be calculated
for each cartel price as the difference between two squared expressions:
(piB − piS)2 − (piC − pidev)2. (4.6)
This is closely related to the comparison of Nash products in static 2x2 games to
determine the risk-dominant equilibrium as proposed by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). The
first squared expression captures the difference between the non-cooperative equilibrium
profit of piB and the profit piS obtained in case of being cheated upon. The second
13Absence of the sensitivity of fines to cheating is in line with fining practices in the field in most
jurisdictions, in which the mere attempt to collude is illegal and is fined. Unlike it is common in the
field, unsuccessful attempts to establish a price agreement are not subject to a fine in the experiment.
This prevents attempts of subjects to merely indicate indifference between both prices to avoid being
fined in case of unsuccessful attempts to collude from affecting the results with respect to their signalled
indifference between both prices.
14Strictly speaking, the critical discount factors necessary to support collusion are not identical.
Yet, the difference is not pronounced enough to expect it to have any (measurable) effect on subject
behaviour.
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squared expression contains the difference between the collusive profit and the deviation
profit. Ceteris paribus, the more pronounced the difference between the two Nash
products, the higher is the riskiness of a collusive equilibrium, which requires a higher
discount factor to sustain collusion. In line with standard prisoner dilemma payoffs,
in the experiment the order of profits is pidev > piC > piB > piS. The corresponding net
present value of the riskiness of collusion in the experiment when the game is infinitely
repeated is given by
(
piB














where δ∗ denotes the discount factor incorporating the riskiness of each collusive
equilibrium. Equation 4.7 can be used to calculate the riskiness of collusion at different
cartel prices and in different treatments for any given discount factor of the firms.
Figure 4.2: The riskiness of collusion
Figure 4.2 illustrates the riskiness of collusion attributed to the two cartel prices as
a function of the discount factor. The riskiness of collusion is identical for price 52
in all treatments because of the identical fines and detection probabilities attached to
it across treatments, whereas the riskiness of collusion for price 46 varies. Note that
we do not consider collusion on price 46 in Baseline, as it is an off-equilibrium option.
Given an identical payoff, the risk constraint is the tightest for collusion on price 52,
whereas it does not differ much for collusion on price 46 across the treatments. The
high riskiness of collusion on price 52 compared to price 46 follows from the fact that
collusion on price 52 is associated with higher cheating incentives than collusion on
price 46, whereas the sucker’s payoff of 0 remains the same in both cases.
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4.3.4 Hypotheses
We primarily seek to examine how endogenous enforcement produces composition
deterrence through affecting strategic uncertainty in non-cooperative infinitely repeated
games. The hypotheses relate to the behaviour of subjects rather than to markets. This
follows from the focus of the experimental design on identifying individuals’ preferences,
which might not translate to the same behaviour at a group level due to coordination
difficulties.
First, as collusion on price 46 is not a payoff-dominant collusive equilibrium in Baseline,
we want to verify that collusion on price 46 is seldom chosen by subjects. The potential
failure of (stable) collusion on price 46 provides evidence that payoff dominance is an
important equilibrium selection criterion and fundamentally affects subjects’ decisions.
As the only feasible collusive equilibrium in Baseline is characterised by collusion on
price 52, subjects who are willing to collude should tend to do so on price 52.
Hypothesis 1: In Baseline, the low cartel price is suggested less often than
the high cartel price.
In itself this is not a very interesting hypothesis to test, as the existing literature has
already shown the importance of payoff dominance in equilibrium selection (see, e.g.
Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011). Yet, providing evidence in support of Hypothesis 1 is
necessary for confirming subjects’ understanding of the game and for the interpretation
of the results. Subjects who adjust their behaviour to payoff dominance provide an
indication of the presence of rational behaviour and strategic considerations. Given
such behaviour, reactions to changes of the expected punishment on price 46 in the
other treatments are likely to reflect strategic choices.
Next, we address the role of strategic uncertainty in the choice of cartel prices. In
treatments EndoF, EndoD, and BothEndo, endogenous enforcement equalises the
expected payoff of colluding on both prices, whereas the expected punishment is
imposed in a way such that collusion on 46 is the equilibrium with the lower riskiness
of collusion. As shown in Figure 4.2, collusion on price 46 is subject to a significantly
lower level of riskiness than on price 52. If strategic uncertainty plays a role in collusive
decisions, subjects should tend to suggest the low cartel price of 46. Further, disruptions
of collusion by previous cheating of cartelists and detection by the antitrust authority
should discourage collusion on price 52 in favour of price 46. We therefore expect
subjects to show a tendency to switch from the high to the low cartel price, but not
vice versa.
Hypothesis 2: In treatments EndoF, EndoD and BothEndo, the low cartel
price is suggested more often than the high cartel price.
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Recall that the expected payoffs from collusion and the riskiness of collusion on price
52 stay the same across treatments. Further, for collusion on price 46 the expected
payoffs are identical in the treatments with endogenous enforcement and the riskiness
of collusion does not differ much between these treatments (as shown in Figure 4.2).
As such, subjects’ price choices should not significantly differ across treatments with
endogenous enforcement.
Hypothesis 3: Subjects’ suggested cartel prices do not differ significantly
between EndoF, EndoD, and BothEndo.
As cartels formed on prices 46 and 52 yield identical expected payoffs, but differ in
the risk of detection, it renders the choice between the two prices similar to a choice
between two lotteries with different exogenous risks. Therefore, ceteris paribus, risk
averse subjects might be more likely to choose the cartel price 46 or not to join a cartel
at all, as opposed to choosing price 52 or being indifferent between both prices. Studies
on the relationship between risk aversion and cooperation do not provide conclusive
findings. Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (2002) suggest the relationship to be negative.
Reuben and Suetens (2012) show that the majority of subjects behave strategically in
infinitely repeated games. Dreber et al. (2014) conclude that the primary determinant
of subjects’ behaviour in these games is payoff maximisation and find no conclusive
pattern between cooperation and risk attitude.15
Recent studies that distinguish between subjects’ risk attitudes towards exogenous
uncertainty and their beliefs driven by strategic uncertainty measure both elements
separately (Tan and Yim, 2014; Berninghaus et al., 2013; Heinemann et al., 2009).
Tan and Yim (2014) suggest that strategic uncertainty might be more important than
exogenous uncertainty for coordination and Berninghaus et al. (2013) find that beliefs
rather than risk attitudes explain subjects’ choices. The importance of beliefs for
cooperation in infinitely repeated games has also been stressed by Dal Bó and Fréchette
(2011). Similarly, we conjecture that strategic uncertainty is the main driver of subjects’
choices and that risk attitude does not drive subjects’ price choices.
Hypothesis 4: Risk attitude does not determine subjects’ suggested cartel
prices.
15There are two major differences between the experiment of Dreber et al. (2014) and ours, which
might affect the results with respect to risk attitudes. First, the average cooperation period in our
experiment (23.3 rounds) is significantly longer than that in theirs (10.7-11.5 rounds). Second, one
feature in their experiment is that in all analysed treatments, an “execution error” occurs with 12.5%
probability and alters subjects’ chosen strategies. This makes it difficult for subjects to form beliefs
about each other. Our experiment does not feature such a design. Thus, subjects in our experiment
are more likely to be able to form beliefs on their opponents and make informed decisions based on the
history of cooperation and cheating.
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The four hypotheses above focus on individual subject’s desired cartel prices. Yet, the
overall welfare effects of endogenous enforcement is also worth examining with respect
to deriving potential policy implications. As mentioned in Section 4.1, a potential
trade-off may exist between frequency and composition deterrence, which makes it
difficult to predict the efficiency of endogenous enforcement ex ante. As the overall
effect on welfare is important as well, it is examined in Section 4.4.2.
4.4 Results
All reported results are based on the first 20 periods to prevent potential end-game
effects from affecting the results. Further, the consideration of all markets based on the
same number of observations prevents an unequal sampling of the groups from affecting
the results.16
First, we present the results relating to our main outcome variables of interest, i.e.
subjects’ suggested cartel prices and the price agreements that were reached.17 Figure
4.3a shows the proportions of suggested cartel prices across all subjects separated by
treatment, where 0 denotes subjects’ preference not to engage in price agreements and
Indiff. refers to instances in which subjects suggest both prices for an agreement; Figure
4.3b shows the proportions of new price agreements that are successfully reached in a
period across all markets, and 0 indicates that no agreement is reached.18
At first glance, observed patterns appear to be in line with the predictions of the theo-
retical model. The first observation is relevant to Hypothesis 1: among all treatments,
the collusive price of 46 is suggested and agreed on the least often in Baseline. As such,
expected profitability appears to represent an important driver of cartel price choice.
The second observation is relevant to Hypothesis 3: the distributions of suggested cartel
prices and price agreements reached do not seem to vary substantially across treatments
with endogenous enforcement. However, as the (suggested) cartel prices are driven
by a substantial number of factors and a static perspective does not allow to identify
potentially important dynamics in subjects’ choices, we draw further inference based
on the regression analysis below.
16Given the random stoppage-rule, actual termination varies across sessions between the 20th and
the 25th period.
17Figures on the distribution of asking prices and market prices, as well as of the asking prices
conditional on cheating in the previous round can be found in the appendix in Section 4.6.1.
18We refer to new agreements reached in a period because agreements from previous periods that
are not detected yet in the absence of new price agreements are usually being cheated upon and do not
bind subjects’ price choices. As such, focusing on non-detected agreements that are in place obscures
subjects’ behaviour and cartel success in the market.
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(b) New price agreements reached
Table 4.2 provides means or proportions for additional important variables that are
used in the regression analysis below together with their respective standard deviations.
It is complementary to the results presented in Figure 4.3. Market prices represents the
prices at which goods are sold and consists of the lowest asking prices in each market
in each period. Asking prices represent the selling prices that subjects individually set
in each market in each period. Prop. new agreement denotes the proportion of markets
with newly reached price agreements, i.e. they are formed or renewed in the period
irrespective of the chosen cartel price in the previous period. Prop. cheating on 46 (52)
reports the proportion of markets with the observed occurrence of cheating on an active
agreement of 46 (52), i.e. agreements that so far have not been detected. Finally, Prop.
detection on 46 (52) is the observed proportion of markets in which agreements on 46
(52) are detected by the computer.
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics
Baseline EndoF EndoD BothEndo
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Asking prices 43.801 3.962 44.133 3.744 43.856 3.242 43.543 3.870
Market prices 41.817 2.352 42.713 3.007 42.208 1.863 42.038 2.688
Prop. new agreement 0.117 0.322 0.167 0.373 0.096 0.295 0.108 0.311
Prop. cheating 46 1.000 0.000 0.429 0.507 0.750 0.452 0.818 0.405
Prop. cheating 52 0.818 0.395 0.684 0.478 0.818 0.405 0.533 0.516
Prop. detection 46 0.000 0.000 0.190 0.402 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.302
Prop. detection 52 0.227 0.429 0.316 0.478 0.273 0.467 0.200 0.414
Several observations can be made in Table 4.2. First, asking and market prices do
not differ substantially across treatments, and they both appear to be above the non-
cooperative equilibrium price of 41.19 This implies that prices rise with firms’ attempts
to collude. Second, combining the results in Table 4.2 with Figure 4.3 shows that
19Pairwise Mann-Whitney U (MWU) tests show that asking and market prices do not differ
significantly between the treatments. See Section 4.4.2 for a detailed discussion of market prices.
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cheating occurred with 100% probability on the few agreements that were reached on
price 46 in Baseline. This suggests that subjects appear to have a clear understanding
about the fact that collusion on price 46 is not an equilibrium in Baseline. Furthermore,
no cartel formed on price 46 was detected in EndoD because of the low detection
probability of 3.3% in this treatment.
A comparison with the results of the Fine treatment in the experiment in Chapter 3
of this thesis shows that the more complicated coordination problem in this essay’s
experiment reduces the prevalence of price agreements. The comparability is given
because both experiments feature the same three firm homogeneous goods price compe-
tition game with very similar discount factors (0.66 in the Fine treatment in Chapter
3 compared to 0.66 for collusion on price 52 and 0.64 for collusion on price 46 in this
experiment). The main difference arises from the difficulty of reaching price agreements.
Whereas in Chapter 3 price agreements merely require subjects to unanimously express
the support for such an agreement with a pre-determined cartel price, in this essay’s
experiment they need to agree on the cartel price as well. Comparing the results in the
two experiments, the additional layer of complexity results in a much higher incidence
of cheating than in the Fine treatment in Chapter 3, in which it is just above 40%.
4.4.1 Subjects’ suggested cartel prices
The hypotheses are tested with nonparametric hypothesis tests as well as with regression
analysis. The hypotheses tests allow for simple first tests of Hypotheses 1 to 3, but
feature low power as they disregard more than 98% of the data. This follows because
the Mann-Whitney U (MWU) test requires to condense the 20 observations of each
subject that contains information on subject-, market-, and time-specific determinants of
suggested cartel prices and interactions into a single (static) observation for each market.
Thus, unlike the regression analysis it does not allow for a ceteris paribus analysis of
the different actions and effects that determine the results and hence cannot properly
capture important dynamics that arise from subjects’ learning over time. Therefore,
the nonparametric hypothesis tests are complementary to the regression analysis, which
represents our main tool for the analysis.
We examine individual subjects’ choices of suggested cartel prices with a multi-level
multinomial logit model with random effects (random coefficients) at the subject and
the market levels. The results are presented in Table 4.3. Columns II to V present
the estimated average marginal effects (with their cluster-robust standard errors in
brackets) of the regressors on subjects’ choices of price agreements, with the choices
being no agreement (0), an agreement on 46, an agreement on 52, or an agreement
on either price (indifference between 46 and 52). The inclusion of lagged dependent
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Table 4.3: Suggested cartel agreement – Multi-level multinomial logit results
0 46 52 46/52
Lag asking price 0.003 0.001 0.006∗ −0.010∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Lag lowest seller −0.046∗ 0.010 0.016 0.020
(0.026) (0.016) (0.019) (0.022)
Lag agreement 46 −0.150 −0.033 0.097 0.085
(0.151) (0.059) (0.102) (0.124)
Lag agreement 52 −0.075 −0.086∗∗∗ 0.087 0.074
(0.087) (0.023) (0.062) (0.074)
Lag choice 46 −0.231∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ −0.010 0.098∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.033) (0.031) (0.037)
Lag choice 52 −0.309∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.025) (0.037) (0.033)
Lag choice 46/52 −0.427∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.018) (0.029) (0.050)
Lag detection 46 0.169∗∗ −0.028 −0.024 −0.118∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.035) (0.057) (0.033)
Lag detection 52 0.150∗∗ −0.030 −0.056 −0.064
(0.071) (0.030) (0.034) (0.048)
Lag cheating 46 0.186 0.026 −0.115∗∗∗ −0.097
(0.160) (0.104) (0.034) (0.075)
Lag cheating 52 0.015 0.127∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.051
(0.069) (0.070) (0.020) (0.057)
EndoF −0.068 0.091∗ −0.070 0.047
(0.076) (0.053) (0.044) (0.054)
EndoD −0.099 0.154∗∗ −0.016 −0.040
(0.072) (0.063) (0.046) (0.055)
BothEndo −0.005 0.098∗ −0.046 −0.047
(0.065) (0.058) (0.048) (0.047)
Period 0.014∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.008∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Automatic price 52 −0.042 0.029 −0.035 0.049
(0.048) (0.025) (0.038) (0.039)
Risk attitude – 2 −0.084 0.011 0.080 −0.007
(0.115) (0.056) (0.089) (0.070)
Risk attitude – 3 0.007 −0.005 0.047 −0.049
(0.104) (0.068) (0.089) (0.072)
Risk attitude – 4 −0.202 0.073 0.164 −0.034
(0.127) (0.075) (0.126) (0.069)
Risk attitude – 5 −0.009 −0.015 0.030 −0.006
(0.117) (0.072) (0.097) (0.067)
Risk attitude – 6 −0.039 −0.003 0.034 0.008
(0.110) (0.061) (0.080) (0.075)
Pseudo-LL -2135.055
Observations 2736
Notes: Values represent average marginal effects. Cluster-robust standard errors in paren-
theses. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. Random effects
(coefficients) are included at the subject and the market levels.
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and independent variables allows to capture dynamics in subjects’ behaviour and
represents an autoregressive distributed-lag model, which is a workhorse model in
applied econometrics to model dynamics in time series and panel data (Pesaran and
Shin, 1998; Banerjee et al., 1990). Their coefficients measure how subjects react to
choices and outcomes in the previous period when making a choice with respect to their
suggested cartel prices in the present period.
Lag asking price denotes the price that a subject set in the previous period. Lag lowest
seller is an indicator variable showing whether the subject set the lowest price in the
previous period (such that she made a positive profit). Lag agreement 46 (52) controls for
the effects of previous periods’ active price agreement on 46 (52) on subjects’ suggested
cartel prices in this period. Lag choice 46, 52, and 46/52 are indicator variables of
a subject’s suggested agreement price in the previous period, with no agreement (0)
serving as the baseline. Given that a price agreement was in place in the previous
period, Lag cheating 46 (52) and Lag detection 46 (52) indicate whether cheating or
detection occurred on the respective agreement. EndoF, EndoD, and BothEndo are
treatment indicator variables that measure the treatment effects, and Baseline serves as
the baseline. Period measures the period effects. Automatic price 52 is an indicator
variable for the markets in which a price of 52 is chosen automatically if all three
subjects in the group are indifferent between both cartel prices. Finally, Risk attitude
measures subjects’ risk attitudes elicited in the risk elicitation task based on Eckel and
Grossman (2008). This variable contains discrete values between 1 and 6 where the
value of 1 represents the highest level of risk aversion and serves as the baseline. In
order to rule out potential biases resulting from the specification of the functional form
of the risk attitude measure, we include 5 indicator variables for the different degrees of
risk aversion and use risk attitude with a level of 1 as the baseline.
The multi-level multinomial logit model does not allow for a direct test of the hypotheses
related to particular included variables. Instead, we need to rely on indirect tests that
are derived from different patterns in the data that are likely to arise if the hypotheses
hold true. Ceteris paribus, we would expect Hypothesis 1 to lead to more agreements to
be reached on price 46 in EndoF, EndoD, and BothEndo than in Baseline. This is the
case if the marginal effects of the three indicator variables indicating these treatments
are positive and significant in Column 46. If Hypothesis 3 holds true, ceteris paribus, we
would expect no significant differences in the marginal effects of the treatments EndoF,
EndoD, and BothEndo with respect to the choice of the suggested cartel price 46. If
Hypothesis 4 is correct and risk attitudes do not determine the suggested cartel price,
the marginal effects of the risk attitude indicator variables should be insignificant.
Finding evidence in support of Hypothesis 2 necessitates relying on observing more
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complex patterns for deriving any inference. Indications in support of Hypothesis 2
can be derived from asymmetries in reactions of subjects to cheating and detection
on prices 46 and 52 in the previous period in suggesting cartel prices in the present
period. In the presence of strategic uncertainty, subjects should react to cheating and
detection on price agreements on price 52 by becoming more likely to suggest the low
cartel price 46. Similarly, persistence in subjects’ choices of the suggested cartel price
over time or reactions to agreements on prices 46 or 52 reached in the previous period
can point towards behaviour in line with Hypothesis 2. This is the case if subjects over
time tend to adjust their suggested cartel prices from 52 to 46. These asymmetries can
be identified by comparing signs and significant of the respective variables on cheating,
detection, past suggested cartel prices, and cartel prices reached in Columns 46 and 52.
We first address Hypothesis 1. Taken together, the results in Figure 4.3a and Table 4.2
suggest that relatively fewer price agreements are reached on price 46 in Baseline and
that all of them are cheated upon. We use the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank
test to test whether subjects are less likely to suggest the cartel price 46 than the cartel
price 52 in Baseline. It tests the H0 of an equal proportion of both suggested cartel
prices across all markets within a treatment and separated by treatments. For this, the
proportion of periods a subject suggests 46 and 52 as the cartel price in the 20 regular
periods are calculated and then compared with each other. The p-values of these tests
are reported in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test:
Prop. of subjects suggesting cartel price 46 compared to 52
Baseline EndoF EndoD BothEndo
0.007 0.937 0.556 0.480
As can be seen from Figure 4.3a and Table 4.4, there is evidence that subjects in
treatment Baseline suggest 46 as a cartel price significantly less often than cartel price
52. This result is also evident from the regression analysis. The marginal effects of the
treatment indicators in Table 4.3 show that, ceteris paribus, subjects are between 9.1%
to 15.4% more likely to suggest the low price 46 in the treatments with endogenous
enforcement than in Baseline. An additional indirect way to test Hypothesis 1 is to
compare the proportion of suggested agreements on price 46 across markets between
the treatments using the MWU test as done in Table 4.5. This draws on the result
in Figure 4.3a that the proportion of suggested cartel prices on price 46 appears to
be larger in the three treatments with endogenous enforcement than in Baseline. The
p-values of pairwise comparisons across the treatments both for suggested cartel prices
46 and 52 are reported in Table 4.5. For this, the proportions of periods a subject
suggests 46 and 52 as the cartel price in the 20 regular periods are calculated as the
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average across time and markets within a treatment. These averages are then compared
across the treatments. Indeed, in line with the other evidence the indirect test shows
that the proportion of suggested cartel prices of 46 are lower in Baseline than in EndoD
and BothEndo. Taken together, we find strong evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.
Table 4.5: MWU test p-values: Prop. of markets’ suggested price agreements
Variable EndoF EndoD BothEndo
Sugg. agreements on price 46
Baseline 0.111 0.013 0.082
EndoF 0.111 0.707
EndoD 0.224
Sugg. agreements on price 52
Baseline 0.285 0.623 0.235
EndoF 0.602 0.931
EndoD 0.469
Result 1: In Baseline, the low cartel price is rarely chosen and results in
unstable price agreements.
The intuition behind Result 1 is straightforward: the low cartel price does not produce
stable cartels in Baseline because it is not a payoff-dominant collusive equilibrium.
It follows that, ceteris paribus, positive payoffs are necessary for collusion but payoff
dominance does not have to be the most suitable equilibria selection condition to describe
subjects’ choices. Furthermore, it confirms that subjects show an understanding of the
game.
Next, we test Hypothesis 2 that subjects choose the low cartel price more often than the
high cartel price in the treatments with endogenous enforcement. No clear preference
for the low cartel price is evident from Figure 4.3b for the treatments with endogenous
enforcement. This is in line with the results of the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank
test in Table 4.4 that tests whether the proportion of suggested agreements on prices
46 and 52 are different from each other. This is in contrast to the regression results in
Table 4.3, in which the dynamics and evolution of subjects’ preferences with respect to
the suggested cartel prices can be captured. First, the treatment indicator variables
show that, ceteris paribus, subjects in the treatments with endogenous enforcement
are between 9.8% and 15.4% more likely to suggest the low cartel price of 46 than
in Baseline. Second, the Lag cheating variables suggest that cheating in the previous
period strongly discourages subjects from choosing price 52 as the agreement price
choice in the present period. However, cheating on an agreement on price 52 in the
previous period increases the probability of subjects choosing 46 in the present period.
Hence, subjects learn about the different levels of riskiness and tend to prefer the low
cartel price with the lower riskiness of collusion to the higher cartel price as a reaction
to cheating. Third, the Lag choice variables suggest that, ceteris paribus, subjects show
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a 5.8% probability to switch from price 52 to 46, but no such substitution pattern can
be observed for the opposite direction.
The divergence in results might follow from the static analysis conducted in the
nonparametric hypothesis tests. If subjects need several periods to learn about the
riskiness of collusion attached to both cartel prices, a preference for the low cartel price
of 46 might only develop over time. This might especially be the case when attempts of
(successful) collusion only occur for the first time after several periods into the game.
The regression analysis makes more efficient use of the data and can capture these
dynamics in the game. We therefore prefer the regression results to the nonparametric
tests in Table 4.4. Thus, we find evidence in support of Hypothesis 2, which indicates
composition deterrence in line with the model predictions.
Result 2: Subjects tend to suggest the low cartel price in the treatments
with endogenous enforcement.
The substitutability between fines and detection probabilities in the treatments with
endogenous enforcement is addressed next. In line with Hypothesis 3, comparisons of
the proportions of the suggested cartel prices of both 46 and 52 across the treatments
in Table 4.5 show that there are no significant differences in subjects’ choices in the
treatments with endogenous enforcement. This is in line with the results of the regression
analysis in Table 4.3, as is indicated by a lack of significance of the marginal effects
of the treatment indicator variables for the suggested cartel price of 52 in Column
52. A similar result arises for the low cartel price of 46. To formally compare the
relevant treatment effects on the suggestion of cartel price 46, we conduct pairwise
Wald tests of the treatment indicator coefficients in Column 46 in Table 4.3. The test
results do not reject the Null hypothesis of equality of coefficients with p-values of 0.169
(EndoF/EndoD), 0.765 (EndoF/BothEndo), and 0.103 (EndoD/BothEndo). Therefore,
the results are in line with the predictions based on the experimental design establishing
equality of the fines and detection probabilities for prices 46 and 52 across all treatments.
Further, the regression results show that there are no significant differences between
treatments for subjects’ choices not to collude or to be indifferent between the two
cartel prices. As such, several tests provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 3.
Result 3: Subjects’ suggested cartel prices are not sensitive to variations
in the fine and the detection probability that feature the same expected
punishment and riskiness of collusion.
As Baseline serves as the baseline in the regressions, concerns may arise due to the
different design and unique collusive equilibrium of the price 52 in Baseline such that
the coefficients for this treatment might differ from those in the other treatments.
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Hence, to ensure the robustness of the regression results, we re-estimate the multi-level
multinomial logit model but exclude Baseline and use EndoF as the baseline. This
potentially provides a more homogeneous sub-sample, increases data precision, and
reduces the standard errors of the estimates. The results of this robustness check can
be found in Table 4.8 in the appendix in Section 4.6.1. Note that almost all qualitative
findings shown in Table 4.3 are supported by the regression estimates based on the
sub-sample in Table 4.8, and that the quantitative results only change marginally.
As such, Result 3 and the estimated marginal effects are not driven by pooling all
treatments for the estimations.20
Finally, we test Hypothesis 4 relating to the impact of the risk attitude on subjects’
suggested cartel prices using the regression analysis in Table 4.3. Indicator variables
control for the different degrees of risk aversion without specifying a particular functional
form for its effect on subjects’ choices. Recall that we measure 6 different degrees of risk
aversion using an Eckel and Grossman (2008) style risk elicitation task, and that the
measure is negatively correlated with risk aversion (a value of 1 indicates the highest
level of risk aversion). Strikingly, despite this very conservative approach of including
the different levels as indicator variables, not a single marginal effect is significant. Yet,
it also has to be tested whether the different coefficients are jointly significant. For
this purpose, we conduct joint F-tests of the coefficients for the risk attitude indicator
variables for all outcome regressions. However, in each case the joint F-test reports that
the variables are jointly insignificant with p-values of 0.252 for outcome regression 46,
0.327 for 52, and 0.790 for 46/52.21 Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is supported by the data.
Result 4: Risk attitude does not determine subjects’ cartel price choices.
A possible explanation for the above result may be the length of interaction of 20
periods, which enables subjects to engage in learning about their partners’ strategies
through repeated interactions. This learning and the associated effects on beliefs might
dominate the effects of the risk attitude on choice. However, when information is limited
and learning could not take place yet, subjects’ actions in the presence of coordination
difficulties may be affected by their risk attitudes. This might be the case especially
20Note that we obtain the above result in a framework that is relevant to the field and features an
overproportionate increase in the punishment compared to an increase in the cartel profit resulting
from a higher overcharge. The result may therefore not be generalised to enforcement regimes that
have different punishment strategies, i.e. punishment that increases linearly or underproportionately
to the increase in cartel profit, which have little relevance for the field.
21Similarly, the risk attitude coefficients are jointly insignificant in the specification that excludes
Baseline, with p-values of 0.144 for 52 and 0.579 for 46/52. Only for the choice of 46, the risk
indicator variables are jointly significant (p-value 0.038). This result is driven by the single significant
coefficient of Risk attitude – 4. If risk attitude indeed plays a role, then the other coefficients should
be individually significant as well. We therefore do not consider this as sufficient and robust evidence
for the significance of risk attitude for price choices.
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at the beginning of the game. Therefore, we re-run the same model again, but limit
it to the first three periods of the game. However, the results stay the same and joint
F-tests again indicate that the coefficients are jointly insignificant.22 This suggests that
risk attitude does not drive the results in the first few periods either.
4.4.2 Cartel prices reached and welfare effects
In the final part of this section, the welfare effects of endogenous enforcement are
analysed at the market level. First, pairwise comparisons of market prices and the
overall proportions of cartel formation between treatments are conducted using MWU
tests.23 Although Table 4.2 reports that average market prices are slightly higher in the
treatments with endogenous enforcement (in particular in EndoF), the p-values shown
in Table 4.6 suggest that there are no significant differences in market prices across all
treatments.
Similarly, the p-values suggest that the proportions of cartel formation do not differ
across the treatments. Recall that with exogenous enforcement in Baseline and endoge-
nous enforcement in the other treatments, a lack of overall differences might provide
evidence for the absence of significant welfare changes induced by endogenous enforce-
ment. Yet, this lack of differences might be due to the trade-off between frequency and
composition deterrence.
Table 4.6: MWU test p-values: Market prices and prop. of markets with agreements
Variable EndoF EndoD BothEndo
Market prices




Baseline 1.000 0.702 0.768
EndoF 0.836 0.883
EndoD 0.977
To address the factors underlying this lack of differences, regression analysis on cartel
price agreements that were reached is conducted using a multinomial logit model with
random effects at the market level. The estimated average marginal effects (and cluster-
robust standard errors in brackets) are reported in Table 4.7. Unlike the multi-level
multinomial logit model used to analyse subjects’ cartel price choices, the regression
table of cartels’ price choices does not feature a column for the indifference between
22The results can be found in Table 4.9 in the appendix in Section 4.6.1.
23Given the instability of agreements observed in Table 4.2, the proportion of markets with newly
reached price agreements is regarded as a more insightful measure of cartel formation for this purpose.
Yet, the same results arise with the alternative measure of active cartel agreements.
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the two prices, as price agreements can only be reached on a single price. Most of the
regressors in Table 4.7 are introduced before in the discussion of Table 4.3. As the
regressions in Table 4.7 are based on market level observations, we use Lag market
price to instead of Lag asking price included in Table 4.3. Further, due to the fact
that the observations are at the market level, it cannot be controlled for individual
subjects’ past suggested cartel prices. Instead, we control for the effect of previous
periods’ price agreements that were reached on prices 46 and 52 on the choice of cartel
price agreements in the present period with Lag agreement on 46 and Lag agreement
on 52, respectively.24
We start with the uncertainty-driven composition deterrence, as it is our primary focus.
The marginal effects of the treatment indicator variables in Table 4.7 suggest that,
compared to Baseline, fewer cartels are formed on the high cartel price 52 in EndoD
and BothEndo. As the overall proportions of cartel formation do not differ across
the treatments, this indicates that more cartels are formed on the low cartel price
46 in these two treatments. As such, we observe that endogenous enforcement leads
to composition deterrence that, on average, reduces the cartel overcharge. A similar
treatment effect is missing in EndoF, which is in line with the observation from Figure
4.3a that there are no large differences in the choice of 52 between Baseline and EndoF.
Yet, a significant effect of EndoF might only be missing because the treatment effect
could be captured by other coefficients already.
24Unlike in Table 4.3, we do not include separate effects of cheating on prices 46 and 52 in Table
4.7, as covariance matrices for the marginal effects cannot be calculated if both effects are determined
separately.
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Table 4.7: Choice of price agreements – Multinomial logit
0 46 52
Lag agreement on 46 −0.825∗∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 0.082
(0.066) (0.198) (0.150)
Lag agreement on 52 −0.828∗∗∗ 0.318 0.511
(0.057) (0.318) (0.321)
Lag cheating 0.138∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.019) (0.016)
Lag detection 46 0.064∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.056∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.011) (0.017)
Lag detection 52 0.093∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗
(0.019) (0.014) (0.019)
Period 0.007∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Automatic price 52 −0.005 −0.006 0.011
(0.020) (0.013) (0.017)
Lag market price 0.009 −0.008 −0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
EndoF −0.030 0.041 −0.011
(0.041) (0.036) (0.017)
EndoD 0.002 0.032 −0.034∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.017)




Notes: Values represent average marginal effects. Cluster-robust standard errors in paren-
theses. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. Random effects
(coefficients) are included at the market level.
Given the evidence of composition deterrence in EndoD and BothEndo, ceteris paribus,
market prices should be lower in these treatments than in Baseline. The fact that
market prices do not differ significantly implies that there must be an opposing effect
that is driving market prices up. The dynamics of cartel prices that are agreed upon
provide some indications that the frequency deterrence is reduced. As shown in Table
4.7, the Lag agreement marginal effects indicate that price agreements on price 46
are persistent whereas those on price 52 are not. Furthermore, the Lag detection
variables suggest that detection of an agreement on 46 in the previous period does
not reduce the probability that an agreement is reached on 46 in this period, but
significantly reduces the probability of reaching an agreement on 52. Hence, while
endogenous enforcement induces composition deterrence towards the low price with the
lower riskiness of collusion, it also stabilises collusion on this price.
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To conclude, we find strong evidence in support of the trade-off generated by endogenous
enforcement on deterrence and welfare. First, it reduces cartel overcharges and increases
the complexity of cartel coordination rendering reaching cartel agreements more difficult.
Second, it leads to an adverse effect on frequency deterrence as it encourages additional
collusion on the low cartel price and stabilises collusion on the low cartel price. As
the result of these counteracting effects, market prices and the proportions of cartel
formation do not differ significantly between treatments with exogenous and endogenous
enforcement, and the effects of endogenous enforcement on overall cartel harm are
unclear.
There are additional reasons for this lack of a clear result to arise. First, as mentioned
in Section 3.2, the experiment is designed to examine the effects of strategic uncertainty
on cartel price choices. Fines and detection probabilities are chosen such that the
expected profitability between cartel prices 46 and 52 is equal, which allows us to focus
purely on the uncertainty-driven incentives. Yet, one would expect stronger effects of
endogenous enforcement if it imposes a penalty regime that leads to a relatively higher
expected profitability for collusion on price 46 than on 52. Thus, as a result of the
focus of this study on the indirect effects of endogenous enforcement on cartel price
choices through strategic uncertainty, only lower bounds for potential overall effects of
endogenous punishment on cartels are estimated. Second, the communication protocol
is designed to clearly capture individual subjects’ preferences for cartel prices and to
measure the effects of strategic uncertainty on decision-making. This comes at the cost
of rendering coordination more difficult. Alternative communication protocols such as
free-form chat may be more effective in establishing and sustaining collusion, as they
allow bargaining to precede cartel price choices. This is in contrast to our experimental
design, in which bargaining is only possible through signalling over the course of several
periods of the game.
4.5 Conclusion
As antitrust enforcement cannot deter cartels altogether because to do so would be
prohibitively costly, composition deterrence might offer the prospect to reduce the harm
caused by cartels. In addition, it represents an important determinant of the overall
welfare effects of antitrust laws. To better understand the properties of endogenous
antitrust enforcement, this essay seeks to establish its effects on composition deterrence
that stem from its impact on cartel prices through strategic uncertainty. For this
purpose, we conduct a laboratory experiment with non-cooperative infinitely repeated
games, in which subjects engage in competition in homogeneous goods price competition
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triopolies. Subjects can coordinate on prices but face the risk of being detected and
fined if they collude. The experimental design and chosen parameters allow us to
abstract from the profitability-driven incentives induced by endogenous enforcement
and focus on the indirect effects of strategic uncertainty on subjects’ decision-making.
The implemented endogenous enforcement regime features an overproportionate increase
in the expected punishment compared to an increase in the cartel profit resulting from
a higher overcharge, and gives rise to payoff-equivalent collusive equilibria that bear
different levels of the riskiness of collusion.
The results confirm that payoff dominance is an insufficient criterion to explain cartel
prices in the presence of endogenous punishment. In line with the prisoner’s other
dilemma framework of Blonski et al. (2011) and Blonski and Spagnolo (2015), subjects
are found to tend to select the collusive equilibrium with the lower riskiness of collusion
in the presence of two Pareto-dominant collusive equilibria. This highlights the role of
strategic uncertainty in a cartel’s coordination problem. Overproportionately increasing
punishment steers cartels towards a lower cartel price by aggravating the cooperation
risks. In addition, we find that cartel price selection is insensitive to different combina-
tions of fines and detection probabilities and is not driven by subjects’ risk attitudes.
Further, the results show a trade-off between increased composition deterrence and
reduced frequency deterrence in the presence of endogenous enforcement. On the one
hand, we find strong evidence of the strategic uncertainty-driven overcharge reducing
composition deterrence. On the other hand, the frequency deterrence properties of
the enforcement are reduced. This follows from the fact that cartels can self-select
themselves into weaker expected enforcement by colluding on low prices only. As a
result of these opposing effects and the study’s focus on the indirect effects through
strategic uncertainty, the overall welfare effects of endogenous enforcement remain
unclear.
Future research should study the trade-off between frequency and composition deterrence
in the context of cartels further. Although a large body of literature exists for the two
forms of deterrence, little is known about how they interact under different enforcement
regimes. For example, while the enforcement featured in our study focuses purely on
uncertainty-driven effects, the trade-off may differ when profitability-driven effects are
present as well. Several studies (e.g. Alm et al., 1995, 1992) have found that subjects do
not react to punishment in accordance to its functional form. Therefore, the observed
behaviour might differ from the optimal behaviour as predicted by theory.
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Auxiliary figures and tables
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(b) Asking prices and previous cheating
Figure 4.4a plots the distributions of both asking and market prices across treatments
in the first 20 periods. As can be seen, homogeneous goods price competition and
cheating leads market prices to be below the asking prices. As stated above, the
predominant price set by individuals is 41, which is the only symmetric non-cooperative
equilibrium that yields positive payoffs for all subjects. Figure 4.4b plots the distribution
of asking prices dependent on whether cheating occurred in the previous period on a
price agreement reached in that period. Remarkably, although many agreements were
reached on 52, cheating primarily leads subjects to charge prices in the range between
41 and 45. This is evident from Figure 4.4a as well. In other words, subjects that
deviate from agreements on price 52 tend to undercut prices by charging prices below
the low cartel price of 46.
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Table 4.8: Suggested cartel agreement excluding Baseline – Multi-level multinomial
logit results
0 46 52 46/52
Lag asking price 0.004 0.002 0.004 −0.010∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Lag lowest seller −0.045 0.018 0.000 0.027
(0.033) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023)
Lag agreement 46 −0.126 −0.039 0.101 0.064
(0.147) (0.074) (0.100) (0.107)
Lag agreement 52 0.039 −0.109∗∗∗ 0.039 0.031
(0.076) (0.025) (0.036) (0.074)
Lag choice 46 −0.227∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ −0.028 0.082∗∗
(0.046) (0.032) (0.034) (0.036)
Lag choice 52 −0.321∗∗∗ 0.063∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.027) (0.037) (0.056)
Lag choice 46/52 −0.443∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.058∗ 0.573∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.023) (0.035) (0.068)
Lag detection 46 0.140∗∗ −0.029 −0.013 −0.098∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.044) (0.059) (0.033)
Lag detection 52 0.106 −0.035 −0.041 −0.066
(0.084) (0.035) (0.029) (0.060)
Lag cheating 46 0.181 0.033 −0.109∗∗∗ −0.104
(0.166) (0.121) (0.037) (0.069)
Lag cheating 52 −0.095∗ 0.197∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.035
(0.055) (0.083) (0.018) (0.056)
EndoD −0.029 0.055 0.055 −0.081∗
(0.074) (0.041) (0.057) (0.046)
BothEndo 0.070 −0.003 0.020 −0.086∗∗
(0.070) (0.041) (0.056) (0.040)
Period 0.015∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.008∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Automatic price 52 −0.010 0.011 −0.041 0.040
(0.054) (0.033) (0.042) (0.045)
Risk attitude – 2 −0.019 0.022 0.031 −0.034
(0.112) (0.052) (0.079) (0.068)
Risk attitude – 3 0.037 0.026 0.027 −0.090
(0.107) (0.084) (0.085) (0.075)
Risk attitude – 4 −0.278∗∗ 0.213∗∗ 0.121 −0.056
(0.085) (0.085) (0.115) (0.074)
Risk attitude – 5 0.007 0.058 −0.009 −0.056
(0.152) (0.118) (0.100) (0.070)
Risk attitude – 6 −0.004 0.048 −0.056 0.012
(0.112) (0.078) (0.052) (0.087)
Pseudo-LL -1587.218
Observations 2052
Notes: Values represent average marginal effects. Cluster-robust standard errors in paren-
theses. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. The Baseline treatment
observations are excluded, and EndoF observations serve as the baseline. Random effects
(coefficients) are included at the subject and the market levels.
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Table 4.9: Suggested cartel agreement in the first three periods – Multi-level
multinomial logit results
0 46 52 46/52
Lag asking price 0.017∗ −0.016∗ −0.007 0.006
(0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009)
Lag lowest seller 0.061 −0.053 −0.095∗ 0.086
(0.062) (0.053) (0.054) (0.060)
Lag agreement 46 0.059 −0.188∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗ −0.168∗∗
(0.120) (0.018) (0.102) (0.065)
Lag agreement 52 −0.065 −0.222∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ −0.073
(0.104) (0.020) (0.127) (0.088)
Lag choice 46 −0.227∗∗∗ 0.067 0.011 0.149∗∗
(0.049) (0.058) (0.073) (0.066)
Lag choice 52 −0.355∗∗∗ 0.030 0.279∗∗∗ 0.046
(0.043) (0.058) (0.066) (0.068)
Lag choice 46/52 −0.387∗∗∗ −0.136∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.036) (0.056) (0.060)
Lag detection 52 0.406∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗ −0.149∗ −0.150∗∗
(0.125) (0.045) (0.082) (0.066)
Lag cheating 46 −0.194∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ −0.286∗∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.020) (0.031) (0.075)
Lag cheating 52 −0.215∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ −0.239∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.022) (0.036) (0.032)
EndoF 0.076 −0.020 −0.088 0.032
(0.068) (0.066) (0.065) (0.056)
EndoD 0.011 0.161∗∗ −0.075 −0.098∗
(0.068) (0.076) (0.054) (0.054)
BothEndo 0.001 0.203∗∗∗ −0.117∗ −0.086∗∗
(0.075) (0.077) (0.067) (0.044)
Period 0.073 −0.082∗∗ −0.015 0.025
(0.048) (0.037) (0.057) (0.044)
Automatic price 52 0.004 −0.003 −0.047 0.046
(0.040) (0.039) (0.046) (0.042)
Risk attitude – 2 0.009 0.059 0.019 −0.087
(0.070) (0.083) (0.081) (0.060)
Risk attitude – 3 0.068 −0.056 −0.038 0.026
(0.087) (0.072) (0.076) (0.080)
Risk attitude – 4 −0.196∗∗∗ 0.146 0.101 −0.052
(0.066) (0.102) (0.090) (0.059)
Risk attitude – 5 −0.020 0.063 0.008 −0.051
(0.076) (0.095) (0.104) (0.061)
Risk attitude – 6 0.019 0.086 −0.022 −0.083
(0.084) (0.094) (0.077) (0.058)
Pseudo-LL -296.673
Observations 288
Notes: Values represent average marginal effects. Cluster-robust standard errors in paren-
theses. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. Includes only the first
three periods. Random effects (coefficients) are included at the subject and the market
levels. The variable Lag detection 46 could not be included, as detection on this price did
not occur in the first three periods.
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4.6.2 Instructions (BothEndo – automatic price of 52)
Instructions
Welcome and thank you for taking part in this experiment. In this experiment you
can earn money. How much money you will earn depends on your decision and on the
decision made by other participants in this room. The experiment will proceed in two
parts. The currency used in the experiment is experimental points. Each experimental
point is worth 12 pence. All earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment.
Every participant receives exactly the same instructions. All decisions will be anonymous,
that is, your identity will not be revealed to other participants at any time during or
after the experiment. It is very important that you remain silent. If you have any
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter
will come to you.
Instructions for Part 1
In the first part of the experiment you will be asked to choose from six different gambles
(as shown below). Each circle represents a different gamble and you must choose the
one that you prefer. Each circle is divided in half. The two numbers in each circle
represent the amount of experimental points the gamble will give you.
50%  50% 50%  50%
50%  50% 50%  50%
50%  50% 50%  50%





-0.5 14.5 5 5
2 11 3 9
4 7
An experimenter will toss a coin to determine which half of the circle is chosen. A
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volunteer will come to the front of the room and confirm the result of the coin toss. If
the outcome is heads, you will receive the number of points in the light grey area of the
circle you have chosen. If the outcome is tails, you will receive the number of points
shown in the dark grey area of the circle you have chosen. Note that no matter which
gamble you pick, each outcome will occur with a 50% chance.
Please select the gamble of your choice by entering the number of your gamble (1,
2, 3, 4, 5, or 6) in the field “I choose Gamble” and press OK.
Once everyone has made their decision, Part 1 will end and we will move on to Part 2
of the experiment.
Instructions for Part 2
In this part of the experiment you will form a group with two other randomly chosen
participants in this room. Throughout the experiment you are matched with the same
two participants. All groups of three participants act independently of each other. This
part of the experiment will be repeated for at least 20 rounds. From the 20th round
onwards, in each round there is a 20 out of 100 (20%) chance that the experiment
will end.
Your job:
You are in the role of a firm that is in a market with two other firms. In each round,
you will have to set a price for your product. This price must be one of the following
prices:
40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52
You will only sell the product if the other firms do not set a lower price than you in
that round. If you sell the product, your earnings are equal to the difference between
the price and the cost, which is 40:
Earnings = Price - 40.
Therefore, you will not make any profit if you set a price of 40. If you do not sell the
product, you will not get any earnings but you will not incur costs either. If two or
more firms set the same lowest price, the earnings will be shared equally between them.
Before you set your price, you may decide to agree with the other firms to set the same
price and share the earnings. There are two prices you can agree on, 46 and 52. If you
agree with the other two firms to set the price of 46 and all firms set 46, each firm will
get a profit of 2 experimental points. If you agree with the other two firms to set the
price of 52 and all firms set 52, each firm will get a profit of 4 experimental points.
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The picture below shows how this will look on the computer. All firms get asked
whether they want to agree on prices.
If you want to agree on prices, you can indicate so by choosing the price you want to
agree on. You can choose either 46 or 52, or you can choose both prices. The other
two firms will do the same. If all three firms wish to agree on prices, and there exists a
common price among the three firms’ chosen prices, an agreement is reached on that
common price.
If all three firms choose both prices, implying that they are fine agreeing on both prices,
then a price agreement on 52 will be reached automatically. If there is no common price
among firms’ choices, no price agreement is reached. For example, no common price is
reached if two firms suggest price 46 and one firm suggest price 52.
If you do not wish to agree on prices with the other two firms, you can indicate so
by choosing the option No. If at least one firm chooses No, there will be no price
agreement.
The following table summarizes how price agreement can be reached:
Price agreement
is reached, if
All three firms wish to agree on prices
and they reach one common price
Agreed price is the common
price (46 or 52)
All three firms wish to agree on prices
and they reach two common prices (when
all firms choose both 46 and 52)
Agreed price is 52
Price agreement
is not reached, if
All three firms wish to agree on prices and they reach no common price
At least one firm does not wish to agree on prices
After deciding whether you would like to form a price agreement, you have to set a
price by filling the “Choose a price” box shown below. If a price agreement is reached, a
message will appear above the “Choose a price” box showing the price that you agreed
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on. If no price agreement is reached in that round, no message will appear and you
have to set a price without being able to coordinate with the other firms.
However, the agreement is not binding and you are not required to set the agreed price.
After your price choice, you will be informed about the prices that you and the other
firms set in that round. If you successfully reach a price agreement, the agreement may
be discovered by the computer. The computer can discover the agreement on price 46
with a 10 out of 100 (10%) chance, and can discover the agreement on price 52 with
a 20 out of 100 (20%) chance. If the agreement on price 46 is discovered, a fine of 4
experimental points has to be paid. If the agreement on price 52 is discovered, a fine of
12 experimental points has to be paid. If no price agreement is reached, you cannot be
discovered or receive a fine.
The chance of being discovered and the fine depend on the price agreement reached,
but not on the prices you set afterwards. The table below summarizes the chance of
being discovered by the computer and the associated fines:
A price agreement can be discovered as long as it has not been discovered in a previous
round. Once this has happened, you will not be fined in the future, unless you make
a price agreement again. If you and the other two firms had several price agreements
and none of them has been discovered, the chance of being discovered and fine always
depend on the latest price agreement.
The picture below summarizes the structure of Part 2 of the experiment.
At the end of each round, you will be told the earnings you have made in this round. If
you have reached a price agreement, you will also be told whether the agreement has
been discovered by the computer.
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Final payment:
At the beginning of the experiment you start with an initial endowment of 50 points =
6 GBP. The earnings you make in each round will be converted into cash. Each point
is worth 12 pence, and we will round up the final payment to the next 10 pence. We
guarantee a minimum earning of 2 GBP.
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Chapter 5
An ex-post evaluation of
multi-market merger decisions by
the European Commission
5.1 Introduction
1 The operation of a firm – and with it its business strategy – often depends on the
interrelation between its activity in different product and geographic markets. Such
interdependencies exist for many reasons including the strategic allocation of resources
for their most efficient use or firms’ attempts to leverage market power across markets.
Despite the fact that such a multi-market presence represents the norm and not the
exception, its effects on firm behaviour are seldom considered. These effects often
come in the form of spillover effects, in which a firm’s presence or behaviour in one
market affects its operation in other markets. In competition economics, spillover
effects play an important role in the analysis of mergers and acquisitions.2 For example,
the effects of a merger on post-merger price equilibria and their dependence on the
multi-market presence of a firm are often of high interest to competition authorities.
Prominent examples for the importance of spillover effects in merger control are some
high-profile mergers in the airlines industry, in which multi-market contact and networks,
two common sources of spillover effects, have played major roles in merger control.
Nevertheless, scope and scale of spillover effects in practice remain elusive.
The lack of consideration given to spillover effects poses the question to what extent
they potentially undermine the validity of predictions about (anticompetitive) effects of
1This chapter is based on joint work with my supervisor Stephen Davies and Farasat Bokhari.
2For ease of exposition, we will subsequently refer to both mergers and acquisitions as mergers
unless stated otherwise.
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mergers and should receive more scrutiny. A prime example of an area in which this
question arises is the merger control case practice of the European Commission (EC)
in the pharmaceutical industry. Virtually all large mergers evaluated by the EC affect
more than one member state and product market, i.e. they are multi-market mergers.
At the same time, the pharmaceutical industry is characterised by large expenditures
on research & development (R&D) and a high capital intensity, which provide much
scope for spillover effects. In this article, we seek to determine whether the case practice
developed by the EC is effective at handling such merger cases, in which the market
investigation usually is focused only on markets, in which the parties have both an
overlapping market presence and a joint market share above 35%. This narrow focus
might be undermined if spillover effects commonly create anticompetitive effects in
other markets.
The evaluation of mergers based on market-level instead of firm-level observations can
come in the form of two different types of studies. First, the effects of several mergers
that affect the same or different markets can be analysed. Our study falls into this
category. In such studies, clusters of firms, in which all observations of a firm are
cross-sectionally and intertemporally interdependent, exist both in the treated and
non-treated groups. Second, the effects of a single merger on several separate geographic
(local) markets can be studied. The clustering structure is similar to that occurring if
several mergers are studied, but only one firm can be found in the treatment group.
In both types of studies, similar identification and estimation issues arise. Evaluating
mergers with respect to their effects at the market-level rather than the commonly used
firm-level allows us to study price effects at the market-level. The term market-level
here refers to a firm’s individual business presence in a specific product (or geographic)
market, which is a more disaggregated perspective than the overall firm-level. We refer
to all of an individual firm’s business presence (i.e. all its sales) in a market as the
business unit (BU) of this firm in the market.
We develop a novel framework to estimate the effects of multi-market mergers at the
market-level that addresses the clustering structure in these environments using the
PSM-DiD estimator that uses weights derived from propensity scores for DiD regressions.
The new framework is then used to evaluate the EC’s case practice. Our novel empirical
framework allows us to assess whether spillover effects across a firm’s BUs lead to
significant price effects of mergers in markets, in which the involved parties had no
overlapping market presence pre-merger. We find evidence for such spillover effects
that cast doubts on the approach chosen by the EC to evaluate multi-market mergers.
Further, with regards to the ex post evaluation of mergers, we show how control groups
need to be carefully constructed to avoid their contamination in the presence of such
spillovers to ensure the identification of the treatment effect.
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Not only the standard difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator, which is commonly
used in the literature to estimate the effects of mergers, breaks down in the presence of
spillover effects, but also matching methods used to address the self-selection of firms
into treatment, i.e. the decision to merge. We propose adequate strategies to estimate
propensity scores in merger analysis at the market-level, which require not only BU-level
variables, but also overall firm-level variables to be included in their estimation. We
show how failure to do so leads to self-selection bias not removed by propensity score
matching (PSM) and biased treatment effects.
The price effects on BUs of the firms involved in mergers are tested for two types
of spillover effects. First, we distinguish between markets in which the parties have
different levels of market share. Second, spillover effects are distinguished between
markets with and without overlaps by the parties involved in the mergers. The results
are complex but provide some evidence for both positive and negative spillovers. In
particular, significant price reductions are found in markets in which the parties had
market shares exceeding 35% prior to the merger. On the other hand, significant price
increases are detected in markets, in which they had market shares between above 15%
and 35%. Most importantly for our purposes, the price reductions primarily appear in
those markets in which only one of the parties was active prior to the merger. This
can only be explained by the existence of spillover effects, and suggests that merger
appraisal should not just be confined to markets in which parties overlap.
5.2 Literature review and background
5.2.1 Ex post merger evaluation studies
A large body of literature has empirically studied the effects of mergers on different
measures of firm performance and market outcomes. Most closely related to this study
are ex post studies that analyse price effects of mergers on either the involved firms (see,
e.g. Krishnan, 2001) or on their competitors (see, e.g. Prager and Hannan, 1998). The
literature started with case studies of single mergers and often with price effects in single
markets (Schumann et al., 1992; Werden et al., 1991; Borenstein, 1990; Barton and
Sherman, 1984), and multi-merger analysis with overall price effects only followed later
(Prager and Hannan, 1998; Kim and Singal, 1993). Weinberg (2007) and Kwoka et al.
(2015) provide surveys of the related literature and the chosen estimation methods.
The literature can further be classified according to their treatment of mergers as
exogenous or endogenous events: a merger can be viewed as exogenous, i.e. if the
assumption is imposed that it occurs completely at random across the population of
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firms. Yet, if it is seen as endogenous and firms decide to merge in anticipation of the
expected gains from doing so (i.e. they self-select themselves into the group of involved
firms), the involved firms represent a non-random subset of the population of firms in
an industry. This self-selection has important consequences for the empirical approach
required to estimate the causal effects of mergers.
In particular older studies treat mergers as exogenous events (see, e.g. Ho and Hamilton,
2000; Kim and Singal, 1993), i.e. they assume that self-selection does not occur.
Thus, they are based on the assumption that merging firms are a random draw of the
population of all firms and that mergers occur by chance and not because of profitability
considerations. Such an assumption must be motivated well, as its violation can induce
significant biases of the estimated causal effects. More recent studies tend to treat
mergers as endogenous events (see, e.g. Danzon et al., 2007; Dranove and Lindrooth,
2003), as firms self-select into the decision to merge based on the anticipation of profit
gains to be realised from the transactions. Endogeneity of the decision to engage in
mergers has important implications on the estimation strategy. While exogenous mergers
can be analysed with DiD estimators based on the treatment evaluation literature (see,
e.g. Kwoka et al., 2015), self-selection requires different approaches, as it leads to
biased estimates of the treatment effects in standard DiD estimators. Depending on
the availability of data and the research questions at hand, different approaches can
be used to estimate treatment effects in the presence of endogenous mergers: merger
simulation (Verboven and Björnerstedt, 2016), instrumental variable estimators (Haucap
and Stiebale, 2016), regression discontinuity design (Saarimaa and Tukiainen, 2010),
PSM (Behr and Heid, 2011), or a combination of PSM with DiD (PSM-DiD) estimators
(Ornaghi, 2009).3
The large majority of ex post studies either estimate the effects of mergers at the
firm-level, i.e. they are concerned with overall profits, or they only study single markets
that are affected. Yet, fuelled by an increased availability of detailed disaggregated
data, recent studies have started to analyse the effects of a single merger across different
markets. These studies include in particular a growing literature on the effects of
mergers on local markets. For example, Villas-Boas et al. (2016) analyse the impact of
a French supermarket merger on prices of the merging firms and their competitors in
different cities across France, each of which constitutes an own local market. Again,
merger studies aimed at local markets can be classified into those assuming exogenous
3Most closely related to this essay is the study of Ornaghi (2009), who studies the effects of mergers
in the pharmaceutical industry on R&D activity as well as the financial performance of the consolidated
firms. In line with this essay, Ornaghi employs PSM-DiD estimators to correct for self-selection in the
estimation of the treatment effect. However, his analysis is based on firm-level rather than market-level
data, such that it does not deal with the additional layers of difficulties relating to the selection of the
control group and identification of the treatment effect in more disaggregated data.
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mergers (Argentesi et al., 2016; Ashenfelter et al., 2015; Hosken et al., 2012) and others
assuming endogenous mergers and correcting for self-selection (Villas-Boas et al., 2016;
Aguzzoni et al., 2016). Both groups of studies rely on DiD-type estimators to estimate
treatment effects. What they all have in common is their varying reliance on the
standard Rubin causal model and estimation strategies developed for (approximating)
randomised controlled trials. Therefore, they all suffer to varying extents from potential
problems in the construction of valid control groups and endogeneity resulting from
unsatisfactory attempts to estimate propensity scores.
As we argue below, in such a type of analysis, in which a treatment is occurring at
the firm-level but the units of observation are BUs at the market-level, a different set
of assumptions and estimation methods is required. This follows from the fact that
this involves a cluster structure in which each unit of observation depends on other
units of the firm in the sample. This cluster structure does not represent a “standard”
randomised controlled trial. As a result, unless a number of restrictive assumptions are
met, the chosen approaches lead to wrong inference.4
5.2.2 Spillover effects
Multi-market mergers warrant the consideration of all affected markets because of
potential spillover effects across separate markets, i.e. the effect of a merger in one
market potentially affects other markets as well.5 These spillover effects can occur for a
multitude of reasons, and can be classified into two broad categories according to their
potential effect on market prices.
Spillover effects with potentially price-reducing effects include increases in efficiency and
cost reductions following from a reallocation of resources within the company towards the
most efficient use (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2008; Harris et al., 2005; Peristiani, 1997),
product diversification that reduces portfolio risks and therefore financing costs (Perold,
2005), economies of scope in production and innovation (Cockburn and Henderson,
2001), and economies of scale, e.g. cost savings realised from large joint input purchases
(Crook and Combs, 2007; Mabert and Venkataramanan, 1998).
On the other hand, spillover effects with potentially price-increasing effects in turn
include the anticipation of innovation competition by competitors leading them to
4Problems include the violation of the underlying stable unit treatment value assumption leading to
biased treatment effects, PSM that does not fully eliminate the self-selection bias, and underestimated
standard errors because of wrongly specified covariance matrices. This is discussed in greater detail
below.
5A classification of spillover effects of mergers in multi-market environments is provided in Section
5.3.3.1.
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limit their commitment to the market (Farrell and Shapiro, 2010), coordinated effects
resulting from increased multi-market contact (Baker, 2002; Bernheim and Whinston,
1990), endogenous barriers to entry arising from increased marketing expenditure
(Sutton, 1998; European Commission, 1998), opportunities to leverage market power
across markets resulting from an increased size of the product portfolio (European
Commission, 1998), and an increased financial strength that can be used to weaken
rivals, e.g. by enabling aggressive pricing or by serving as a pre-emptive device to
limit rivals’ entry and capacity expansion (Fresard, 2010; Campello, 2006; Bolton and
Scharfstein, 1990; Benoit, 1984). An overview of some of the identified effects together
with sources discussing them is provided in Table 5.1.
The importance of spillover effects in merger control has been acknowledged in the
literature for several decades. Yet, due to the large number of potential procompetitive
(increases in efficiency) and anticompetitive (abuse of dominance, foreclosure, predatory
pricing) effects, especially in conglomerate mergers spillovers have remained elusive and
guidelines for merger control are hard to derive. As the overall effect of such mergers
can be positive or negative depending on which of the effects dominate, the issue is
frequently debated among scholars, lawyers, and competition authorities. One of the
most spectacular cases related to this was the proposed General Electric/Honeywell
merger, which was cleared by the DOJ in the USA but blocked by the EC in 2001 based
on concerns over the establishment of a dominant position arising from portfolio effects.
Discussing the case, Kolasky (2002) points out that spillover effects played almost no
role in U.S. merger control in the 80’s and 90’s, and that in Europe only three cases
(including the General Electric/Honeywell merger) were blocked by the EC based on
suspected anticompetitive effects arising from spillovers, two of which were later cleared
by the courts due to a lack of evidence backing up such concerns.
Neven (2008) assesses the application of different concepts of spillover effects by the
EC in recent cases. He argues that economies of scale and scope as a result of multi-
market presence, portfolio effects inducing changes of demand triggered by reduced
search and transaction costs, and the bundling of brands to strengthen the weaker
brand do not represent meaningful sources of anticompetitive behaviour. He finds that
only the reduction of potential competition by strategically exploiting substitution
patterns between separate markets appears to be problematic. Further, he suggests
that potential competition can be softened by tying goods together from separate but
competitive markets, and that exclusionary practices can arise in case the tied products
are complements.
Nevertheless, at least some of the findings of Neven (2008) remain contested. For
example, Chung and Jeon (2014) examine conglomerate mergers in Korean beer and
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Table 5.1: Spillover effects and their implications on prices
Factor Impact on price Literature
Increase in efficiency & cost reduction following from reallocation of
resources for more efficient use
- / ? Jovanovic & Rousseau (2008), Harris et
al. (2005), Peristiani (1997)
Product diversification: reduces risk and financing costs - / ? Perold (2005)
Economies of scope (in innovation) - / ? Cockburn & Henderson (2001)
Economies of scale (e.g. cost savings from joint input purchases) - / ? Crook & Combs (1997) Mabert &
Venkataramanan (1998)
Innovation competition & anticipation by competitors + Farrell & Shapiro (2010)
Coordinated effects & multi-market contact + Bernheim & Whinston (1990), Baker
(2002)
Barriers to entry – marketing expenditure + Sutton (1998), European Commission
(1998)
Product portfolio & leveraging market power + European Commission (1998)
Financial strength & weaker competitors + Fresland (2010), Benoit (1984),
Campello (2006), Bolton and Scharf-
stein (1990)
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liquor markets and find that the merged firms could leverage market power across
markets due to portfolio effects. Yet, despite dominant market positions, they could not
find dominant conglomerate firms engaging in any foreclosure activity. They conclude
that market conditions need to be evaluated in merger control to anticipate gains in
market power arising from increased leverage related to portfolio effects. Chen and Rey
(2015) provide a theoretical model on how portfolio effects can strategically be used to
soften competition using bundling and tying, and propose that the potential for such
practices needs to be scrutinised in merger control.
The ambiguity surrounding the assessment of spillover effects has lead to controversies
among competition authorities and divergent practices in merger control (see, e.g. Fox,
2007). As a result, many competition authorities are reluctant to oppose mergers on the
grounds of spillover effects. The need for further studies is self-evident. It is hoped that
this essay helps to fill the gap by suggesting a methodology that can be used to shed
further light on the issue. Moreover, in the application in Section 5.4 we find evidence
of spillover effects.
5.3 Estimation strategy
5.3.1 Novel approach and contribution
In this section, we introduce the empirical methodology to carry out BU-level treatment
evaluation in the context of multi-market mergers. First, we introduce the concept of
cluster-randomised trials previously applied in the fields of sociology, medicine, and
educational research. This provides the potential for a theoretical framework that can be
applied in our study to identify causal effects. Second, and again from other disciplines,
we introduce concepts for the estimation of propensity scores in cluster-randomised
trials, which we will use for matching and the construction of control groups to address
self-selection of specific firms into merger activities. Third, we operationalise the
methodology so it may be applied in the present context by introducing classifications
and exclusion restrictions that allow the construction of valid treatment and control
groups.
We shall follow the prevailing approach of most ex post merger evaluation studies to
use DiD models that draw on the treatment evaluation methodology. Further, like
many recent studies in this area, we make use of PSM to address self-selection bias and
combine the two methodologies using the PSM-DiD estimator. This choice is motivated
by several factors. First, DiD approaches are relatively simple to apply to a large
number of markets. Second, PSM allows to correct for self-selection of firms engaging in
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mergers, such that unbiased, causal effects of mergers can be estimated. Third, unlike
other methods based on propensity scores, PSM yields comparably little bias in the
outcome regression results in case the propensity score is misspecified (see, e.g. Zhao,
2008; Rubin, 2004). Fourth, relying on the PSM-DiD model in the outcome regressions
ensures that unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity does not bias the estimates. Fifth,
the PSM-DiD estimator can be adapted to the special form of randomised controlled
trials introduced below that needs to be approximated in the econometric design to
capture the causal effects of mergers.
5.3.2 Modifying the Rubin causal model to conduct a cluster-
randomised trial
The Rubin causal model
The foundation of most of the treatment evaluation literature is the Rubin causal model
(Rubin, 1974). It is based on the concept of randomised controlled trials (RCT). The
RCT framework provides a set of conditions needed to identify the causal effects of an
intervention. These include the assumptions that all observations used in the analysis
are statistically independent from each other. In addition, the intervention needs to be
assigned randomly to the observations, such that the treatment does not correlate with
characteristics of the treated units (e.g. firms). In case this assignment is non-random,
the treatment effect on the treated (ATT) can be estimated nonetheless (e.g. using
PSM) provided that the selection process can be controlled for – this is ensured by the
conditional independence assumption (CIA). A central element to identify the causal
effect of a treatment is the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA). It requires
that the fact that a unit (such as a firm) receives the treatment does not affect the
outcomes (i.e. prices) of any of the other observations (firms) in the sample. A more
in-depth look at the standard methodology can be found in the appendix in Section
5.6.1.
Identification of the treatment effect in the context of multi-market mergers is more
difficult if the level of observation/aggregation is more disaggregated than the firm-level.
A particular cluster structure exists in such data. All business units of a firm form a
cluster because their outcome observations such as prices are correlated with each other
and across time. As a result, the SUTVA is fundamentally violated because the effect
on prices of a merger on the merging firm in market A is most likely not independent
from the effect on prices in market B. Further, to satisfy the SUTVA the construction
of the control group needs to be adapted to the correlations between BU observations
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of treated firms across markets that affect competitors. Due to these spillover effects,
prices of competitors of merging firms can be affected by the treatment (the merger) in
markets, in which only one of the merging firms is active pre-merger. This follows from
the fact that the competitors’ prices in different markets are correlated with each other
within “their” clusters. Then, the SUTVA is only satisfied if these observations of the
competitors are not included into the control group.
In addition, self-selection is not only potentially correlated with market-specific charac-
teristics, but also with overall firm-level characteristics. In other words, not every single
BU of a firm independently decides whether it merges with another firm, but the firm
reaches this decision based on both its position in the individual markets in which it is
active as well as based on its overall firm-level position and characteristics. As such,
the CIA does not hold because the probability of a BU to receive the treatment does
not only depend on its BU-level variables, but also on the overall firm-level variables.
The cluster-randomised trial
A cluster-structure as described above requires a refinement of the SUTVA in order
to take correlations and spillovers into account. Further, in case self-selection occurs
in an observational study, the steps that have to be taken to control for non-random
treatment assignment are aimed at replicating conditions of the RCT by correcting for
self-selection to fulfil the CIA. In the context of multi-market mergers the controlled
trial that needs to be approximated is fundamentally different to the standard RCT as
assumed by most studies. Specifically, unlike in RCTs, the treatment (the merger) is
assigned either to all (a firm involved in a merger) or to none (firms not engaging in any
merger) of the units (BUs) within a cluster. As a result, the SUTVA is violated as the
prices in different markets served by the involved firms are not statistically independent,
and self-selection bias needs to be corrected differently to account for both market-
and firm-level effects. The type of underlying randomised controlled trial that must be
approximated is known as the cluster-controlled trial, also known as group-controlled
trial or randomised community trial (see, e.g. Giraudeau and Ravaud, 2009).6
Definition (CRT): Cluster-randomised trials are a form of randomised
controlled trials in which the treatment is administered to either all or none
of the units within a cluster, and clusters both with and without treatments
assigned to them exist.
6This is not to be confused with multisite randomised trials, in which the treatment is assigned to
some units within a cluster only: they require different approaches to the estimation of propensity
scores, matching, and outcome analysis compared to CRTs (see, e.g. Leon et al., 2013; Thoemmes and
West, 2011).
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VanderWeele (2008) extends the concept of RCTs introduced above to CRTs. CRTs
(as well as multisite randomised trials) are largely unknown in economics, but have
been developed in the sociological research of neighbourhood interventions, education,
as well as in medicine. In order to allow causal inference in CRTs, five fundamental
assumptions need to be fulfilled.
First, the SUTVA assumption underlying RCTs needs to be altered. In our context,
this is because spillover effects lead an involved firm’s outcome (e.g. the price) in a
particular market to potentially depend on the outcomes in its other product markets.
VanderWeele introduces:
Definition (CL-SUTVA): The cluster-level stable unit treatment value
assumption. This is a modified SUTVA assumption that allows for the
identification of causal effects in CRTs.
Although he borrows the term from sociological research, VanderWeele (2008)’s article
relates to the field of medicine.7 Nevertheless, the concept is general and equally applies
to economic applications. In the present analysis, it requires that the price of a firm
in a given market does not depend on the treatment assignment of other firms. Put
differently, the outcomes of a firm’s BUs do not depend on the merger activity of other
firms.8
Importantly, however, the CL-SUTVA explicitly allows for spillover effects between a
firm’s different BUs. Interdependencies between the different BUs through spillover
effects lead to a treatment effect, which depends not only on the causal effect of a
merger on the outcome variable in a market, but also on the effect it has on other
markets, in which the involved firms are present. Thus, the estimated treatment effect
is a total effect, which consists of the direct effect of the merger on a BU as well as the
indirect effect on it originating from spillover effects from the firm’s other BUs.
Second, a modified conditional independence assumption is required. If X denotes
BU-level-specific and Z overall firm-level-specific variables with indices i and k denoting
markets and firms, respectively, it can be expressed as:
Yikd ⊥ Dk|Xik, Zk, (5.1)
where Yikd denotes the outcome variable, Dk the treatment, and index d takes the
value 1 for treated units and 0 otherwise. If propensity scores are used to eliminate
self-selection bias, failure to control for firm-level variables Zk leads to a violation of
7He labels the CL-SUTVA the neighbourhood-level stable unit treatment assumption.
8This has important consequences for the construction of control groups and is discussed below.
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the modified conditional independence assumption. Thus, propensity scores need to
include all relevant firm-level variables Zk that determine both the decision to merge
as well as the outcome variable, and not only BU-specific variables Xik. Therefore, an
observational study that attempts to approximate a CRT necessitates stronger data
and identification requirements than “standard” RCTs.
Third, the overlap assumption – also known as the common support assumption – needs
to be defined as
0 < P (Dk = d|Xik = x, Zk = z) < 1 (5.2)
for all realisations of d, x and z.9 This means that BU observations with any given
combinations of values of firm-market and overall firm-level variables X and Z have
a positive probability to be in the treatment and the control groups. In other words,
there need to be observations in the control group that are sufficiently similar to those
in the treatment group both with respect to the BU-level and the firm-level variables.
Fourth, the consistency assumption requires Dk = d ⇒ Yikd = Yik. In other words,
the outcome Y (price) that is observed for an observation if (or if not) assigned to the
treatment D is equal to the outcome that is in fact observed for the given treatment
assignment. This condition is usually fulfilled in observational studies and relates to
the absence of measurement errors.
Fifth, VanderWeele (2010) adds the assumption of intact clusters as introduced by
Hong and Raudenbush (2006) in the context of sociological multisite randomised trials.
This requires that treatments do not alter the cluster membership of the BUs. In the
present context, the two parties of a merger have to be pooled not only after the merger
or acquisition, but also before it takes place. Only then can the observed difference in
the outcome over time in a treated unit be related to the treatment effect.
5.3.3 Constructing treatment and control groups in CRTs
5.3.3.1 A classification of treatment effects in multi-market mergers
The treatment effect is identified by comparing the BUs that are affected by mergers
with a control group consisting of BUs of firms not affected by any merger. To guide
9This extension is necessary for both treated and non-treated observations for the average treatment
effect (ATE), but only for treated observations for the ATT. Therefore, the overlap assumption does
not need to hold for non-treated units in order to obtain a valid ATT. Further, it follows that common
support must be satisfied not only for BU specific variables X, but also for the overall firm-specific
variables Z.
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the construction of the control group, the following example contains a list of treatment
effects that can arise in multi-market mergers if the analysis is based on market-level
observations. Consider the hypothetical case shown in Figure 5.1. There are four
firms with BUs active in five markets A,B,C,D, and E. Firms 1 and 2 merge and taken
together are active in markets A, B, C, and D both before and after the merger. They
have an overlapping market presence only in market B. Firm 3 is active in markets A,
B, D, E, and F. Therefore, it is a competitor to the merging parties because of overlaps
in market presence in markets A, B, and D.
Definition: A firm that is active in the same markets as the merging
firms is a competitor to those firms (in these markets). The observations of
the competitor in these overlapping markets are referred to as competitor
observations.
Another firm, 4, is active in markets F and G, which are not (directly) affected by the
merger and it is referred to as an outsider.
Definition: An outsider is defined as a firm that is neither directly (through
treated BUs) nor under certain assumptions indirectly (through competitors’
BUs) affected by mergers. Its BUs are referred to as outsider observations.
Under certain assumptions about spillover effects (see below), Firm 3’s BUs in markets
E and F can also be treated as outsider BUs.
Figure 5.1: Construction of treatment and control groups
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4
A1   B1  C1 B2     D2 A3  B3  D3  E3  F3 F4
Involved parties Competitor Outsider
G4
A classification of treatment effects that can be estimated in such a multi-market
environment is presented in Table 5.2. Treatment effects can be estimated both for the
merging parties and their competitors.
Definition: Denote an acquirer as the firm that fully acquires another firm
or parts of another firm’s assets and the firm that is being bought as a
target.
In case only parts of a firm are bought by the acquirer, the term target refers to the parts
subject to the transaction only. Mergers and acquisitions are pooled in the empirical
analysis and it is assumed that both types of transactions generate similar effects, as
they both give rise to mostly the same spillover effects.
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Depending on which observations are used from the involved parties, different treatment
effects for the acquirer and the target (in case of acquisitions), their combined presence,
or the BUs in which the involved parties had or did not have an overlapping market
presence pre-treatment can be estimated. For the competitors, estimation is possible of
the direct spillover effects of mergers for markets in which the mergers occur and of the
indirect spillover effects that arise in the other markets in which the competitors are
active. Theoretically, in the example above it is perceivable that firm 1 and 2’s merger
creates indirect spillover effects for firm 3’s market behaviour in non-affected markets
E and F as well through altering its behaviour in the affected markets A, B, and D.
In that case, firm 3’s observations in market E and F can be used to estimate indirect
merger effects on competitors.
Table 5.2: Classification of treatment effects
Estimated treatment effect Treatment group Control group
All BU’s of merging parties A1, B1+2, C1, D2 [(E3, F3), F4], G4
Overlapping BUs of merging parties B1+2 [(E3, F3), F4], G4
Non-overlapping BUs of merging parties A1, C1, D2 [(E3, F3), F4], G4
Acquirer’s BUs A1,C1 [(E3, F3), F4], G4
Target’s BUs D2 [(E3, F3), F4], G4
Direct effect on BUs of competitors A3, B3, D3 [F4], G4
Indirect effect on BUs of competitors E3, F3 G4
Notes: BU observations in round (squared) brackets have to be dropped in the presence of
spillover effects of type 1 (2).
In the application below, we focus on the effects of the mergers on all BUs of the
merging parties, and further analyse those with and without overlaps in market presence.
Therefore, we can refrain from imposing somewhat arbitrary choices with respect to
the classification of firms into acquirers and targets in mergers among equals.
5.3.3.2 Exclusion restrictions
Cross-sectional exclusion restrictions
Construction of the control group depends on the limits of the indirect spillover effects.
In the context of this study, the CL-SUTVA as defined by VanderWeele (2008) requires
that a firm’s BUs should only be affected by its own merger, but not by other mergers.
Thus, it allows for spillovers across a firm’s BUs created by the treatment, which are
captured in the total treatment effect as indirect effects. They add to the total effect
together with the direct effects that consist of the treatment effect on a BU in a market
that originates from that market. Continuing to use the above example, we classify
potential spillover effects into several groups.
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Definition: A spillover effect of type 1 is an effect of a merger on the
competitors’ BUs in markets in which the merging parties have no presence.
For example, observations E3 and F3 would be affected by type 1 spillover effects. This
effect might arise if the competitor’s exposure to the merger in markets A, B, and D
lead it to change its behaviour in markets E and F. If such indirect spillover effects
exist, observations inside the round brackets in Table 5.2 need to be dropped from
the control group pool.
Definition: A spillover effects of type 2 exists if the competitors’ exposure
to a merger has an effect on outsiders in markets in which the competitor is
active but the merging parties are not.
Such a spillover effect of type 2 can affect BU F4. Put differently, being affected by a
merger in markets A, B, and D, Firm 3 might change its behaviour in markets E and
F. This in turn might affect outsider Firm 4 and its BU in market F. If such indirect
spillover effects exist, all observations contained in the squared brackets in Table
5.2 need to be dropped from the control group pool as well. The existence of type 2
spillover effects implies stronger assumptions than type 1. This follows from the fact
that type 1 effects are necessary for type 2 effects to occur.10
In assessing how to address such spillover effects we face an inevitable trade-off. Spillover
effects of type 1 might be unlikely, e.g. if merger control ensures that the involved
parties do not have strongly overlapping market activities that could generate large
merger effects. In that case, observations E3 and F3 can safely be included into the
control group pool. A larger pool from which the control group can be constructed
is desirable, as it potentially increases the quality of matches as well as the efficiency
of the econometric estimators suggested below. Outsider observations in markets in
which the competitor is active but the involved parties are absent need to be dropped
(observation F4) from the control group pool if one assumes spillover effects of type 2
to be present.
Provided that spillover effects of type 1 are unlikely to arise and are limited in magnitude
in case of their existence, type 2 spillover effects are very unlikely to arise.11 In the
10Strictly speaking, the indirect spillover effect of the merger on the competitors’ markets in which
the merging parties are not active could in turn produce an indirect spillover effect of observations of
outsiders in which neither the involved parties nor the competitors are active (spillover effect of type 3,
observation G4). We rule out such an effect as it is very unlikely to arise but would put very strong
demands to the availability of data.
11An indirect way to test the existence of type 1 spillover effects is to test for indirect merger effects
on the competitors’ BUs. If no such merger effects can be found, it could be argued that neither type
1 nor type 2 spillover effects exist, such that the potentially affected BU observations can be included
into the control group pool. Yet, such a test is imperfect as the lack of significant treatment effects,
e.g. for BUs E3 and F3, might be the result of misspecification of the econometric models used for the
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application below, we will assume that neither spillover effects of type 1 or type 2 are
present. This choice is motivated by our limitied control group pool, and allows us to
add competitor observations to the control group pool which are more similar to the
treated BUs than the other available observations increasing matching quality.
In practical applications, researchers often face a trade-off between potential bias and
efficiency when determining exclusion restrictions, especially in a panel data context,
in which several mergers might affect a market over time. While stronger exclusion
restrictions reduce the chance that the CL-SUTVA is violated, it might result in many
observations being dropped from the analysis. This can have undesirable effects on the
analysis. First, the number of treated units for which no suitable control group can
be constructed is likely to increase. This potentially leads to treatment effects that
are only representative for particular sub-samples of the treated units. Second, the
reduced sample size used in the estimation of the ATT reduces the statistical power of
the treatment effect estimators. This problem does not only follow from treated units
that are dropped because no suitable control group matches can be found, but also
from reductions of the control group pool.
Therefore, two further restrictions are imposed to better address the above trade-off.
We assume that mergers do not have any effects unless the parties have a joint market
share above a given threshold. Such an assumption of a de minimis threshold of a
critical market share is proposed by Hosken et al. (2012). More specifically, in this
study we ignore the parties’ BU observations in markets in which their pre-treatment
joint market share is below 3%. This assumption has two positive effects on the sample
composition. First, it removes markets from the sample, which in the predominant
number of cases should not feature any effects and would conceal significant effects in
the other markets by reducing the estimated treatment effects and increasing standard
errors if included. Second, it reduces the number of merger markets with significant
effects that need to be dropped because of overlapping mergers in the treatment window
as described below.
In addition, for similar reasons a restriction based on the relative size of the smaller
party is imposed. In this study, mergers are not considered if the smaller party’s revenue
does not exceed 10% of the total revenue of the merged entity. Such mergers are very
unlikely to generate any notable (spillover) effects on prices across markets, as the
target is relatively small and unimportant for the overall firm performance of the joint
entity. An example for the use of these cross-sectional exclusion restrictions can be
found in the appendix in Section 5.6.2.
estimation or follow from a lack of power induced by an insufficient sample size.
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Intertemporal exclusion restrictions
A further complication arises from the panel data structure and the timing of mergers.
The above discussion is based on the assumption that, in any one merger, none of the
BU observations is affected by other mergers, which is required by the CL-SUTVA. As
a result, in case two mergers affect the same markets at the same point in time, the
causal effect of neither of them can be identified. The extent of this problem depends
on fundamentally untestable assumptions about the number of time periods that have
to pass until all effects of a merger are realised. In this study, we assume that in the
two post-treatment years all merger effects are realised.12
Unlike competitors’ observations, for which the dates of treatment are given, control
group observations can potentially be picked from any period for which sufficient data
is available. To increase the control group pool as well as the matching quality, the
control group pool should be constructed from different time periods available in the
data. Therefore, in this study outsider observations are considered from all time periods
in which mergers occur.13 Construction of the control group pool is conducted based
on the same intertemporal exclusion restrictions.
BUs of firms that at some point in time are in the treatment group because they are
engaging in merger activity can at other points in time be included into the control
group pool. This follows from the assumption imposed above that treatment effects are
realised after, e.g. two years. Such BUs can be used in other time periods if – around
those time periods – the estimation window does not include the time periods of their
own post-treatment windows “contaminated” with the treatment effect. An example
for the use of intertemporal exclusion restrictions in the study can be found in the
appendix in Section 5.6.2. Two further intertemporal exclusion restrictions are imposed
to ensure that the common trend and common support assumptions needed for the
PSM-DiD estimator are not violated. Merger BU observations are excluded (i) if they
have gaps in the treatment window because the firm temporarily left the market, (ii) if
there is market entry or exit occurring in the treatment window.14
12Thus, in the application the PSM-DiD regressions are based on a one year pre-treatment and
two years post-treatment window. These choices are admittedly somewhat arbitrary but reflect our
pragmatic judgement of what is sufficient to capture the non-instantaneous effects of a merger, e.g.
efficiency improvements, whilst confining the post-treatment period to a relative short time scale to
minimise the chance of confounding factors to impact the results. This choice is in line with many ex
post merger studies: Mariuzzo and Ormosi (2016) report that in their sample of 55 ex post estimates
contained in 37 published merger studies, 56% of the estimates are limited to two years and 87% to
three years after the merger.
13The mergers are roughly spread evenly across the available time periods. Considering outsiders at
different points in time improves matching quality as outlined above. At the same time, determining
the selection of periods from which the outsider observations are chosen from the time periods at which
the mergers occurred increases the likelihood that the common trend assumption necessary for the
DiD estimator holds.
14Note that overlapping observations of BUs involved in mergers in a market (after the de minimis
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5.3.4 Model specification
5.3.4.1 Estimation of propensity scores
PSM-DiD estimators can be applied to the sample once the BUs of firms engaged in
mergers, their competitors, as well as their outsiders are identified and problematic
observations are removed based on the exclusion restrictions. In a first step, the
propensity scores, which are used to construct the weights in the PSM-DiD estimator,
need to be estimated.15 The propensity scores usually are predicted based on running a
logit model that estimates a BU’s probability to be subject to a merger. As the unit
of observation features observations of individual firms’ market presence in a specific
market (i.e. the BU), the data usually contains multiple observations for each firm (one
observation for each market in which the firm is active).
The dependent variable in the logit model is a binary variable that takes the value
1 for each BU observation of a firm subject to a merger in that period and 0 for all
BUs of firms not engaged in mergers at that point in time.16 To deal with the time
dimensionality in the panel data and to apply the intertemporal exclusion restrictions,
the dependent variable is set to missing for all time periods without mergers, such
that these time periods are not included in the logit estimation. We pool all time
periods that are considered for the logit model (i.e. those in which mergers occur) for
the estimation of the logit model.17 Observations that need to be excluded because of
any of the cross-sectional or intertemporal exclusion restrictions introduced in Section
5.3.3.2 are not used in the estimation of the logit model.
Thoemmes and West (2011) provide a discussion of different approaches to estimate
rule has been applied) are dropped before they are checked for any form of incomplete data. This
ensures that the CL-SUTVA is not violated by merger BU observations that overlap with other
observations of BUs involved in mergers which are not used because of incomplete data.
15Inverse probability weighting (IPW) represents an alternative way to use propensity scores to
address self-selection, which has recently been extended to be used with DiD estimators (Stuart et al.,
2014). However, we do not use it here for two reasons. First and foremost, while being more efficient
than matching, it is subject to larger levels of bias if the propensity scores are not specified correctly
(see, e.g. Zhao, 2008; Rubin, 2004). Second, it is problematic to use in the context of panel data
with treatments that occur at different points in time because it is based on the concept of including
all available data into the analysis of the outcome variable. However, because of the intertemporal
exclusion restrictions that need to be imposed and the common trend assumption in the DiD regression,
inclusion of control group observations should be limited to the few best control group observations
and to the periods of the pre- and post-treatment window used in the DiD regression.
16As such, the dependent variable for a firm that merges in one period takes the value 1 in that
period for all its BUs and the value 0 in the other included periods in which it is not merging. Thus,
the group of outsiders/the potential control group includes observations of firms that engage in mergers
at other points in time, provided that these observations are not contaminated by treatment effects as
outlined at the end of Section 5.3.3.2
17The time periods in which mergers occur are spread roughly equal across the data set. This
approach allows to prevent ambiguities and arbitrariness in the application of the intertemporal
exclusion restrictions.
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propensity scores for clustered data in the context of sociological research. They show
that the specification to estimate propensity scores fundamentally depends on the type
of RCT that is approximated in observational studies. Further, the optimal specification
depends on whether matching is to be performed within or across clusters. In case of
CRTs, matching has to be performed across clusters (Leon et al., 2013; Leyrat et al.,
2013). This follows from the fact that all units in a treated cluster are receiving the
treatment, such that no control group observation are available within it. For matching
across clusters in CRTs, Thoemmes and West (2011) suggest to estimate a logit model
to obtain propensity scores – which expressed as a generalised linear model using the
logit function as the link function – takes the (linear) form










where piikt(X,Z) is a BU’s probability to be affected by a merger depending on firm-
market variables X and overall firm-level characteristics Z, logit (piikt(X,Z)) is the logit
of probability piikt(X,Z), and θτ denotes time-dummies controlling for period fixed
effects. To obtain piikt(X,Z), the dependent variable in the logit regression is a variable
that takes the value 1 for BUs affected by mergers in the periods, in which these mergers
occur and is 0 otherwise. Adding θτ to the specification controls for general differences in
the probability to engage in mergers across different time periods that might arise from,
e.g. the business cycle. ∑Aa=1 βaXaikt denotes the sum of regression coefficients βa and
covariates Xaikt, where a, ..., A represents the number of BU-specific covariates included
in the specification. Similarly, ∑Bb=1 γbZbkt denotes the sum of regression coefficients γb
and covariates Zbkt, where b, ..., B depends on the number of overall firm-level-specific
covariates included in the specification.
The specification proposed in Equation 5.3 is a direct product of the CL-SUTVA
introduced in Equation 5.1 to allow for causal inference in CRTs. It is aimed at
approximating the modified conditional independence assumption belonging to the
CL-SUTVA, which takes the form of Yikdt ⊥ Dkt|Xikt, Zkt if the time dimension is
included and in which Y denotes the outcome variables used in the main analysis. As
such, not only BU-level variables X that determine both the probability that the BU
observation is subject to a merger and the outcome variable (in our case prices) over
time need to be included, but so also do overall firm-level variables Z that affect both
stages.
In determining the specification of the propensity score, it is important to keep in mind
that in particular in small datasets a good specification is not a model that includes
all variables that determine treatment assignment but one that includes only those
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variables that are strongly correlated both with treatment assignment and the outcome
variable (the price). In other words, an inconsistent model to predict the propensity
score is often preferred to a fully specified and consistent model. This follows from
the fact that the propensity score in matching is merely a tool to achieve covariate
balance between a specific set of variables.18 A complete and consistent estimation
of the treatment assignment in turn is not the objective (see, e.g. Clarke et al., 2015;
Wyss et al., 2013; Brookhart et al., 2006; Augurzky and Schmidt, 2001). As such, the
validity of the estimated propensity scores is quite robust to the misspecification of the
error distribution in the logit model. An exception to this is endogeneity bias resulting
from a correlation between unobserved or excluded variables and included variables
that are correlated with the treatment assignment as well. However, Augurzky and
Schmidt (2001) show that including higher order terms of or interaction effects between
the included explanatory variables can substantially alleviate this problem.19
5.3.4.2 Conducting the matching
After Equation 5.3 has been estimated, it is used to predict the probability for each BU
observation to be affected by mergers. This probability constitutes the propensity score,
which is then used to match the BUs affected by mergers to those unaffected by mergers
from the control group pool to obtain the matched sample. The matching algorithm
determines a weight for each observation. Depending on the matching algorithm that is
used, a treated observation is matched to several observations, and observations that
are closer and more comparable to the treated unit receive higher weights than those
observations not that comparable to the treated unit. Observations that cannot be
matched are not considered in the outcome analysis that follows.
There are two possible strategies to carry out matching given the panel dimension of the
data. Very restrictively, one could match a treated observation only to control group
observations originating from the same point in time but from an unaffected market,
e.g. by determining the best match for a treated observation. If all pharmaceutical
mergers are affected by the same time-variant unobservable shocks, such an approach
ensures that the common trend assumption required by the DiD model as outlined below
is fulfilled. Yet, such a strict matching requirement negatively affects the matching
quality, as it significantly reduces the size of the control group pool. This creates several
problems. First, this renders it harder to remove the self-selection bias, as the reduced
number of potential control group observations increases the difficulty of achieving
18In our case these need to fulfil the modified conditional independence assumption in Eq. 5.1 and
are the BU-level variables X and overall firm-level variables Z that correlate both with the probability
to receive the treatment and the outcome measure (the price).
19In the application, as a safeguard against potential endogeneity in the logit model we follow this
approach and include higher order terms for the main explanatory variables.
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common support. Second, some treated observations might have to be dropped because
no suitable control group observations are available in the same period. In case the
treatment effect varies across units with different propensity scores – which is likely
to be the case in most applications – this creates the risk of obtaining very specific
treatment effects only valid for particular sub-groups in the sample. Third, a reduced
matching quality directly threatens to violate the common trend assumption, as it is
not only driven by time-variant unobservables, but also by time-variant observables
that are used to carry out the matching.
Therefore, we do not restrict matching to simultaneous observations, although we do
apply such a restriction as a robustness check only. As reported in Section 5.4.5 below,
this does not affect the qualitative findings in our application.20 An example for this
approach is provided in Figure 5.2. Consider first the left part of the Figure. Assume
that we seek to determine the best match for a treated observation T, which originates
from 2008. Further, assume that the control group pool consists of the three control
group observations C1, C2, and C3 originating from 2004, 2008, and 2011, respectively.
Crosses represent the point of time from which the observations are originating, and
the horizontal lines show the price paths a year before to two years after the considered
matching periods. Suppose control group observation C1 is the best match for treated
observation T (as can be seen from the closest match in a common trend pre-treatment),
and is matched to T accordingly.






















The outcome analysis is based on relative time rather than absolute time, as depicted
in the right part of the Figure. Although originating from different years, treated and
control units are considered to be from time period 0 in the DiD outcome regression,
which is the time of the treatment, after which the treated and control group prices
differ in post-treatment years 1 and 2 because of the effect of the merger. Matching is
20However, limiting the matching to control group observations significantly increases the mean
bias in the estimates (see Tables 5.6 and 5.29), i.e. it reduces the matching quality.
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successful if it satisfies the common support assumption as well as generates matches
that fulfil the common trend assumption in the (relative) year preceding the treatment.
The common trend assumption might be violated if, e.g. macroeconomic shocks affect
the observations originating from different time periods differently. To ensure that the
intertemporal matching strategy does not lead the common trend assumption to fail,
formal tests need to be conducted to validate that this is indeed not the case.21
5.3.4.3 Outcome analysis
After matching has been conducted, a regression-based outcome analysis is used on
the matched sample. For this purpose, the sample weights created by the matching
algorithm are used in the estimation of the weighted DiD regression. The PSM-DiD
estimator has been proposed to combine the strengths of both the DiD and matching
methods (Heckman et al., 1998, 1997). Smith and Todd (2005) show that the PSM-DiD
estimator allows to remove the bias induced by time-invariant observables that matching
estimators in isolation cannot eliminate. In other words, the PSM-DiD estimator corrects
self-selection bias both originating from time-variant (and time-invariant) observables
as well as from time-invariant unobservables, such that only time-variant unobservables
cause bias. As such, it critically relaxes the assumptions of both the DiD estimator
as well as the matching methods. This is a particularly useful feature in the presence
of the stronger requirements towards observable variables imposed by the modified
conditional independence assumption in Equation 5.1.
The DiD model compares the difference in the outcome variable between the treatment
and control groups after the mergers have taken place with the same difference before
the events. The difference in these differences constitutes the effect of the mergers on
the observed outcome. Potential endogeneity due to self-selection in this specification is
overcome by using the weights derived from PSM. The outcome variable Pikt denotes the
price index of all products offered by a firm’s BU i in market k at time t. Abstracting
from the weighting for simplicity, the DiD model can be estimated based on a fixed
effects regression of the form
Pikt = α + δ1Gkt + δ2Dkt +
T∑
τ=t+1
ϕτUτ + ikt, (5.4)
where Gkt denote firms in the treatment group,
∑T
τ=t+1 Uτ denotes time dummies for
periods t+ 1 to T with corresponding coefficients ϕτ , the treatment effect is measured
by Dkt = Gkt×>kt, and >kt denotes an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for the
post-treatment periods.22 This is an adaptation of the multi-period DiD model allowing
21In the application, we employ the common trend assumption test suggested by Autor (2003).
22Note that treatment group indicator Gkt and treatment time indicator >kt feature both time and
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for different treatment times (see, e.g. Wooldridge, 2013) to the multi-level dimension of
the data. In this framework, the treatment effect is measured by the coefficient δ2. Of
course, alternative specifications that assume time-variant or heterogeneous treatment
effects can be applied in the framework as well.
Matching creates treatment and control groups that are very similar with respect to
their BU-level variables X and overall firm-level variables Z. As a result, variables
used in the matching procedure have little to no explanatory power in the propensity
score-weighted DiD regression. Therefore, in order to reduce standard errors in the
DiD regression, the variables used to estimate the propensity scores are not included
in the DiD regression. While this does not exclude the inclusion of other time-variant
variables in the DiD regression, these variables are not included here for simplicity,
because no such inclusions are made in the application below.
5.4 Application
5.4.1 The merger control framework of the European Com-
mission in the pharmaceutical industry
Using the above empirical framework, we analyse the EC merger control case practice
in the pharmaceutical industry. For this purpose, an ex post evaluation of the price
effects of 11 mergers in the United Kingdom that were cleared by the EC is carried out.
As the pharmaceutical industry is characterised by a high capital intensity and a large
expenditure on R&D, it holds much scope for spillovers to arise. While the focus on
the British market does not allow us to estimate the price effects in other countries,
the framework allows us to capture price effects in the British market that result from
spillovers originating from other countries.23
In order to focus resources in the assessment of multi-market mergers in the pharmaceu-
tical industry and cope with the large number of affected markets, the EC has developed
a case practice that limits the number of markets that are considered in-depth in the
merger control procedure. Pharmaceutical markets are usually national in scope, as
prices are regulated at a national level. Product market definition in the industry com-
monly is based on the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system.
This employs a code based on 5 levels: level 1 denotes the anatomical main group
firm indices k and t, as treated units can at other times serve as control units, and the post-treatment
time for a (control group) observation depends on the time of the merger (that the control group
observation is matched to).
23This follows from the CL-SUTVA that yields the total treatment effect. We subsequently assume
that these inter-country spillovers do not lead to systematic positive or negative price effects in the
British market such that we can generalise the treatment effects.
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(such as N for nervous system), level 2 the therapeutic usage (e.g. N01 for anaesthetics
treating the nervous system), level 3 the pharmacological sub-group (e.g. N01 B local
anaesthetics), level 4 the broad chemical sub-group within the pharmacological sub-
group, and level 5 the chemical substance of the main active ingredient. In many cases,
the EC defines a market to consist of all pharmaceuticals offered in an ATC3 class, but
sometimes a definition based on the ATC4 classes or a combination of ATC3 or ATC4
classes is more appropriate. The EC’s case practice is characterised by requiring the
involved parties to report their market shares in all relevant markets with an overlap of
business activity together with an own assessment with respect to the geographical and
(ATC-based) product market definition. The market definition is then established by
comparing the involved parties’ definition with those of competitors and customers.
The Commission sorts the markets into three groups, in which potential anticompetitive
practices might arise. This grouping is based on the joint market shares of the involved
parties (see, e.g European Commission, 2011a) and is labelled as
 Group 1 if they are above 35% and increase through the merger by more than
1%,
 Group 2 if they are above 35% and increases through the merger by less than
1%,
 Group 3 if they are between 15% and 35%.
As a further simplification of the procedure, the EC does not always consider all
markets that fall in any of the three groups in the in-depth assessment. For example,
if the involved parties’ “activities overlap and their joint market shares do not exceed
35% under any plausible market definition and/or where the increment is below 1%,
competition concerns may be excluded.” (European Commission, 2011a, p.4). While the
groups that are considered vary between the cases, in line with the previous example the
exclusive focus in many of them is on Group 1 markets (see, e.g European Commission,
2011b).
Such a merger control practice relies on several implicit assumptions. First and foremost,
it rules out potentially significant spillover effects of mergers between markets with and
without an overlapping market presence of the parties prior to the transaction. Second,
it assumes that anticompetitive effects are unlikely to arise unless the joint market
shares of the parties involved in the mergers exceed a threshold (in particular when only
Group 1 is considered in an investigation). This focused market investigation limits
the analysis to the markets potentially being affected the most by a merger, but risks
missing out anticompetitive effects in non-overlapping markets or those, in which the
parties have a low market share. This study seeks to determine whether this merger
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control practice is effective.
5.4.2 Analysed markets and the data
5.4.2.1 Analysed markets
The empirical analysis focuses on pharmaceutical markets and prices in the United
Kingdom. Pharmaceutical prices in the United Kingdom are regulated in the Pharma-
ceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS), which is negotiated approximately every five
years between the National Health Service (NHS) and the industry body ABPI. Prices
are regulated based on a rate of return cap that is set in the PPRS, and pharmaceutical
companies can freely set prices for newly introduced branded drugs. Price increases for
existing drugs are possible, but need to be justified and approved by the Department of
Health, whereas price reductions do not require approval (Vogler et al., 2009; Maynard
and Bloor, 2003).
The necessary data for the analysis is derived from the British Pharmaceutical Index
(BPI) provided by the Intercontinental Marketing Service (IMS).24 The data contains
monthly information on sales and prices at the package level by manufacturer and
markets as defined by the ATC classification for all drugs sold in the United Kingdom
between April 2003 and March 2013. Apart from sales and prices, the data further
includes information on product names, main active molecules, strength and form, as
well as information whether the product is branded or a generic. For the analysis,
the data is aggregated to quarterly observations at the BU-level, i.e. all products and
packages sold by a manufacturer in a quarter are summed up to a single observation.
Aggregation to quarterly data is conducted for two reasons. First, this takes into
account that sales are stable for most products, such that little additional information
is gained at the monthly level. Second, for a small minority of products, unsteady sales
including arbitrary fluctuations and temporary exit might lead to misleading inference
in the empirical analysis. Thus, the aggregation removes noise in the data that might
otherwise undermine the identification of effects in the data.
In the application, all medicines that belong to an ATC3 class constitute a market.
This market definition results in some markets to be wider than defined by the EC,
which establishes a market to consist in some cases not of all products in an ATC3
24The focus on mergers assessed at the European level potentially misses out mergers checked by
national competition authorities. However, this is unproblematic for this analysis. First, there were no
mergers in the United Kingdom in the analysed time periods that could significantly affect market
prices. Second, smaller mergers cleared by other European competition authorities are unlikely to
have a substantive impact on prices in the United Kingdom. IMS allocates sales of a small number of
manufacturer-level joint ventures equally among the international corporations that own them. This
hardly affects the analysis, as data aggregation is conducted at the international corporation level.
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class, but of some of the ATC4 levels within an ATC3 class.25 This approximate market
definition is necessitated by the fact that market definitions by the EC only exist for a
fraction of the markets in the data, all of which are subject to mergers. Thus, relying
on these market definitions results in a sample, in which no proper control group can
be constructed, as most control group observations would have to be excluded because
of the exclusion restrictions introduced above. The approximate market definition used
here in turn allows us to significantly extend the control group pool in the analysis. As
our market definition has a tendency to be wider than that of the EC, the estimated
treatment effects represent a lower bound for the effects that can be expected for the
affected markets.
Sales of non-branded products by generic producers are not separable by manufacturer
in the data, such that generic products are excluded from the analysis. Pooling the
sales of all non-branded products would imply joint profit maximisation by the generic
producers within and across markets. To prevent potential bias and distortions in
market power by these firms, generic producers are excluded from the analysis but are
considered in the calculation of market shares of other firms and of the overall sales in
a market.
Excessive fluctuations in the dependent variable (prices) in a small number of outliers
threaten the common trend assumption required by the DiD estimator. They further
risk to induce inflated standard errors from potential measurement errors as well as
spurious results. To tackle this issue, a firm’s observations in a market are excluded if
the associated price index features a coefficient of variation that is in the top 10% range
of the data, i.e. it features a coefficient of variation greater than or equal to 0.513.26
After aggregation and data cleaning, the data contains 35,607 quarterly observations of
213 firms active in 242 product markets at defined by ATC3 classification codes ranging
from the second quarter of 2003 to the first quarter of 2013.
All mergers considered in this study were assessed by the EC between 2003 and 2013.
Case selection is based on mergers, in which both involved firms are pharmaceutical
companies and the mergers are classified according to NACE classification code C21
“Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations” or
its related sub-groups. Acquisitions of pharmaceutical firms by non-pharmaceutical
25Some products with multiple applications appear in several ATC3 classes, such that in few cases
a market definition based on the ATC3 class might be to narrow as well. However, this is less common
than markets that consist of some of the ATC4 levels within an ATC3 class. As such, potential biases
resulting from these cases in our market definition should be small in scale and scope.
26In the data set, some BU observations limited to a few small firms feature very large price
fluctuations over time with the highest case having a coefficient of variation of 3.843. Excluding these
observations with excessive fluctuations – which in most cases are likely to be caused by artefacts in
the data – makes it more likely that the common trend assumption holds and increases the power of
the PSM-DiD estimator.
120
firms are not considered: these cases are neither changing the market structure and
competition nor the R&D activities other than through potential changes in financial
strength and investment behaviour of a company, which in these cases are not likely to
arise. Further, acquisitions are not included if they only affect few product markets,
e.g. when the licence of a single branded product is sold from one pharmaceutical
company to another.27 Furthermore, both firms had to be active in markets in the
United Kingdom at the time of the merger, such that changes in market power and
competition due to the event can be expected in the market.28 A list of the 11 merger
cases that are considered in the study can be found in Table 5.12 in the appendix.
5.4.2.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 5.3 contains descriptive statistics for key variables used in the analysis. Avg.
price is the unweighted average price of all products sold by a firm’s BU in an ATC3
market. HHI denotes the ATC3 market’s Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Share in market
measures the market share as defined by the relative sales revenue of a firm’s BU
compared to all sales in the market, and Share generics represents the joint market
share of all generic producers in the market. No. of active markets counts the number
of ATC3 product markets, in which a firm is active in the United Kingdom. BU’s no.
of uniq. product form packs and Av. no. of product form packs contain the number of
unique packages summed up across all products and forms (liquid, tablet, gels, etc.)
by a firm’s BU in a market and the firm in total across all markets, respectively. No.
of uniq. product form packs in market contains the same information but aggregated
across all firms’ sales in an ATC3 market. No. of uniq. molecules in market counts the
number of unique molecules (active ingredients) offered in an ATC3 market.
The first two numeric columns with the title Whole sample in Table 5.3 show the
mean and standard deviation for the whole sample of BUs that can be used after
data cleaning. Columns 4 and 5 named Treatment obs. contain the same statistics for
the treated observations that are used in the analysis, and Columns 6 and 7 labelled
Other obs. show the same statistics for the BU observations that are not subject to
any measurable merger in the data.29 The last two columns named Diff. contain the
results of two-sample t-tests with unequal variance, with which the observations of the
treatment observations and all other observations are compared and tested for equality.
27Note that such mergers would be excluded because of the exclusion restrictions anyway, as the
target’s sales are likely to be below 10% of the total sales of the joint entity.
28As a result, the study does not analyse spillover effects arising from overlaps in other, geographically
separate markets on firms in the British market if only one of the involved firms is active in the United
Kingdom.
29Table 5.3 is based on the treatment and control group observations that according to kernel
matching are on support and can be considered in the analysis. As 74 treated BUs can be matched to
control group observations and are included with a three year window of quarterly observations, this
yields (up to) 888 observations in the PSM-DiD regressions.
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Significant differences between the two samples provide an indication of a non-random
selection into the treatment group, i.e. of self-selection.
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics
Whole sample Treatment obs. Other obs. Diff.
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean diff. T-Stat.
Avg. price 7.311 33.708 8.867 42.887 7.271 33.440 -1.60 (-1.100)
HHI 0.443 0.239 0.486 0.247 0.442 0.238 -0.04∗∗∗ (-5.315)
Share in market 0.166 0.281 0.318 0.326 0.162 0.279 -0.16∗∗∗ (-14.137)
Share generics 0.241 0.266 0.174 0.233 0.242 0.266 0.07∗∗∗ (8.556)
Total sales in market (Mill. £) 18.973 30.179 12.249 20.467 19.145 30.367 6.90∗∗∗ (9.768)
Firm’s sales in market (Mill. £) 1.337 5.054 2.426 5.322 1.309 5.044 -1.12∗∗∗ (-6.180)
No. of active markets 25.903 25.029 58.644 17.275 25.066 24.632 -33.58∗∗∗ (-56.471)
BU’s Num. of uniq. product-form-packs 4.338 5.411 6.325 6.176 4.287 5.381 -2.04∗∗∗ (-9.741)
Av. no. of product form packs 4.353 2.231 5.821 1.327 4.316 2.237 -1.51∗∗∗ (-31.697)
Num. of uniq. product-form-packs in market 62.373 67.469 41.027 49.381 62.919 67.781 21.89∗∗∗ (12.904)
Num of unique molecules by drug-class 9.559 6.826 7.401 5.619 9.614 6.845 2.21∗∗∗ (11.519)
Observations 35607 888 34719 35607
Notes: Sample comparisons are based on the two-sample t-test with unequal variance. ∗
p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
The results of the t-tests provide strong evidence that self-selection is present with
respect to all explanatory variables. BUs of firms engaged in mergers, on average, are
active in more concentrated markets. These markets are smaller in size as measured
by sales than markets without mergers, and the involved parties’ BUs, on average,
have higher sales than their non-treated counterparts. The most important difference
between the two samples relates to the market presence of the firms that are involved in
mergers: whereas they are active in, on average, about 58 markets, firms not affected by
mergers are active in 25 markets only. This suggests that firms engaged in mergers tend
to be larger multi-market firms than their non-treated counterparts. As these firms are
more diversified with respect to geographic and product coverage, they are likely to
have stronger financial capabilities and R&D activities and are therefore more likely to
be affected by spillovers. Further, Table 5.3 indicates that mergers tend to occur in
markets with more limited product varieties (and thus fewer substitutes available) and
fewer molecules (active ingredients).
As outlined in Section 5.3.3.2, not all BU observations affected by mergers can be
studied due to the exclusion restrictions that need to be applied to guarantee that the
causal effect of the treatment can be identified. The effect of these exclusion restrictions
on the sub-sample that can be studied is shown in Table 5.13 in the appendix in Section
5.6.4. Of the 423 treated BUs that are identified in the data, only 81 can potentially be
used in the analysis (if matching is possible – with kernel matching we are only able
to match 74 treated BUs), and 342 need to be excluded. Two-sample t-tests between
included and excluded cases indicate that the included cases are not a random draw
from the BU observations affected by mergers. Therefore, while the strict exclusion
restrictions strengthen the internal validity of the study, they limit the external validity
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of the results, such that conclusions need to be drawn accordingly. That said, these
findings highlight that a careful construction of the treatment and control groups to
satisfy the CL-SUTVA is an important and non-trivial exercise in such clustered data.
5.4.3 Propensity score matching
Two different matching procedures are used to carry out PSM: kernel matching and
nearest-neighbour matching. Kernel matching matches each treated unit to all available
control group BU observations in a bandwidth of 0.05 or less, i.e. to control group
BUs which are sufficiently close to a treated unit with respect to the difference in
propensity scores.30 Nearest-neighbour matching matches each treated unit to (up to)
the 5 closest matches from the control group pool with replacement, provided that they
lie within a caliper of 0.1, i.e. the difference in the estimated propensity scores between
a treated and the control group observations is below 0.1. The latter procedure often
provides a better reduction in self-selection bias, as it only matches each unit with
a limited number of the closest counterfactual observations available with respect to
the propensity score.31 This might come at the cost of lower efficiency compared to
kernel matching, which uses more information, but tends to yield a lower reduction in
the bias in many applications (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Given the advantages
of each method, they are complementary and should provide similar results if the
matching and empirical results are robust. In both cases, matching is conducted with
replacement to reduce the number of treated observations that cannot be matched as
they are off support, which is primarily a problem for treated observations with high
propensity scores in the analysis. This allows to include those treated observations into
the analysis, which are likely to be affected the most by mergers. The results based on
kernel matching are presented below, and those based on nearest-neighbour matching
can be found in the appendix in Section 5.6.4. The results based on kernel matching
are our preferred results, as matching tests show that it achieves the lowest levels of
bias (as is evident from a comparison of Tables 5.6 and 5.29) and represents the more
efficient method.
Before matching can be carried out, the propensity scores are estimated using a logit
model as laid out in Equation 5.3. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that
takes the value 1 if a BU observation belongs to a firm that is involved in a merger,
and is not excluded from the sample because of the exclusion restrictions laid out in
30Using these algorithms, 1251 of the 1251 and 74 of the 81 BU observations in the control and
treated groups are on support for kernel matching. For nearest-neighbour matching, the respective
numbers are 1251 of 1251 and 80 of 81 BU observations, respectively.
31As stated further below, in our results using nearest-neighbour matching instead results in a
higher bias, potentially because of a large caliper compared to the bandwidth specified for kernel
matching. We chose the parameters to obtain roughly the same number of treated BUs that can be
matched in the analysis.
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Section 5.3.3.2. Similarly, control groups are constructed according to the procedure
described in Section 5.3.3.2: outsider firm BU observations from markets unaffected
by mergers are included in the logit estimation with the dependent variable taking
the value of 0. Independent variables shall include all variables that both determine
a BU’s propensity to be affected by a merger and market prices, which serve as the
dependent variable in the outcome analysis based on the PSM-DiD estimator. Variables
that only affect the BU’s propensity to be subject to a merger or only the prices are not
included, as they potentially reduce matching quality, render fulfilment of the common
support assumption harder, and inflate standard errors in the PSM-DiD estimator. As
is common in the literature, the propensity to receive treatment is calculated using
independent variable values from the period prior to the treatment, i.e. the first lags of
independent variables are included in the logit model (see, e.g. Caliendo and Kopeinig,
2008).
The chosen specification for the logit model and the results can be found in Table 5.4.
A parsimonious specification is chosen to prevent biased propensity scores to arise from
overspecification (Zhao, 2008). Column I contains variable names and indicates the logit
specification, Column II displays the estimated coefficients, and Column III contains
the corresponding average marginal effects. In line with suggestions in the literature
(see, e.g. Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Austin et al., 2007), inclusion of independent
variables is limited to those that should affect both a BU’s propensity to be affected
by a merger as well as the market prices. Further, we include squared terms of the
main explanatory variables to reduce the impact of potential endogeneity bias on the
estimated propensity scores (Augurzky and Schmidt, 2001).32
With respect to market-level-specific variables, HHI is included as a measure of market
power, as a higher concentration should yield higher market prices. It further increases
the profitability of acquiring a BU in the market through its positive correlation with
markups. A BU’s market share, measured by Share in market and Share in market
sq., is included both in a simple and squared form to allow for a non-linear inverted
U-shaped effect: this captures the tendency of larger firms to complement their market
presence with innovative products of smaller specialist producers. In addition, higher
shares correlate with higher market power and therefore determine market prices. Yet,
the competition authorities’ practice to block mergers based on joint market shares that
are deemed too large should provide a soft threshold for this effect. The presence of
generics, which is controlled for with Generic prod. market share, limits the price-cost
32Augurzky and Schmidt (2001) show that the inclusion of higher order terms of the explanatory
variables approximates a Taylor expansion of the specified function that can capture most of the
deterministic effects of omitted variables that correlate with the included variables. As a result, the
effect of omitted variables on the errors term is mostly limited to stochastic noise.
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margin that producers can set for branded products. Therefore, the market share of
generics might not only influence prices, but also the profitability of acquiring a target
or asset operating in the market.
In addition to the market-level variables outlined above, two overall firm-level variables
are included as well. As many of the mergers are undertaken by large multi-national,
multi-product firms and spillover effects on prices partly depend on their multi-market
presence, information on multi-market activity is essential to obtain valid propensity
scores satisfying the CL-SUTVA. It is measured with the variable No. of active markets
and No. of active markets sq., which count the number of ATC3 markets, in which a
firm was active prior to the treatment period. While a positive effect of a multi-market
presence on a BU’s propensity to be affected by mergers thus can be expected, the
effect likely is not linear, as is the case for market shares: a substantial market presence
reduces the scope for a merger, as its unconditional clearance, on average, becomes
less likely. Multi-market firms are also more likely to charge higher prices, as they can
profit from, e.g. portfolio effects in distribution and higher marketing expenditure. Av.
no. of product form packs is another firm-level variable that is included and controls
for portfolio effects as well as product diversification strategies that might increase the
value of a BU rendering it more likely to be acquired in a transaction or be affected
by a merger. Yet, its effect is unclear ex ante, as a negative effect of this variable is
equally plausible if one assumes that mergers and acquisitions are predominantly used
to complement product portfolios.
The results of the logit model are mostly in line with expectations. The HHI is found
to have a positive effect on a BU’s probability to be affected by a merger. Similarly, the
BU’s market share features a strongly positive but diminishing effect with a turning
point at a market share of approx. 49%. As expected, the coefficient of the market
shares of generics is negative. Multi-market presence has a strong and positive but
diminishing effect (with the turning point occurring at approx. 62 markets) on the
probability to receive the treatment. We find weak evidence of a negative effect of Av.
no. of product form packs. The significance of the two overall firm-level variables shows
the importance of including these variables into the propensity score estimation in order
to satisfy the CL-SUTVA.
The logit model estimated in Table 5.4 is used to predict the propensity scores. In line
with suggestions of Heckman and Todd (2009), the logarithm of the odds ratio of the
predicted propensity score is subsequently used to carry out matching.33 Results of the
matching, which is carried out using Stata’s user-written program psmatch2 (Leuven
33Matching on the log odds ratio of the propensity score rather than the score itself ensures that
despite unknown sample weights in choice-based sampling – as is the case for this study – the probability
of being in the treated group can consistently be estimated (see, e.g. Heckman and Todd, 2009).
125
Table 5.4: Estimation of propensity scores – Logit model
Coeff./Std. Dev. ME/Std. Err.
HHI 1.022∗ 0.045∗
(0.600) (0.027)
Share in market 7.106∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(1.289) (0.041)
Share in market sq. -7.309∗∗∗
(0.909)
Generic prod. market share -1.468∗ -0.065∗∗
(0.754) (0.030)
No. of active markets 0.373∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.153) (0.001)
No. of active markets sq. -0.003∗∗
(0.001)






Notes: Independent variables are included with their value of the last period before the
treatment to ensure exogeneity. Column II reports coefficients, and Column III reports
average marginal effects. Cluster–robust standard deviations are reported in parentheses. ∗
p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
and Sianesi, 2015), are presented for the kernel matching algorithm in Tables 5.5 and
5.6, and for the nearest-neighbour matching algorithm in Tables 5.18 and 5.19 in the
appendix in Section 5.6.4.
A comparison of the distribution of the logarithm of the odds ratio pre- and post-
matching can be found in Figures 5.6a and 5.6b in the appendix: it shows that
treated and control groups have substantially different propensity score distributions
indicating the presence of self-selection. Further, it can be seen that matching establishes
distributions of propensity scores that are more similar to each other. Table 5.5 shows
differences in means for the variables used to calculate the propensity scores both
before and after kernel matching. Successful matching removes significant differences
in means between the treated and control groups, which can be tested either using a
two-sample t-test, or by calculating the variance ratio of the treated over the non-treated
as suggested by Austin (2009).34 Another measure for sample bias is provided by % bias,
34In case of perfect balance, the variance ratio should be one. Values exceeding the 2.5th and
97.5th percentiles of the F-distribution with number of matched treated observations - 1 and number
of matched treated observations - 1 degrees of freedom offer a rough guideline whether the achievement
of balance has failed and are reported at the bottom of the Table 5.5.
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which is defined as the % difference of the sample means in the treated and non-treated
groups divided by the square root of the average of the sample variances in the groups of
treated and non-treated observations. A comparison in the bias pre- and post-matching
is provided by % reduct. |bias|, which contains the % value of change of the absolute
value of the % bias achieved by matching. Similar to Table 5.3, a comparison of samples
indicates whether self-selection is present. Yet, unlike in Table 5.3, which includes
all treated observations selected by the matching algorithm after matching and all
non-discarded observations including all time periods in the treatment window, Table
5.5 only contains the means of the variables in the period prior to the merger, which
offers a more precise look at self-selection.
Table 5.5: Matching results (kernel matching)
Unmatched (U) Mean % reduct. t-test V(T)/
Variable Matched (M) Treated Control % bias |bias| t |p>t| V(C)
HHI U 0.481 0.481 0.0 0.0 0.998 0.89
M 0.480 0.475 2.2 -7098.5 0.1 0.890 1.07
Share in market U 0.333 0.206 40.4 3.5 0.000 0.99
M 0.327 0.350 -7.3 81.9 -0.4 0.663 1.00
Share in market sq. U 0.209 0.142 21.1 1.9 0.055 1.19
M 0.208 0.224 -5.0 76.6 -0.3 0.769 1.15
Share generics U 0.159 0.231 -28.2 -2.3 0.023 0.67
M 0.170 0.185 -6.0 78.8 -0.4 0.704 0.89
No. of active markets U 58.000 28.230 135.2 10.2 0.000 0.45∗
M 58.946 59.605 -3.0 97.8 -0.2 0.824 0.97
No. of active markets sq. U 3660.7 1466.3 103.8 8.4 0.000 0.70
M 3789.0 3875.9 -4.1 96 -0.3 0.789 0.98
Av. no. of product form packs U 5.670 4.522 62.0 4.6 0.000 0.37∗
M 5.781 5.800 -1.0 98.3 -0.09 0.929 1.20
Notes: * if variance ratio outside [0.64; 1.55] percentiles of the F-distribution for U and
[0.64; 1.57] for M.
Several observations can be made in Table 5.5. First, there is strong evidence for
significant differences in the explanatory variables between the treated and control
groups and thus for the presence of self-selection. Second, differences in means are much
less pronounced after matching has been carried out pointing towards a fulfilment of the
covariate balance requirement. The biggest sample differences occur for the firm-level
variables Av. no. of product form packs and No. of active markets, which highlights
the importance of controlling for firm-level factors in BU-level merger studies. Third,
apart from HHI, matching leads to significant reductions of the bias. For HHI, the bias
increases, but as the post-matching differences are non-significant, this is unproblematic.
Fourth, both t-test and variance ratio criteria report that differences in means between
treated and control groups are successfully eliminated by matching as well.
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The same conclusion with respect to the achievement of covariate balance can be drawn
based on five tests of overall covariate balance reported in Table 5.6. Columns Ps R2,
LR chi2, and p>chi2 report results of a probit estimation of the propensity score on all
variables used to estimate the propensity score with the columns featuring the Pseudo
R2, the chi2 value of the log likelihood ratio test of joint insignificance of all covariates,
as well as the corresponding p-values. As evident from Table 5.6, the variables have no
explanatory power post-matching, such that their effect on a BU’s propensity to be
affected by a merger has successfully been removed using PSM. Columns Mean Bias
and Median Bias contain the mean and median values of the distribution of the absolute
values of the bias reported in Table 5.5. Again, matching significantly reduces bias
induced by self-selection. Rubins’ B and Rubin’s R denote the absolute standardised
difference of the means of the linear index of the propensity score of the treated and
non-treated groups as well as the ratio of the treated to the non-treated variances of
the propensity score index, respectively. Both measures are suggested by Rubin (2001):
values of B below 25 and of R between 0.5 and 2 indicate that the two samples are
balanced. Both measures report that significant imbalances between the samples are
removed successfully using matching. The last column %Var contains the percentage
of variables with variance ratios exceeding the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the
F-distribution reported in Table 5.5. In line with the other tests of overall covariate
balance, the test shows that covariate balance has been achieved.
Table 5.6: Matching tests (kernel matching)
Sample Ps R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 Mean Bias Median Bias Rubin’s B Rubin’s R %Var
Unmatched 0.344 209.95 0.000 55.8 40.4 182.3∗ 0.17∗ 29
Matched 0.005 1.09 0.993 4.1 4.1 17.1 0.92 0
Notes: ∗ if B>25% and R outside of [0.5; 2].
Similar tests of individual and overall covariate balance based on nearest-neighbour
matching are reported in Tables 5.18 and 5.19 in the appendix. Most of the tests
indicate that covariate balance is achieved by nearest-neighbour matching as well.
5.4.4 PSM-DiD results
Drawing on the matched data obtained from PSM, PSM-DiD estimators can be applied
to estimate different ATTs relating to the effects of mergers. For this purpose, the
weights obtained using matching are used in the estimation of DiD regressions as
presented in Equation 5.4 to obtain the PSM-DiD estimator. All estimates are based
on cluster- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors and – in contrast to related
studies studying merger effects based on BU-level observations – clustering is done at
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the firm-level instead of the BU-level: this explicitly allows for correlations in a firm’s
BU prices across markets as can be expected due to spillover effects and firm-wide
pricing policies.35 In order to study the research questions non-parametrically, PSM-DiD
estimators are not merely estimated based on all of the available sample, but also on
different sub-samples. In case sub-samples are analysed, the matching algorithms are
re-applied to the identified sub-samples to ensure that correct weights are provided for
the control group observations that are selected by the algorithms. These observations
can have different weights according to the treated observations sample they are matched
with, irrespective of whether replacement as a matching option is allowed or not.
As matching on a set of independent variables creates control groups with similar
characteristics in the outcome regression, the explanatory power of those variables in
the outcome regression is very limited. Thus, the variables used in the estimation of the
propensity score are not included in the PSM-DiD outcome regression (see, e.g. Ornaghi,
2009; Girma and Görg, 2007). For the estimation of the DiD regressions, all variables
other than those indicating the treatment effects are partialled out, such that the R2 and
Adjusted R2 values refer only to the treatment effect variables. Sub-sample analysis to
answer different research questions is carried out by re-running the PSM-DiD estimator
on the different sub-samples. For this purpose, separate sets of weights obtained from
sub-sample-specific matching procedures are used.36 Note that the observation numbers
between the columns and tables vary because of differences in the chosen outcomes,
the used matching algorithms and approaches, and the (rules set to create) different
sub-samples.
35Valid standard errors in outcome regressions using PSM is a field that currently receives a lot
of research. Many researchers use bootstrap procedures in outcome regressions to take into account
that the propensity score used for matching is estimated to prevent downward-biased standard errors.
Abadie and Imbens (2008) show that such an approach leads to inconsistent estimates of standard errors
and Abadie and Imbens (2006) suggest a consistent estimator for nearest-neighbour matching with a
fixed number of matches for non-clustered data as a solution. The extension of this nearest-neighbour
estimator with a fixed number of matches to clustered data structures by Hanson and Sunderam (2011)
so far has seen little use in the literature. Recent articles by Otsu and Rai (2016) and de Luna et al.
(2010) propose refined bootstrap procedures for nearest-neighbour matches with a fixed number of
matches. The limitation of the approaches to nearest–neighbour matching with a fixed number of
matches renders their use problematic, as they cannot be combined with caliper matching or kernel
matching to rule out bias from bad matches in case no close control group observations are available.
Further, this limitation does not allow for an efficient use of the control group by using more than the
nearest-neighbours if feasible. Yet, specifying calipers (or bandwidths) is very important in this study
due to the lack of control group observations with large propensity scores (as can be seen in Figure
5.6a), as is also evident from the reduction of the mean bias achieved by kernel matching evident in
Table 5.6 compared to nearest-neighbour matching in Table 5.29. Thus, we refrain from using these
estimators based on a fixed number of matches as they would either risk increasing bias or require
excluding some of the observations which are most likely to feature significant treatment effects.
36The calculation of sub-sample-specific weights is necessary, as control group observations might




Before turning to the specification and results of the PSM-DiD estimator, it is necessary
to assess whether the common trend assumption of the estimator is fulfilled. Only then
can it provide reliable estimates of the causal effect of the treatment. Figure 5.3 plots
the average price of the treatment and control group BU observations over time for the
whole sample of cases that can be analysed after the exclusion restrictions for causal
identification are applied. Time period 0 represents the quarter in which the merger
occurred. Price trends before the treatment at times appear to be somewhat different,
although the differences in absolute terms tend to be small.
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A more formal way to assess the common trend assumption suggested by Autor (2003)
is to regress the pre-treatment periods on indicator variables for the periods prior to
the treatment that take the value 1 for BUs in the treatment group. These indicator
variables are known as leads. They test whether the treatment group is subject to a
different trend than the control group prior to the treatment. A lack of significance of the
leads indicates that the time trends do not differ between the treated and control groups
prior to the mergers and is seen as an indicator that the common trend assumption
is satisfied.37 The sub-sample-based analysis does not only require the common trend
to be present in the full sample, but also in the different sub-samples that are used
throughout the analysis. The tests show that the common trend assumption appears to
be satisfied for the overall sample and for most of the sub-samples.38
37Strictly speaking, the common trend assumption is stronger. It does not only require the trends in
the outcome variable of treated and control groups to be the same before the treatment, but also after
the treatment, i.e. the treated group would have shown the same trend in the periods after receiving
the treatment had it not received it. Yet, this assumption is fundamentally untestable, such that only
the proposed indirect way to test the common trend assumption is possible.
38The results of the common trend tests for the market shares- and overlap-based sub-samples as
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Main results
In the main analysis, the PSM-DID estimator as specified in Equation 5.4 is estimated
based on a pooled sample of all mergers that are considered in this essay. As this pooled
sample constitutes of a large set of different markets, firms, and business environments,
we can study the impact of different factors on the treatment effect. For this purpose,
sub-sample analysis is conducted based on two factors. First, it is distinguished between
different levels of the (joint) market share of the parties conducting a merger. Second,
an overlap-based classification is used that takes into account whether the parties had
an overlap in market presence prior to the event. Separating the sample based on
different joint market shares allows to analyse whether there are spillovers between
markets, in which the parties have a high market share and power, and those, in which
their joint market presence is less pronounced. Sub-samples consisting of markets with
and without an overlap of the BUs of the parties prior to the mergers in turn allows
to study spillovers that exist between markets, which are directly or only indirectly
affected by the mergers. Combining the two dimensions to create sub-samples enables
us to estimate to what extent these two types of spillovers are interrelated with each
other.
The first set of estimates presented in Table 5.7 studies the presence of spillovers across
markets with different levels of market shares by the merging parties. Treatment effect
year 1 and Treatment effect year 2 measure the ATTs in year one and two after the
treatment, respectively. The coefficients indicate the relative differences in prices one
and two years after the merger compared to the prices in the year before the mergers.
Five different sub-samples are analysed: Column II contains the ATT based on all
observations that can be used, and Columns III to VI show ATTs for sub-samples
according to the joint market share of the involved parties: up to 5%, above 5% to
15%, above 15% to 35%, and above 35%. This sub-sample selection is partly based on
the grouping used by the EC used to classify markets with potential anticompetitive
effects presented in Section 5.4.1.39 The validity and representability of the sub-sample
regression results depend on two factors. First, the number of treated BUs that make
up the treatment group is important. The lower the number of treated BUs, the less
representative is the estimated treatment effect. This number is shown in all estimates
tables in row “Treated BUs”. Second, the validity of the treatment effect depends on
whether the common trend assumption is fulfilled for the sub-sample.
well as for combinations of the two can be found in Tables 5.14, 5.15, 5.16, and 5.17 in the appendix in
Section 5.6.4, respectively.
39The sum of the number of observations in all sub-sample columns does not add up to the number
of observations based on the whole sample, as a control group observation can be featured in each of
the sub-samples. As such, it is counted several times when the sum of all sub-sample observations is
calculated.
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Table 5.7: Merger effects by market shares (kernel matching)
All <5% 5%-15% 15%-35% >35%
Treatment effect year 1 -0.579 -0.733 -0.509 0.417 -1.178∗∗
(0.442) (0.605) (0.565) (0.316) (0.521)
Treatment effect year 2 -1.049 -0.986 -0.475 1.073∗∗ -1.912∗∗
(0.681) (1.656) (0.664) (0.515) (0.906)
Observations 4668 780 2124 1848 2028
Treated BUs 74 7 26 18 23
R2 0.001 0.010 0.000 0.002 0.030
Adjusted R2 -0.082 -0.144 -0.101 -0.107 -0.075
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-
ing considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
The results indicate that the mergers significantly reduce market prices of the merging
parties in each of the two years after the merger in markets with a joint market share
above 35%. On the other hand, their prices increase in the second year after the mergers
in markets, in which their market shares lie between above 15% and 35%.
These findings suggest that spillover effects might exist between BUs of the parties in
markets with different levels of market shares. Recall that the estimated treatment
effect in each case represents the total effect and thus consists of the direct effect that
is linked to the market itself and the indirect effect that captures the spillovers. If one
conjectures that the treatment effect is linked to market power and consists only of a
direct effect that increases with the market share, the observed signs of the coefficients
cannot be explained. Alternatively, one could assume that the mergers do not induce
any direct effects on prices. In both cases, the results can only be determined by indirect
spillover effects. A potential explanation for these results is the use of realised efficiency
gains to increase the market power in those markets, in which the parties involved in
the transactions have a more limited market presence.
The second source of spillover effects between markets with overlaps in market presence
and those without is shown in Table 5.8. Columns II and III contain the results for
markets with and without overlaps in market presence of the involved parties. The
results suggest an absence of any per se effects depending on overlaps in market presence
prior to the transactions if all observations are included irrespective of the market shares
of the parties involved in the transactions prior to the mergers.
However, in a third set of estimates, the interdependencies of the two sources of spillover
effects are analysed. This allows for the identification of the sources of the significant
treatment effects in Table 5.7 for the sub-samples of the BUs in which the parties
engaged in mergers feature joint market shares of either above 35% or between above
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Table 5.8: Merger effects by the presence of overlaps (kernel matching)
All Overlap No overlap
Treatment effect year 1 -0.579 -0.526 -0.661
(0.442) (0.656) (0.492)
Treatment effect year 2 -1.049 -0.161 -1.186
(0.681) (1.071) (0.747)
Observations 4668 900 4452
Treated BUs 74 7 64
R2 0.001 0.000 0.001
Adjusted R2 -0.082 -0.140 -0.084
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-
ing considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
15% and 35%. The results for the sub-sample of observations with a joint market share
above 35% are reported in Table 5.9, and those for the sub-sample of observations
between above 15% and 35% in Table 5.10. As in Table 5.8, Columns II and III contain
the results for markets with and without overlaps in market presence of the involved
parties, respectively.
Table 5.9: Merger effects by the presence of overlaps for market shares above 35%
(kernel matching)
All Overlap No overlap
Treatment effect year 1 -1.178∗∗ -1.471∗∗∗ -1.044∗
(0.521) (0.0438) (0.540)
Treatment effect year 2 -1.912∗∗ 1.332∗∗∗ -1.897∗∗
(0.906) (0.0438) (0.922)
Observations 2028 132 2004
Treated BUs 23 2 21
R2 0.030 0.032 0.032
Adjusted R2 -0.075 -0.540 -0.074
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-
ing considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
The results in Table 5.9 provide evidence for significant price reductions in markets, in
which only one of the involved parties was active pre-merger with market shares above
35%. However, the effect on markets with an overlapping market presence of above
35% is unclear because this sub-sample only consists of 2 treated BUs.
An analysis of the source of the price increase detected for markets, in which the parties
have a joint market share between above 15% and 35%, can be found in Table 5.10.
Unlike for non-overlapping markets, in which the party active prior to the merger has a
market share above 35%, no significant price reduction is found for markets without an
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Table 5.10: Merger effects by the presence of overlaps for market shares between 15%
and 35% (kernel matching)
All Overlap No overlap
Treatment effect year 1 0.417 0.547 0.226
(0.316) (0.502) (0.274)
Treatment effect year 2 1.073∗∗ 3.496∗ 0.888
(0.515) (2.038) (0.596)
Observations 1848 420 1452
Treated BUs 18 3 15
R2 0.002 0.003 0.002
Adjusted R2 -0.107 -0.203 -0.117
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-
ing considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
overlapping activity if the market share lies between above 15% and 35%. Again, the
effect on markets with overlapping market activities is unclear because of an insufficient
number of observations in the sub-sample.
Two main results arise from Tables 5.9 and 5.10. First, the presence of significant price
effects for the parties’ BUs in markets in which the parties have no overlapping market
presence points towards the existence of spillover effects between markets with and
without overlapping market activities by the parties. As the mergers do not lead to a
direct change of the market power of the BUs in these markets, the treatment effect
can only be driven by the indirect effect that captures spillovers.
Second, they provide further indications with respect to the presence of spillover effects
between BUs of the involved parties in markets with different market shares. As the
results of significant price effects in markets with market shares above 35% due to sample
composition are primarily driven by non-overlapping markets that are determined by
indirect effects consisting of spillover effects, the coefficient patterns observed in Table
5.7 are likely to be driven by these same indirect effects as well.
Taken together, the results provide evidence for the existence of spillovers between the
parties’ BUs across markets with different market shares and between markets with
and without overlapping market activity. Further, both types of spillovers might be
interrelated with each other and do not occur in isolation.
5.4.5 Robustness checks
Most of the results are robust to the choice of the matching algorithm. The above
analysis is re-estimated based on nearest-neighbour matching with up to 5 matches
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within a caliper of 0.1. This matching algorithm mostly passes both the tests of the
common support and the common trend assumptions necessary for the DiD model to
hold. Exceptions are a failure of the common trend assumption for the sub-sample
of treated BUs with a joint market share of up to 5% before the treatment and an
indication of a potential violation of the common support assumption in a minority of
the common support tests. The results are reported in the appendix in Section 5.6.4
and are mostly in line with those based on kernel matching. Overall, consistent with the
lower efficiency of nearest-neighbour matching, they feature fewer significant treatment
effects than the results based on kernel matching. The results indicate significant price
reductions of the BUs involved in mergers in markets, in which the joint market share
exceeds 35%, but suggest that no price increases occur in markets in which the (joint)
market shares lie between above 15% and 35%. No price effects are found in the other
market share sub-samples or in the overlap-based analysis. Some differences to the
results based on kernel matching are present in the analysis of the overlap-based analysis
limited to markets, in which the (joint) market shares exceed 35% or lie between above
15% and 35%. In line with those building on kernel matching, the results based on
nearest-neighbour matching indicate that price reductions occur in markets without
overlaps in market presence, in which the active party has a market share above 35%.
For the markets, in which the parties have either overlapping or non-overlapping market
shares between above 15% and 35%, no significant price increases are detected.
A second robustness test is conducted with respect to the intertemporal matching
of propensity scores laid out in Section 5.3.4.1 and the results are presented in the
appendix in Section 5.6.5. As pointed out before, the approach improves the matching
quality, but potentially risks undermining the common trend assumption. Therefore, the
analysis is conducted again based on the kernel matching estimator limiting matching
to control group observations from the same period. However, the tests of the common
support and the common trend assumptions report that they might in parts be violated.
Further, the mean bias after matching has been conducted is the highest among the
three matching approaches conducted in this study (see Table 5.29). Limiting matching
to observations from the same period results in a significant reduction in the number
of matches. First, more of the treated observations cannot be matched and need to
be excluded from the analysis. Second, the number of control group observations that
are matched to a treated observation as well as the quality of the matches is reduced.
Consequently, the matched control group observations are of lower quality (i.e. the
difference in propensity scores between treated and matched control group observations
is increased), lead to a reduced efficiency, and produce less representative treatment
effects. Nonetheless, the qualitative results are mostly in line with those based on
intertemporal matching of the propensity scores.
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5.4.6 On the importance of controlling for firm-level variables
Next, we highlight the importance of controlling for firm-level variables for matching as
pointed out in the theory discussion in Section 5.3.2. For this purpose, we re-estimate
the last column of the results in Table 5.7, i.e. the analysis of treatment effects based
on (joint) market shares above 35% of the BUs engaged in mergers, using three different
specifications. In the first specification shown in Column Exog. DiD, we assume that
selection into treatment is exogenous and estimate a standard DiD regression based
on the whole sample (after the exclusion restrictions are applied). Second, we assume
that self-selection occurs and employ the PSM-DiD estimator but exclude all firm-level
variables (i.e. variables Z in Equation 5.1) from the logit specification presented in
Table 5.4. We emulate the approach taken in previous studies and assume that each
BU on its own decides – independent from all other BUs of the same firm – whether to
self-select into treatment by excluding the variables No. of active markets, No. of active
markets sq. and Av. no. of product form packs. The results based on this specification
are reported in Column Endo. DiD wo. Z. Results in Column Endo. DiD w. Z are
based on the approach proposed in this essay, i.e. they include firm-level variables in the
logit specification in order to estimate propensity scores. Thus, the logit specification in
this approach equals that in Table 5.4 and the results are identical to the last column
in Table 5.7.
Table 5.11: Comparison of different DiD approaches – Merger effect with market
share above 35% (kernel matching)
Exog. DiD Endo. DiD wo. Z Endo. DiD w. Z
Treatment effect year 1 0.232 -0.102 -1.178∗∗
(0.231) (0.592) (0.521)
Treatment effect year 2 -1.074 -1.570 -1.912∗∗
(1.245) (1.003) (0.906)
Observations 15628 5052 2028
Treated BUs 26 26 23
R2 0.000 0.004 0.030
Adjusted R2 -0.072 -0.075 -0.075
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-
ing considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
The results in Table 5.11 show that the three specifications produce largely different
results. Provided that our preferred set of estimates is unbiased indeed, the treatment
effects can be interpreted to be insignificant and biased upwards in case self-selection
is incorrectly ignored. Further, taking self-selection into account using a PSM-DiD
estimator but wrongly excluding firm-level variables from the logit specification used to
estimate propensity scores reduces this bias to a small degree. Yet, as the comparison to
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the last column shows, the bias is not eliminated. Further, the treatment effect is only
detected when the firm-level variables are taken into account, highlighting the danger
of obtaining results that are not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively wrong if the
modified conditional independence assumption underlying the analysis is violated.
5.5 Conclusion
In this study, a new empirical approach is developed to carry out ex post evaluations
of mergers that affect multiple geographic and/or product markets and that focuses
on market-level observations as the unit of analysis. Such disaggregated data is
characterised by clustering and a correlation between different observations belonging
to the same firm. As a result, some of the core underlying assumptions of the treatment
evaluation approaches commonly used in the literature are violated. We draw on
recent methodological contributions from outside the field of economics to introduce
appropriate methodologies to conduct an analysis of the effects of mergers when the
outcome is measured at the market-level, but the treatment occurs at the firm-level.
Specifically, we introduce appropriate assumptions that modify the treatment evaluation
framework and construct a framework to identify treatment effects in clustered data.
Further, we show how the approach to correct for self-selection into mergers based
on propensity scores needs to be adapted to clustered data and how the subsequent
estimation of treatment effects can be conducted.
We use the new framework to assess the case practice used by the EC to prevent anti-
competitive effects in multi-market mergers. The application focuses on pharmaceutical
markets in the United Kingdom to estimate the price effects of 11 mergers that occurred
between 2003 and 2013. As pharmaceutical firms are offering products in a multitude of
independent product markets, the level of the analysis is the BU, i.e. a firm’s operation
within a distinct product market. We find that the EC’s case practice to only scrutinise
markets in which the involved parties overlap and have a (joint) market share exceeding
35% might be too narrow. While significant price reductions are found for markets, in
which their (joint) market shares exceeds 35%, this effect is at least partly offset by
price increases in markets, in which their joint market shares lie between above 15%
and 35%. Further, significant price reductions are found in markets without overlaps of
market activity by the involved parties if the market share of the active party exceeds
35%, but not if this market share lies between above 15% and 35%. Taken together,
the results provide evidence of interdependencies induced by spillovers between markets
with different levels of market presence of the parties and between markets with and
without overlaps in market presence of the involved parties. Both types of spillover
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effects are found to be interrelated with each other with respect to their effects on
the parties’ BU prices. Unfortunately, while we observe some indications that these
spillovers lead to price increases in markets with overlaps in market presence, a lack of
data prevents us from establishing whether this is indeed the case.
The results show that spillover effects might be a common phenomenon in multi-market
mergers that should receive more scrutiny both in research and in merger control.
Further, it remains unclear which spillover effects are more likely to be present or
which are most important in practice. A current technical limitation of the framework
developed in this study is the lack of appropriate econometric estimators to obtain
unbiased standard errors. While some researchers have begun to suggest approaches to
estimate valid standard errors in the presence of clustered data and matching estimators,
current solutions are limited to a small set of matching algorithms often not suitable
for the application in specific data sets. Limitations of this study’s application are the
small sample size as well as the non-random inclusion of affected businesses in this
analysis. Both limitations are a product of the strict exclusion restrictions that need
to be applied to the data to ensure a causal identification of treatment effects. Thus,
the results only apply to the mergers that are included in this study, and might not
generalise to other samples or industries. Future research should therefore attempt to
control for spillover effects using larger data sets to ensure not only the internal validity,
but also the external validity of the results.
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5.6 Appendix
5.6.1 The fundamentals of treatment effect identification
The foundation of most of the treatment evaluation literature is the Rubin causal
model (Rubin, 1974). It describes the fundamental identification issue of unobservable
counterfactuals that any study attempting to evaluate the impact of a treatment faces,
as well as conditions under which the effects can be estimated nonetheless. As such, it
provides the fundamental core of all studies evaluating mergers using the treatment
effects methodology and outlines the conditions under which causal inference on the
effects of a merger on a market outcome can be gained. The Rubin causal model is
based on the concept of randomised controlled trials (RCT) to identify causal effects.
The RCT provides a set of (ideal) conditions needed to identify causal effects of an
intervention. These are characterised by all observations being statistically independent
from each other and the intervention to be assigned randomly to the observations, such
that the treatment does not correlate with characteristics of the treated units.
The following description draws on Wooldridge (2010). For simplicity, assume that we
attempt to quantify the effects of several mergers on the prices offered by different firms
operating in many markets. Assume here that the unit of outcome is a price index of
a firm’s prices in all markets in which it is active. The outcome Ykd here denotes, e.g.
the price index of firm k and subscript d = {1, 0} denotes whether the observation is
affected by the merger or not, respectively. Here, we ignore the cluster structure of the
data, as clustering within firms is not part of the standard RCT framework, and rely
on aggregating a firm’s prices in different markets into a single price index instead. To
ease the notational burden, we ignore the time dimension. We would like to compare
the differences in prices after the treatment (i.e. the merger): the difference between
the price indices in the presence of the treatment (y1) and the price indices that would
have existed absent the treatment (y0) constitutes the treatment effect. Calculating
the average value of this difference for all firms engaging in mergers yields the average
treatment effect of the treated (ATT)
τATT ≡ E(yk1 − yk0|D = 1), (5.5)
where subscripts 1 and 0 next to firm subscript k denote the (hypothetical) case of a
treated and non-treated outcome of firm k, respectively.40 Further, the observations are
40In this study, the estimated treatment effect is the ATT, which requires less strict assumptions
to hold than the average treatment effect (ATE). First, the ATE using the CIA implies that both
potential outcomes y1 and y0 are conditionally independent from unobservables in the treatment
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limited to the sub-samples of actually treated and non-treated units with |D = 1 and
|D = 0, respectively. Of course the counterfactual outcome, i.e. the effect of a merger
on the price had it not taken place, cannot be observed. To overcome this problem, the
outcomes of a suitable control group which consists of firms that did not merge can be
used for the construction of the counterfactual outcome Yk0|D = 1 of a firm engaged in
a merger. This solution to construct a counterfactual requires the stable unit treatment
value assumption (SUTVA) to hold (Rubin, 1977). It implies that the fact that unit k
receiving the treatment does not affect the outcomes Y of any of the other units. In
the context of multi-market mergers this implies that, e.g. the price of a merging firm
in a given market is not affected by the fact that the firm merges in any other market.
Further, it rules out any effect of the merger on the control group.
If the decision to merge D is statistically independent from the analysed outcomes (i.e.
D ⊥ yk0, yk1), the ATT can simply be estimated by calculating the difference-in-means
estimator τATT = E(yk1|D = 1)− E(yk0|D = 0). In the context of panel data analysis,
the DiD estimator, which is related to the difference-in-means estimator, can be used to
estimate the ATT if the treatment is exogenous (as then the assumption D ⊥ yk0, yk1
is satisfied).
However, if the decision to merge is non-random and correlates with the observed
outcomes yk0 and yk1, identification using the difference-in-means estimator breaks
down as can be seen by re-writing it to (Wooldridge, 2010, p.907):
E(ykd|D = 1)− E(ykd|D = 0) = E(yk0|D = 1)− E(yk0|D = 0) + E(yk1 − yk0|D = 1)
= E(yk0|D = 1)− E(yk0|D = 0) + τATT . (5.6)
As shown above, identification is ensured only when y0 is mean independent of the
treatment, i.e. E(yk0|D) = E(yk0), which ensures that E(yk0|D = 1)−E(yk0|D = 0) = 0.
Fortunately, provided sufficient data is available, τATT can be estimated nonetheless
using the conditional independence assumption (CIA, also known as unconfoundedness
assumption) proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Rather than requiring D ⊥
yk0, yk1, the CIA only assumes
Ykd ⊥ D|Xk, (5.7)
selection process, which is modelled to obtain the propensity score. Estimation of the ATT relaxes
this assumption and only requires the treated outcome y1 to be conditionally independent from the
unobservables in the treatment selection model (Wooldridge, 2010). Second, estimation of the ATT
only requires the overlap assumption to apply to covariates of the treated sub-population. As a result,
no positive probability of treatment is required for covariate values corresponding to observations that
never or seldom receive the treatment.
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i.e. conditional on observable variables X, treatment assignment is random. This
requires that all variables that determine the decision to engage in a merger and that
correlate with the outcome can be controlled for. Several methods have been proposed
to control for selection on observables as described above. In this study, propensity
scores as proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) are used. Another assumption
that is necessary, which is usually explicitly tested in studies using propensity scores,
is the common support assumption that requires all sub-samples with characteristics
X = x in the treatment group to have counterfactual observations in the control group
with the same characteristics X = x, i.e. 0 < P (Dk = d|Xk = x) < 1 (Lechner, 2010).41
5.6.2 On the use of cross-sectional and inter-temporal exclu-
sion restrictions
Figure 5.4 exemplifies the cross-sectional and intertemporal exclusion restrictions im-
posed in the study. The horizontal line represents time, and the vertical bars depict the
beginning and end of the available time periods in the data, respectively. Assume that
there are 7 mergers in a given ATC3 market named M1 to M7, whose occurrence in
time is marked by crosses and the corresponding treatment windows are indicated by
squared brackets. Each merger has the hypothetical joint market share of the merging
parties displayed next to the merger name. Mergers in the markets that are written in
black can be used in the analysis, whereas those in grey have to be excluded.
Figure 5.4: Exclusion restrictions
[ [ [ [ [ [ [] ] ] ] ] ] ]X X X X X X X
M1-40% M2-51% M3-17% M4-31% M5-1% M6-39% M7-17%
TimeStart data set End data set
Mergers M1 and M7 have to be excluded, because some data in the considered treatment
windows is missing, as it lies outside the time periods available in the data. M2 can be
considered, as it does not overlap with any other merger and features a joint market
share exceeding the de minimis threshold. M3 and M4 both have to be excluded, as
they both exceed the de minimis threshold and overlap, such that the merger effects
cannot be separated and the CL-SUTVA is violated. This is in contrast to mergers M5
and M6, which overlap as well. M5 is ignored because the joint market share is below
the de minimis threshold. As it is assumed that therefore a merger effect is absent, M6
can be included in the analysis.
41Limitation of the overlap assumption to the treated group follows from the focus on the ATT.
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5.6.3 On the inclusion of treated BUs into the control group
pool
With respect to the inclusion of treated units into the control group pool at other
points in time, assume that two firms merge in January 2005, and that the effect of
the merger is fully realised after two years, i.e. by December 2007. The joint firm does
neither engage in nor is affected by another merger for the rest of the time. Then, the
observations of the joint firm can be used as control group observations, e.g. around
January 2010. At that point in time, they are neither affected by mergers in the
one year pre-treatment nor in the two years post-treatment that are included in the
estimation window. The same does not hold true when the joint firm’s observations are
to be used around June 2007: in that case, the estimation window includes the firm’s
observations from June 2006 to May 2008. Yet, this estimation window overlaps with
the post-treatment periods that include the effect of the merger occurring in January
2005, and therefore cannot be used. Figure 5.5 exemplifies the use of firms that engage
in merger activity as control group observations.
Figure 5.5: Using firms subject to mergers as control group observations




















Using observations of firms that engage in mergers as control group observations at
other points in time can be crucial to ensure the successful application of matching,
especially when the number of independent firm observations is limited and self-selection
leads to systematic differences between treated and control group firms. This is likely to
be a problem in cluster-randomised trials, as obtaining a large number of independent
clusters can be more expensive/data demanding than requiring independent individual
units. Therefore, we make efficient use of the data and include treated firms in the
control group pool when their observations are not contaminated according to the above
logic. This is very beneficial to fulfil the common support assumption of the matching
estimator.
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5.6.4 Auxiliary tables and figures
Table 5.12: List of mergers
Name EC Case No. Date
Sanofi-Synthelabo / Aventis M.3354 26.04.2004
Teva / IVAX M.3928 24.11.2005
Novartis / Chiron M.4049 06.02.2006
UCB / Schwarz Pharma M.4402 21.11.2006
Abbott / AMO M.5448 23.02.2009
Sanofi-Aventis / Zentiva M.5253 20.03.2009
Glaxo Smith Kline / Stiefel Laboratories M.5530 17.07.2009
Merck / Schering-Plough M.5502 22.09.2009
Novartis / Alcon M.5778 09.08.2010
Takeda / Nycomed M.6278 29.07.2011
Teva / Cephalon M.6258 13.10.2011
Table 5.13: Descriptive statistics and observations used
All cases Considered cases Excluded cases Diff.
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean diff. T-Stat.
Avg. price 7.631 32.430 10.498 43.261 6.953 29.326 -3.55 (-0.700)
HHI 0.447 0.222 0.486 0.242 0.438 0.216 -0.05 (-1.616)
Share in market 0.189 0.275 0.331 0.320 0.156 0.252 -0.18∗∗∗ (-4.609)
Share generics 0.263 0.285 0.163 0.229 0.287 0.292 0.12∗∗∗ (4.145)
Total sales in market (Mill. £) 18.333 29.813 13.925 26.118 19.376 30.564 5.45 (1.632)
Firm’s sales in market (Mill. £) 1.511 3.680 2.644 5.186 1.243 3.173 -1.40∗ (-2.331)
No. of active markets 64.426 26.077 59.370 17.379 65.623 27.626 6.25∗ (2.561)
BU’s Num. of uniq. product form packs 6.085 6.770 6.272 6.160 6.041 6.914 -0.23 (-0.296)
Av. no. of product form packs 5.707 1.275 5.670 1.355 5.715 1.257 0.05 (0.272)
Num. of uniq. product form packs in market 56.664 63.958 40.000 48.227 60.611 66.596 20.61∗∗ (3.192)
Num of unique molecules by drug-class 8.806 6.319 7.457 5.659 9.126 6.432 1.67∗ (2.323)
Observations 423 81 342 423
Notes: Sample comparisons are based on the one-sample t-test with unequal variance. ∗
p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.













































Table 5.14: Common trend assumption test – Merger effects by market shares (kernel
matching)
All <5% 5%-15% 15%-35% >35%
Lead quarter 3 -0.594 -1.261∗ -1.034 0.117 -0.416
(0.365) (0.721) (0.659) (0.572) (0.598)
Lead quarter 2 -0.275 -1.682∗ -1.101 0.495 0.245
(0.419) (0.875) (0.709) (0.521) (0.517)
Lead quarter 1 -0.851 -0.339∗∗ -1.085∗ 1.110 -1.818
(0.673) (0.142) (0.639) (0.927) (1.468)
Treatment effect year 1 -1.002 -1.574 -1.306 0.825 -1.674∗
(0.699) (0.973) (1.042) (0.666) (0.888)
Treatment effect year 2 -1.468∗ -1.821 -1.277 1.519∗ -2.400∗∗
(0.875) (2.007) (1.083) (0.831) (1.072)
Observations 4668 780 2124 1848 2028
Treated BUs 74 7 26 18 23
R2 0.001 0.020 0.000 0.002 0.041
Adjusted R2 -0.083 -0.137 -0.103 -0.109 -0.064
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-
ing considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
Table 5.15: Common trend assumption test – Merger effects by the presence of
overlaps (kernel matching)
All Overlap No overlap
Lead quarter 3 -0.594 -0.131 -0.712∗
(0.365) (0.0937) (0.412)
Lead quarter 2 -0.275 -0.166 -0.379
(0.419) (0.193) (0.478)
Lead quarter 1 -0.851 -0.386 -0.982
(0.673) (0.280) (0.719)
Treatment effect year 1 -1.002 -0.697 -1.170
(0.699) (0.553) (0.788)
Treatment effect year 2 -1.468∗ -0.332 -1.691∗
(0.875) (0.985) (0.988)
Observations 4668 900 4452
Treated BUs 74 7 64
R2 0.001 0.000 0.002
Adjusted R2 -0.083 -0.145 -0.085
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-
ing considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table 5.16: Common trend assumption test – Merger effects by the presence of
overlaps for market shares above 35% (kernel matching)
All Overlap No overlap
Lead quarter 3 -0.416 -0.0958 -0.423
(0.598) (.) (0.597)
Lead quarter 2 0.245 -0.190 0.290
(0.517) (.) (0.553)
Lead quarter 1 -1.818 -0.00899 -1.872
(1.468) (.) (1.477)
Treatment effect year 1 -1.674∗ -1.545 -1.543∗
(0.888) (.) (0.892)
Treatment effect year 2 -2.400∗∗ 1.258 -2.388∗∗
(1.072) (.) (1.077)
Observations 2028 132 2004
Treated BUs 23 2 21
R2 0.041 0.032 0.046
Adjusted R2 -0.064 -0.598 -0.061
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-
ing considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
Table 5.17: Common trend assumption test – Merger effects by the presence of
overlaps for market shares between 15% and 35% (kernel matching)
All Overlap No overlap
Lead quarter 3 0.117 0.0408∗ -0.216
(0.572) (0.0244) (0.507)
Lead quarter 2 0.495 0.162∗ 0.224
(0.521) (0.0879) (0.332)
Lead quarter 1 1.110 -0.676 0.993
(0.927) (0.427) (0.925)
Treatment effect year 1 0.825 0.429 0.459
(0.666) (0.437) (0.457)
Treatment effect year 2 1.519∗ 3.378∗ 1.155
(0.831) (1.960) (0.742)
Observations 1848 420 1452
Treated BUs 18 3 15
R2 0.002 0.003 0.002
Adjusted R2 -0.109 -0.213 -0.119
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-
ing considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Nearest-neighbour matching results
Table 5.18: Matching results (nearest-neighbour matching)
Unmatched (U) Mean % reduct. t-test V(T)/
Variable Matched (M) Treated Control % bias |bias| t |p>t| V(C)
HHI U 0.481 0.481 0.0 0 0.998 0.89
M 0.480 0.470 4.2 -13362.9 0.28 0.782 1.10
Share in market U 0.333 0.206 40.4 3.52 0.000 0.99
M 0.334 0.381 -14.9 63.2 -0.95 0.346 1.04
Share in market sq. U 0.209 0.142 21.1 1.92 0.055 1.19
M 0.210 0.240 -9.4 55.4 -0.6 0.551 1.22
Share generics U 0.159 0.231 -28.2 -2.27 0.023 0.67
M 0.161 0.189 -10.9 61.4 -0.72 0.475 0.79
No. of active markets U 58.000 28.230 135.2 10.2 0.000 0.45∗
M 58.125 59.976 -8.4 93.8 -0.67 0.503 0.99
No. of active markets sq. U 3660.7 1466.3 103.8 8.41 0.000 0.70
M 3677.7 3898.9 -10.5 89.9 -0.73 0.469 0.99
Av. no. of product form packs U 5.670 4.522 62.0 4.55 0.000 0.37∗
M 5.685 5.855 -9.2 85.2 -0.84 0.404 1.28
Notes: * if the variance ratio is outside the [0.64; 1.55] percentiles of the F-distribution for
U and [0.64; 1.56] for M.
Table 5.19: Matching tests (nearest-neighbour matching)
Sample Ps R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 Mean Bias Median Bias Rubin’s B Rubin’s R %Var
Unmatched 0.344 209.95 0.000 55.8 40.4 182.3∗ 0.17∗ 29
Matched 0.023 5.18 0.638 9.6 9.4 36.1∗ 0.98 0
Notes: ∗ if B>25% and R outside of [0.5; 2].
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Table 5.20: Merger effects by market shares (nearest-neighbour matching)
All <5% 5%-15% 15%-35% >35%
Treatment effect year 1 -0.321 -0.554 -0.957 0.640 -0.577
(0.385) (0.698) (0.970) (0.676) (0.558)
Treatment effect year 2 -0.906 -0.605 -0.674 1.197 -1.950∗∗
(0.641) (2.023) (0.964) (1.051) (0.851)
Observations 3336 444 1488 1140 1320
Treated BUs 80 7 27 20 26
R2 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.017
Adjusted R2 -0.088 -0.199 -0.114 -0.124 -0.096
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-
ing considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
Table 5.21: Merger effects by the presence of overlaps (nearest-neighbour matching)
All Overlap No overlap
Treatment effect year 1 -0.321 0.417 -0.490
(0.385) (0.697) (0.447)
Treatment effect year 2 -0.906 1.117 -1.153
(0.641) (1.018) (0.702)
Observations 3336 528 3024
Treated BUs 80 8 72
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001
Adjusted R2 -0.088 -0.180 -0.091
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-
ing considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table 5.22: Common trend assumption test – Merger effects by market shares
(nearest-neighbour matching)
All <5% 5%-15% 15%-35% >35%
Lead quarter 3 -0.619 -1.267∗ -1.735 -0.0517 -0.339
(0.391) (0.738) (1.187) (1.040) (0.577)
Lead quarter 2 -0.175 -1.633∗ -1.931 0.496 0.621
(0.487) (0.897) (1.322) (1.011) (0.671)
Lead quarter 1 -0.628 -0.265∗∗ -1.998∗ 1.549 -1.263
(0.715) (0.133) (1.198) (1.601) (1.434)
Treatment effect year 1 -0.669 -1.367 -2.353 1.108 -0.814
(0.675) (1.075) (1.854) (1.387) (1.000)
Treatment effect year 2 -1.249 -1.413 -2.079 1.713 -2.178∗∗
(0.846) (2.383) (1.738) (1.780) (0.998)
Observations 3336 444 1488 1140 1320
Treated BUs 80 7 27 20 26
R2 0.001 0.012 0.001 0.003 0.021
Adjusted R2 -0.089 -0.198 -0.116 -0.126 -0.095
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-
ing considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
Table 5.23: Common trend assumption test – Merger effects by the presence of
overlaps (nearest-neighbour matching)
All Overlap No overlap
Lead quarter 3 -0.619 0.950 -0.841∗
(0.391) (1.604) (0.432)
Lead quarter 2 -0.175 0.463 -0.387
(0.487) (1.519) (0.518)
Lead quarter 1 -0.628 0.388 -0.885
(0.715) (1.516) (0.750)
Treatment effect year 1 -0.669 0.863 -1.006
(0.675) (1.825) (0.756)
Treatment effect year 2 -1.249 1.563 -1.664∗
(0.846) (2.121) (0.951)
Observations 3336 528 3024
Treated BUs 80 8 72
R2 0.001 0.001 0.002
Adjusted R2 -0.089 -0.188 -0.092
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-
ing considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table 5.24: Merger effects by the presence of overlaps for market shares above 35%
(nearest-neighbour matching)
All Overlap No overlap
Treatment effect year 1 -0.577 -0.674∗∗∗ -0.539
(0.558) (0.0246) (0.578)
Treatment effect year 2 -1.950∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ -1.987∗∗
(0.851) (0.0246) (0.881)
Observations 1320 144 1260
Treated BUs 26 2 24
R2 0.017 0.011 0.018
Adjusted R2 -0.096 -0.515 -0.099
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-
ing considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
Table 5.25: Merger effects by the presence of overlaps for market shares between 15%
and 35% (nearest-neighbour matching)
All Overlap No overlap
Treatment effect year 1 0.640 0.175 0.174
(0.676) (0.308) (0.406)
Treatment effect year 2 1.197 0.486 0.613
(1.051) (0.768) (0.796)
Observations 1140 240 912
Treated BUs 20 4 16
R2 0.002 0.000 0.001
Adjusted R2 -0.124 -0.319 -0.139
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-
ing considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table 5.26: Common trend assumption test – Merger effects by the presence of
overlaps for market shares above 35% (nearest-neighbour matching)
All Overlap No overlap
Lead quarter 3 -0.339 -0.0958 -0.317
(0.577) (.) (0.584)
Lead quarter 2 0.621 -0.190∗∗∗ 0.679
(0.671) (1.58e-15) (0.709)
Lead quarter 1 -1.263 -0.00899 -1.295
(1.434) (.) (1.441)
Treatment effect year 1 -0.814 -0.747∗∗∗ -0.764
(1.000) (0.0246) (1.011)
Treatment effect year 2 -2.178∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ -2.203∗∗
(0.998) (0.0246) (1.022)
Observations 1320 144 1260
Treated BUs 26 2 24
R2 0.021 0.011 0.022
Adjusted R2 -0.095 -0.565 -0.097
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-
ing considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
Table 5.27: Common trend assumption test – Merger effects by the presence of
overlaps for market shares between 15% and 35% (nearest-neighbour
matching)
All Overlap No overlap
Lead quarter 3 -0.0517 0.723 -1.054
(1.040) (0.926) (0.842)
Lead quarter 2 0.496 -0.0308 -0.342
(1.011) (0.913) (0.369)
Lead quarter 1 1.549 -0.121 0.928
(1.601) (0.913) (1.379)
Treatment effect year 1 1.108 0.316 0.0456
(1.387) (0.962) (0.612)
Treatment effect year 2 1.713 0.627 0.524
(1.780) (1.106) (1.027)
Observations 1140 240 912
Treated BUs 20 4 16
R2 0.003 0.000 0.004
Adjusted R2 -0.126 -0.340 -0.140
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-
ing considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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5.6.5 Robustness check: matching to same period control group
observations only (non-intertemporal kernel matching)
Table 5.28: Matching results (non-intertemporal kernel matching)
Unmatched (U) Mean % reduct. t-test V(T)/
Variable Matched (M) Treated Control % bias |bias| t |p>t| V(C)
HHI U 0.481 0.481 0 0 0.998 0.89
M 0.456 0.493 -48898.5 -0.69 0.493 0.87
Share in market U 0.333 0.206 40.4 3.52 0.000 0.99
M 0.293 0.338 -14.1 65.1 -0.62 0.534 0.8
Share in market sq. U 0.209 0.142 21.1 1.92 0.055 1.19
M 0.179 0.229 -16 24.2 -0.69 0.493 0.84
Share generics U 0.159 0.231 -28.2 -2.27 0.023 0.67
M 0.210 0.109 39.8 -41.2 2.04 0.044 1.61
No. of active markets U 58.000 28.230 135.2 10.2 0.000 0.45∗
M 61.381 61.546 -0.7 99.4 -0.04 0.969 0.86
No. of active markets sq. U 3660.7 1466.3 103.8 8.41 0.000 0.7
M 4103.2 4180.2 -3.6 96.5 -0.16 0.872 0.9
Av. no. of product form packs U 5.670 4.522 62 4.55 0.000 0.37∗
M 5.915 5.854 3.3 94.7 0.2 0.841 1.11
Notes: Results based on matching being limited to control group observations from the same
period. * if variance ratio outside [0.64; 1.55] percentiles of the F-distribution for U and
[0.54; 1.86] for M.
Table 5.29: Matching tests (non-intertemporal kernel matching)
Sample Ps R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 Mean Bias Median Bias Rubin’s B Rubin’s R %Var
Unmatched 0.344 209.95 0.000 55.8 40.4 182.3∗ 0.17∗ 29
Matched 0.040 4.63 0.705 13.2 14.1 47.2∗ 1.42 0
Notes: Results based on matching being limited to control group observations from the same
period. ∗ if B>25% and R outside of [0.5; 2].
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Table 5.30: Merger effects by market shares (non-intertemporal kernel matching)
All <5% 5%-15% 15%-35% >35%
Treatment effect year 1 0.173 0.466∗∗∗ 0.0850 0.792 -0.0189
(0.171) (0.155) (0.184) (0.727) (0.0876)
Treatment effect year 2 0.435 5.062 -1.012∗∗∗ 1.830∗ -0.226∗
(0.710) (3.192) (0.390) (1.061) (0.126)
Observations 1368 192 576 432 384
Treated BUs 42 4 15 13 10
R2 0.002 0.067 0.020 0.021 0.008
Adjusted R2 -0.117 -0.178 -0.134 -0.172 -0.210
Notes: Results based on matching being limited to control group observations from the
same period. Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with
clustering considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
Table 5.31: Merger effects by the presence of overlaps (non-intertemporal kernel
matching)
All Overlap No overlap
Treatment effect year 1 0.173 0.418∗∗ 0.179
(0.171) (0.180) (0.341)
Treatment effect year 2 0.435 3.117 0.120
(0.710) (3.746) (0.671)
Observations 1368 228 1428
Treated BUs 42 5 37
R2 0.002 0.023 0.000
Adjusted R2 -0.117 -0.143 -0.120
Notes: Results based on matching being limited to control group observations from the
same period. Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with
clustering considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
152
Table 5.32: Common trend assumption test – Merger effects by market shares
(non-intertemporal kernel matching)
All <5% 5%-15% 15%-35% >35%
Lead quarter 3 -0.174 -0.0408 -0.282∗ 0.0291 -0.283
(0.114) (0.0869) (0.145) (0.121) (0.244)
Lead quarter 2 -0.225 -0.00773 -0.128 -0.0229 -0.216
(0.262) (0.194) (0.125) (0.244) (0.161)
Lead quarter 1 -0.333 -1.095∗∗ 0.102∗ -0.106 -0.413∗
(0.241) (0.540) (0.0593) (0.111) (0.215)
Treatment effect year 1 -0.00971 0.180∗∗∗ 0.0110 0.768 -0.244∗∗∗
(0.192) (0.0469) (0.212) (0.685) (0.0945)
Treatment effect year 2 0.255 4.776 -1.086∗∗∗ 1.803∗ -0.447∗
(0.674) (3.115) (0.417) (1.048) (0.248)
Observations 1368 192 576 432 384
Treated BUs 42 4 15 13 10
R2 0.002 0.068 0.020 0.021 0.013
Adjusted R2 -0.119 -0.201 -0.140 -0.182 -0.214
Notes: Results based on matching being limited to control group observations from the
same period. Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with
clustering considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
Table 5.33: Common trend assumption test – Merger effects by the presence of
overlaps (non-intertemporal kernel matching)
All Overlap No overlap
Lead quarter 3 -0.174 -0.0635 -0.190
(0.114) (0.0718) (0.237)
Lead quarter 2 -0.225 -0.0270 0.396
(0.262) (0.158) (0.560)
Lead quarter 1 -0.333 -0.853 -0.343
(0.241) (0.618) (0.896)
Treatment effect year 1 -0.00971 0.182∗∗∗ 0.147
(0.192) (0.0411) (0.650)
Treatment effect year 2 0.255 2.881 0.0896
(0.674) (3.624) (0.953)
Observations 1368 228 1428
Treated BUs 42 5 37
R2 0.002 0.023 0.001
Adjusted R2 -0.119 -0.160 -0.122
Notes: Results based on matching being limited to control group observations from the
same period. Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with
clustering considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table 5.34: Merger effects by the presence of overlaps for market shares above 35%
(non-intertemporal kernel matching)
All Overlap No overlap
Treatment effect year 1 -0.0189 0.198∗∗∗ -0.693∗
(0.0876) (4.04e-17) (0.396)
Treatment effect year 2 -0.226∗ 0.0321∗∗∗ -1.225∗
(0.126) (4.38e-17) (0.686)
Observations 384 24 456
Treated BUs 10 1 9
R2 0.008 0.438 0.023
Adjusted R2 -0.210 -0.499 -0.169
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-
ing considered at the firm–level, ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
Table 5.35: Merger effects by the presence of overlaps for market shares between 15%
and 35% (non-intertemporal kernel matching)
All Overlap No overlap
Treatment effect year 1 0.792 0.557∗∗∗ 0.450
(0.727) (0.207) (0.488)
Treatment effect year 2 1.830∗ 9.559∗∗∗ 1.384
(1.061) (3.673) (1.280)
Observations 432 60 420
Treated BUs 13 2 11
R2 0.021 0.137 0.005
Adjusted R2 -0.172 -0.232 -0.201
Notes: Cluster– and autocorrelation–consistent standard errors in parentheses with cluster-




This thesis consists of four essays that show how the design of competition law and its
enforcement might be improved. Chapter 2 develops a new empirical cartel screen to
increase the detection of cartels, and Chapter 3 investigates policy measures to reduce
the harm that tacit collusion after the end of cartels can cause on welfare. Acknowledging
that not all cartels can be detected, Chapter 4 studies how cartel fining rules can be
designed to reduce the welfare damage of cartels by lowering the optimal cartel price.
Finally, Chapter 5 develops an empirical framework to study the occurrence of spillover
effects in multi-market M&As. The framework is used to test for ineffectiveness in
the merger control practice of the EC caused by interdependencies of firms’ market
presences and their effects on market prices.
The new empirical cartel screen developed in Chapter 2 to uncover cartels from analysing
market data is applied to three European markets for pasta products. It successfully
reports the cartels that were present in the Italian and Spanish markets, but does not
wrongly detect signs of collusion in the French market, which was not cartelised. The
new screen is less dependent than existing cartel screens on specific hypotheses with
respect to how cartel behaviour creates collusive markers, and detects the cartels in
Italy and Spain despite the fact that the established price variance-based screens fail
to report any signs of collusion. Based on these results, the new methodology offers
the promise to be a valuable contribution to the growing toolkit of behavioural cartel
screens and to help strengthen deterrence by increasing the risk of detection.
The experimental investigation in Chapter 3 provides insights on the determinants,
consequences, and prevention of PCTC. Tacit collusion after cartels is found to be
linked to preceding cartel success and collusive price hysteresis. As a result, firms in
previously successful cartels appear to be least deterred by exogenous fines based on the
cartel periods only in the presence of PCTC. Further, in its presence some of the most
common methods to estimate cartel overcharges used in private damage litigation are
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subject to a downward bias. As this bias increases with preceding cartel success, private
damage litigation cannot compensate for this deficiency in public enforcement. Erasing
information about the cartel pricing strategies from the industry through removing
key cartel personnel from their positions after detection shows the prospect to disrupt
PCTC and reduce its negative effects on welfare.
The use of endogenous enforcement against cartels that depends on their behaviour to
reduce the harm induced by undetected cartels is experimentally analysed in Chapter 4.
It is found that endogenous expected punishment that increases with the cartel price
can contribute to the strategic uncertainty between cartelists and lead them to choose
lower cartel prices. This is shown in the experiment by offering cartels two equally
profitable cartel prices, of which the lower cartel price features a lower level of riskiness
of collusion. As predicted by the equilibrium concept of Blonski et al. (2011) and
Blonski and Spagnolo (2015), the results show that subjects tend to agree on the low
cartel price, as it offers a less negative payoff in case of being cheated on the agreement.
The essay shows that enhancing composition deterrence – despite currently largely
being overlooked in the context of cartels in favour of frequency deterrence – offers the
promise to reduce the harm caused by cartels. As one cannot hope to be able to detect
all cartels, the strategic design of antitrust enforcement to reduce the cartel price of
undetected cartels can contribute to effective competition policy.
A new empirical framework to conduct ex post evaluations of mergers in clustered data,
in which the treatment applies to either all or none of the market-level observations by
a firm, is developed in Chapter 5. In these environments, spillover effects can induce
a dependence of the effect of mergers on a firm’s market presence in one market on
its presence in other markets. The framework is used to study whether such spillover
effects undermine the effectiveness of the EC’s case practice to evaluate multi-market
mergers in the pharmaceutical industry. The results show that spillovers are present
both between markets in which the parties have different levels of market shares, and
between markets with and without overlaps in market presence prior to the merger.
Significant price reductions are found in markets, in which the market shares of the
parties exceed 35%, but they are partly offset by price increases in markets in which
they feature market shares between above 15% and 35%. Yet, due to a lack of data, no
definite answer can be provided whether significant price reductions found in markets,
in which the parties had no overlapping market presence prior to the mergers, lead
to increases in market prices in markets with overlaps. The findings suggest that
spillover effects need to receive more attention in merger control to ensure that potential
anticompetitive effects of mergers are not overlooked. Further, more research is needed
on the determinants of spillover effects in practice, as they are ex ante hard to predict
for competition authorities with respect to their existence and magnitude.
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